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Abstract  
 
‘Medication Without Harm, WHO Global Patient Safety Challenge’, 
published by the World Health Organization in 2017 calls for action to 
reduce patient harm which occurs as a result of unsafe medication 
practices and medication errors. Medication error related research 
conducted within the Middle East has been noted to be of poor quality. 
The aim of this research was to investigate issues relating to medication 
error causality and suboptimal reporting of medication errors, with the 
intention of contributing to the development of theory informed 
interventions. 
The first phase was a PROSPERO registered systematic review which 
aimed to critically appraise, synthesise and present the available evidence 
around the incidence/prevalence, nature and causes of medication errors 
amongst hospitalised patients in Middle Eastern countries. Findings 
indicated the lack of robust and rigorous research generally, and 
specifically in Qatar. There was a clear need to theory informed primary 
research. 
The second phase collated data recorded in medication error reports 
submitted within Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC), Qatar. The estimated 
incidence of medication errors in HMC, as derived from medication error 
reports was 0.44 per 1,000 medication orders which is lower than 
previous studies published in the region and elsewhere. According to 
Reason’s Accident Causality Model, the vast majority were considered as 
active failures (slips, lapses, mistakes and violations). One further key 
finding was the lack of details recorded in the reports hence limiting any 
synthesis and conclusions. Notably, behaviour change theories could not 
be applied, hence specific targeted research was warranted.  
The third phase comprised qualitative focus groups with samples of health 
professionals in HMC to explore the perspectives of health professionals 
on issues of medication error causes and contributory factors, and error 
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reporting. Theoretical Domains Framework (TDF) determinants suggested 
as being potentially associated with these errors were: social/professional 
role and identity; emotions; and environmental context and resources. 
There was a lack of recognition of nurses’ roles and frequent policy non-
adherence. Stress was perceived to be a major contributor to errors, as 
was excessive workload and lack of staff at key times. Discussions on 
issues of medication error reporting identified a number of facilitators and 
barriers. The TDF domain of emotions featured heavily, with several key 
themes emerging as barriers to reporting: fear and worry; and likely 
investigation follow reporting; impact on evaluation and appraisal 
processes. 
This doctoral research has generated original findings which can be used 
as part of intervention development aiming to improve medication safety 
and optimise medication error reporting system. Future work should now 
focus on the feasibility/piloting phase of the Medical Research Council 
guidelines on complex interventions.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction  
 
 
This chapter provides a description of the structure and key definitions 
within the field of patient safety culture and medication errors. There is a 
narrative review of the published, peer-reviewed literature on medication 
errors in terms of causality, incidence, severity and reporting. There is 
emphasis on patient safety, safety culture, medication errors and error 
reporting in the global context and within the State of Qatar, which was 
the setting for the primary research. The overall aim of the doctoral 
research is stated, along with the aims and research questions of each of 
the research phases.  
1.1 Thesis structure 
This thesis is presented in six chapters. As described above, Chapter one 
provides the background and context to the doctoral research.  
Chapter two describes the methodological and theoretical framework 
underpinning various research phases of this study. This chapter gives 
justification for the philosophical and methodological stances adopted 
throughout. There is consideration of the selection of key methods and 
emphasis on the theoretical frameworks employed. 
Chapter three is a systematic review which aimed to critically appraise, 
synthesise and present the available evidence on the 
incidence/prevalence, nature and causes of medication errors amongst 
hospitalised patients in Middle Eastern countries. The review adopted a 
theory driven approach based on Reason’s Accident Causation Model, and 
a narrative approach to data synthesis. The need for the primary doctoral 
research is highlighted in this chapter, hence providing evidence of the 
original contribution to knowledge described in later chapters.  
Chapter four presents the quantitative phase of the study, giving the 
research aim, methodology, methods, results and discussion. This phase 
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comprises a theory-informed analysis of medication errors reported in 
HMC as part of routine practice.  
Qualitative research conducted in Qatar is presented in Chapter five, 
describing the research aim, methodology, methods, results and 
discussion. Given the lack of qualitative studies identified from the 
systematic review presented in Chapter 3, phenomenologically driven 
focus groups were conducted with groups of health professionals based at 
Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC), Qatar. The qualitative research was 
grounded in theories of behaviour and behavioural change to provide in-
depth understanding and generate rich data.  
Chapter six is the final discussion chapter which collates and considers 
the findings from all three research phases. Academic, societal and 
economic impact is described along with key areas of further research. 
Recommendations are stated to advance patient safety in Qatar and 
beyond. 
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      Figure 1-1 Summary of the structure of the thesis 
 
1.2 Patient Safety 
With the publication of ‘To Err Is Human’ by the ‘Institute of Medicine’ 
(IOM) (now known as the National Academy of Medicine (NAM)) in 1999, 
the scale of harm associated with medical care in the United States of 
America (US) was quantified. The report generated great concern among 
healthcare organisations, key stakeholders, leaders and patients across 
the world. It estimated that each year preventable harm due to medical 
negligence accounted for almost 98,000 lives in USA hospitals alone. This 
led to greater focus on patient safety practices and research globally. (1) 
Introduction 
Methodology
Systematic 
review
Quantitative 
research 
Qualitative 
research 
Discussion 
Conclusion 
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The report called for comprehensive, coordinated efforts by governments, 
healthcare providers, consumers and others to promote patient safety, 
setting a minimum goal of 50% reduction in errors by 2004. Promoting 
patient safety in healthcare settings remains a global challenge, with an 
estimated one in ten patients being harmed whilst receiving care. (2,3) 
Medication errors and their consequences have major economic 
consequences with associated global costs of US$ 42 billion annually. 
(2,4) 
In an effort to raise awareness of key concepts and strategies in patient 
safety, the World Health Organization (WHO) published ‘Medication 
Without Harm, WHO Global Patient Safety Challenge’ in March 2017. (2,3) 
The challenge calls for action to reduce patient harm which occurs as a 
result of unsafe medication practices and medication errors. (2,3) The 
goal is to ‘gain worldwide commitment and action to reduce severe, 
avoidable medication-related harm by 50% in the next five years’, 
specifically by addressing harm resulting from errors or unsafe practices 
due to weaknesses in health systems. The challenge has drawn 
international attention and commitment to develop interventions to 
improve all stages of the medication use processes including prescribing, 
dispensing, administering, and monitoring. (5) Accumulation of evidence 
confirms that healthcare professionals often prescribe, dispense and 
administer medication in ways and circumstances that may increase the 
risk of patient harm. (6-13) The WHO report places emphasis on the need 
to focus attention on organisational safety culture. (3,5,14) 
1.3 Safety culture 
While the terms ‘organisational safety culture’ and ‘safety culture’ have 
appeared in the health-related literature for many years, there has been a 
lack of clear definitions and understanding, with the two terms used 
interchangeably. In 1993, the ‘Study Group on Human Factors’ in the US 
defined organisational safety culture as, ‘the product of individual and 
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of 
behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management’. (15) 
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Much later in 2015, the National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) of the 
US Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) defined safety culture as, 
‘one in which health care professionals and leaders are held accountable 
for unprofessional conduct yet not punished for human mistakes; errors 
are identified and mitigated before they harm patients; and strong 
feedback loops enable frontline staff to learn from previous errors and 
alter care processes to prevent recurrences’. (16) 
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in the US further 
defined patient safety culture as ‘an extent to which beliefs, values, and 
norms shared by staff throughout the organization support and promote 
patient safety’. (17) A positive (or indeed negative) safety culture 
influences the behaviours, perceptions, attitudes and commitment of 
healthcare professionals towards improving patient safety. 
The IOM identifies three core elements of a positive safety culture as, (17) 
1. A belief that despite the high risk involved in healthcare processes, 
they can still be designed to prevent errors.  
2. Organisations’ commitment to detect and learn from errors. 
3. Building a ‘just’ environment where disciplinary actions are taken 
only when an individual intentionally increases risk to patients or 
peers.  
It is clear from all of these definitions and descriptions that a positive 
safety culture encompasses aspects of the shared beliefs, values and 
norms of healthcare staff and that these need to be rewarded, supported, 
expected and accepted.  
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Figure 1-2 Schematic representing key components of safety 
culture  
 
  
Patient Safety 
Culture
The belief, 
values, norms, 
shared by 
healthcare staff
Supported 
Expected 
Accepted
Rewarded
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Several US based patient safety organisations lead developments in 
promoting a positive safety culture. These, and their aims, are described 
in Table 1.1.  
 Table 1-1 Key international organisations promoting safety culture 
Organisation Mission/ Aim 
National Academy of 
Medicine (US) (18) 
To improve health for all by advancing science, accelerating 
health equity, and providing independent, authoritative, and 
trusted advice nationally and globally 
Joint Commission 
International (US) (3) 
To improve patient safety and quality of health care in the 
international community by offering education, publications, 
advisory services, and international accreditation and 
certification 
Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (US) (4) 
To improve health and health care worldwide 
National Coordinating 
Council for Medication 
Error Reporting and 
Prevention (NCCMERP) 
(US) (19) 
To maximize the safe use of medications and to increase 
awareness of medication errors through open communication, 
increased reporting and promotion of medication error 
prevention strategies 
 
Promoting a positive safety culture within healthcare organisations is 
anticipated to contribute significantly to the improvement of patient safety 
practices across the continuum of care through several factors such as 
leadership support, teamwork, evidence-based practice, good 
communication, just culture, learning and patient centred care. It is 
important that organisations adopt a ‘just culture’ (fairly balancing and 
understanding a system failure while observing a professional 
accountability) as opposed to a ‘blame culture’ (blame is centred towards 
an individual). (20) 
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This doctoral research focused on aspects of medication errors within the 
context of safety culture. Given the numerous terms contained within 
reports and publications, the following section defines key related terms 
and highlights those that are adopted throughout this thesis.
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1.4 Medication error definitions and categories 
 
There are many different definitions of the term ‘medication error’, as described in Table 1.2.  
Table 1-2  Key definitions of ‘medication error’ 
M
e
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
 E
r
r
o
r
s
 
Source Definition(s) 
NCCMERP (19) 
"Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient 
harm while the medication is in the control of the health care professional, patient, or 
consumer. Such events may be related to professional practice, health care products, 
procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order communication; product labelling, 
packaging, and nomenclature; compounding; dispensing; distribution; administration; 
education; monitoring; and use.” 
AHRQ (21) 
“A medication error is an error (of commission or omission) at any step along the pathway 
that begins when a clinician prescribes a medication and ends when the patient actually 
receives the medication.” 
NAM (22) “Medication errors are events that may cause harm if inappropriate medication is used.” 
UKMHRA (23) 
“Any patient safety incidents where there has been an error in the process of prescribing, 
preparing, dispensing, administering, monitoring or providing advice on medicines.” 
Bates et al (24) “Any error occurring in the medication use process.” 
Ferner and Aronson (25) 
“A failure in the treatment process that leads to, or has the potential to lead to, harm to 
the patient.” 
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The most widely used definition is that of NCCMERP, ‘any preventable 
event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient 
harm, while the medication is in the control of the health care 
professional, patient, or consumer’. This definition has also been adopted 
by the WHO and IHI. This is also the definition which has been adopted by 
Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC), Qatar, the setting for the primary 
research.  
 
As described in the NCCMERP definition, medication errors can occur at 
any stage of medication use processes. The focus of most of the published 
research on medication errors is illustrated in Figure 1.3.  
 
 
 
Figure 1-3 Stages of most focus of medication error research  
 
Prescribing
Transcribing 
Dispensing Administering 
Monitoring 
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While there are also many different definitions of categories of errors 
associated with each of these stages, the most commonly cited are given 
in Table 1.3. 
Table 1-3: Key definitions of errors at different stages of the medication 
use process  
Term Definition 
Prescribing error (10) 
occurs ‘as a result of a prescribing decision or 
prescription writing process, there is an unintentional 
significant reduction in the probability of treatment 
being timely and effective or increase in the risk of 
harm when compared with generally accepted 
practice’ 
 
Transcribing error 
‘any deviation during the transfer of information from 
an order sheet to documentation forms or medication 
administration records’ 
 
Administration error 
(26) 
“any deviation from the prescriber's medication order 
as written on the patient's chart, manufacturers’ 
preparation/administration instructions, or relevant 
institutional policies” 
 
Dispensing error (11) 
“to all errors occurring during the process of 
dispensing medication as included in the identified 
research papers, which are detected within the 
pharmacy (prevented dispensing incidents) and after 
the medication has left the pharmacy (un prevented 
dispensing incidents)” 
 
Monitoring error(27) 
when ‘a prescribed medicine is not monitored in the 
way which would be considered acceptable in routine 
general practice’ 
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1.5 Medication error reporting  
While accepting that some medication errors are inevitable due to the 
many factors including nature of the processes, the dynamic environment 
of healthcare and the human component, it is essential that there are 
effective and efficient reporting processes and systems to facilitate rapid 
learning and changes in practice preventing further errors. This is 
important within the framework of safety culture. 
Both the IOM and NCCMERP have strategic aims that highlight the value 
of effective and efficient medication error reporting systems and practices 
in reducing error prevalence and severity. (19,28) Two key goals of 
NCCMERP are to: stimulate the development and use of medication error 
reporting systems by healthcare organisations; and to stimulate the 
review and analysis of error reports leading to the development of 
recommendations to reduce, and ultimately prevent, errors. (19) The 
strategies stated for achieving these goals in relation to medication error 
reporting are to: 
1. Heighten awareness of reporting systems available to or within 
health care organizations 
2. Stimulate and encourage reporting and sharing of medication errors 
both nationally and locally 
3. Develop standardization of classification systems for the collection 
of medication error reports so that databases will reflect reports 
and categorization systems 
4. Encourage systems and provide targeted feedback so that 
appropriate prevention strategies can be developed and 
implemented in facilities. 
There is, however, evidence of widespread and significant under-reporting 
of medication errors by healthcare professionals. (20) 
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1.6 Narrative literature review 
Given the large number of publications within the medication errors 
literature, this section presents the key findings of systematic reviews in 
the field of medication errors (and their subcategories) across the world, 
ending with a description of those originating from the Middle East. 
Previous systematic reviews have highlighted the heterogeneity of studies 
in terms of error definitions, methods of measurement and outcome 
measures, (6,12,29-31) hence a narrative approach to data synthesis was 
selected a-priori. 
The following method was used to search and review the literature. 
The search was conducted using Cumulative Index of Nursing and 
Cumulative Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), Medline, PubMed and 
Science Direct. Search terms were (medication errors OR prescribing 
errors OR dispensing errors OR administration errors OR transcribing 
errors) AND (systematic reviews or meta-analysis). The period of the 
search was from 2008-2018, as the study team anticipated that, because 
an overwhelming majority of systematic reviews were published in the last 
10 years that captured sufficient data on medication errors from all 
previous studies. The reference lists of all identified papers were also 
reviewed to identify additional studies. The data extraction tool was 
developed to extract the following: authors, year of publication, 
aim/objective, inclusion dates, and key findings in terms of incidence 
reported and the stated recommendations and limitations. 
All systematic reviews that quantified incidence or prevalence of 
medication errors and/or provided information regarding causes or 
contributory factors associated with medication errors were included.  
Systematic reviews published on specific mediations or solely on non-
hospitalised patients (ambulatory care, outpatients, emergency etc.) were 
excluded from the review.  
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Figure 1-4 Summary of the structure of the thesis 
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Table 1-4: Data extraction of evidences from systematic reviews of medication errors 
Evidence from systematic reviews of medication errors  
A
u
th
o
r
(
s
)
, 
p
u
b
li
c
a
ti
o
n
 
y
e
a
r
 
Stated review aim/objective 
Literature 
inclusion 
dates 
Key findings and 
reported 
incidence/prevalence/rate/ 
frequency/percentage 
Stated key limitations and 
recommendations 
A
la
n
a
z
i,
 M
. 
A
. 
e
t 
a
l.
, 
2
0
1
6
 
(2
9
) 
To systematically investigate 
the literature regarding the 
prevalence and incidence of 
prescribing errors in high-risk 
medicines in inpatient settings. 
1985 
to May 2015 
Key findings 
 
• 9 studies were included 
• Majority of the studies originated 
from western countries 
• Medication orders as denominator 
was most frequently used among 
the studies 
Prevalence: 0.24 to 89.6 per 100 
orders 
 
• Language limitations.  
• Small number of studies and low 
sample size makes it difficult to 
generalise.  
• There was heterogeneity in 
prescribing error definitions, and 
the use of and error severity scales. 
 
A
ls
h
e
h
ri
, 
G
. 
H
 e
t 
a
l.
, 
2
0
1
7
  
To provide an up to-date and 
critical appraisal of the 
epidemiology and nature of 
medication errors and adverse 
drug events in this setting. 
January 1999 to 
October 2016 
Key findings 
 
• 20 studies were included 
• Medication errors were frequently 
associated with psychotropic and 
antipsychotic medications  
 
Rate: 10.6 to 17.5 per 1000 patient-
days 
 
• Studies identified heterogeneity in 
the denominator used, the 
population involved, and the 
outcome definition. Studies differed 
in data presentations and 
classification of drugs 
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A
ls
u
la
m
i,
 Z
.,
 
2
0
1
3
 (
3
0
) 
 
To identify and review studies 
of the incidence and types of 
medication errors in Middle 
Eastern countries and identify 
the main contributing factors. 
 
Inception to 
October 2011 
 
Key findings 
 
• 45 studies were included from 
10/15 middle eastern countries  
• Majority of the studies were on 
prescribing errors followed by 
administration errors.  
• Poor knowledge of medicines was 
identified as a major contributory 
factor for errors 
• Majority of studies did not assess 
the severity of medication errors  
 
Rate: Prescribing error – 7.1 – 90.1%  
         Administration error – 9.4 - 80% 
 
 
• Might have missed some important 
studies as only studies in English 
language were included.  
• High data heterogeneity and 
different types of data reporting, 
interpretation, and classification 
systems were used. 
F
e
in
s
te
in
, 
M
.,
 e
t 
a
l.
, 
2
0
1
8
  
To determine the rate of 
medication error paediatric 
anaesthesia. 
January 2004 to 
December 2018 
Key findings 
 
• 22 studies were included 
• High heterogeneity among the 
articles included  
 
Rate: 0.08% (95% CI 0.05 
‐0.10%) 
• Significant heterogeneity in 
definition among studies caused 
inconsistencies in measured 
outcome.  
• Majority of studies took place in 
academic hospitals which limits 
generalisability to private hospitals 
• Future studies should adhere to 
NCCMERP definitions to avoid 
inconsistencies  
G
a
te
s
 P
J,
 
2
0
1
8
(3
2
) 
To review the incidence and 
severity of preventable adverse 
drug events (pADEs) resulting 
January 2000 to 
December 2017 
Key findings 
 
• 22 studies were included 
• Severity reported were mostly 
minor 
• Heterogeneity among studies did 
not allow pooling of data and meta-
analysis.  
• A strict inclusion criterion limited 
the number of studies  
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from medication errors in 
paediatric inpatient settings. Incidence: 0-17 pADEs per 1000 
patient days or 1.3% of medication 
errors (of any type) 
J 
A
ls
a
id
a
n
, 
2
0
1
8
 (
3
3
) 
To identify, summarise, review 
and evaluate published studies 
on medication errors, drug 
related problems and adverse 
drug events in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries. 
1 January 1990 
to 31 August 
2016 
Key findings 
 
• 54 studies were included 
• No qualitative studies 
• Prescribing errors were reported 
highest. 
 
Incidence: 8.5–16.9/100 admissions 
• No quality threshold was in place 
for inclusion of studies.  
• Heterogeneity in definitions used 
did not allow pooling of data and 
meta-analysis.  
• Severity of harm caused due to 
medication errors was not assessed.  
K
e
e
rs
, 
R
. 
N
.,
 
2
0
1
3
 (
1
2
) 
To systematically review and 
appraise empirical evidence 
relating to the causes of 
medication administration 
errors (MAEs) in hospital 
settings.  
1985 to May 
2013 
Key findings 
 
• 54 studies were included 
• Causes of medication errors were 
categorised into Reason’s model 
of accident causation.  
• Slips and lapses were the most 
commonly reported unsafe acts, 
followed by knowledge-based 
mistakes and deliberate 
violations. 
• Error Provoking conditions 
associated were poor 
documentation, heavy workload, 
and distractions etc., 
• Latent factors like cultural issues 
managerial issues were less well 
explored.  
• Causes were described superficially, 
mostly related to quantitative 
surveys and observational studies. 
Limited used of qualitative studies 
or causation framework theories.  
• Only papers published in English 
language were selected, some 
relevant studies may have been 
missed.  
• More studies with theoretical 
pathways are needed to explore the 
multiple system factors linked to 
errors with emphasis on 
interventions designed to minimise 
medication administration errors.  
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L
e
w
is
, 
P
. 
J 
2
0
0
9
 (
6
) 
To systematically review the 
prevalence, incidence and 
nature of prescribing errors in 
hospital inpatients. 
1985 to October 
2007 
Key findings 
 
• 64 studies were included  
• Majority of the studies were from 
the university affiliated hospitals 
in UK and USA. 
• Most of the studies were carried 
out on adults. Data collectors 
were mostly pharmacists.  
  
Error Rates - 2–514 per 1000 items 
prescribed and 4.2–82% of patient 
charts 
• Poor classification of errors 
among the studies.  
• Lack of standardization between 
severity scales made it 
impossible to compare results 
directly. 
• The lack of standardization 
between different studies, 
especially around definitions and 
data-collection methods, was a 
barrier to understanding the 
extent of prescribing errors  
M
a
ti
n
, 
B
. 
K
, 
e
t 
a
l.
, 
2
0
1
8
  
To estimate the 1-year period 
prevalence of medication errors 
and the reporting rate to nurse 
managers among nurses 
working in hospitals in Iran. 
January 2000 to 
May 2017 
Key findings 
 
• 13 studies were included 
• High heterogeneity among the 
articles included  
 
Period prevalence: 53% (with a 
range of 17–88%) 
• Results may not be generalizable to 
other countries.  
 
M
e
k
o
n
n
e
n
, 
A
. 
B
 
2
0
1
8
 (
3
4
) 
To systematically investigate 
the literature on the extent of 
medication errors and adverse 
drug events, and the factors 
contributing to medication 
errors in African hospitals. 
From inception 
to 31 August, 
2017 
Key findings 
 
• 51 studies were included 
• Prescribing errors were reported 
highest. 
• contributory factors reported were 
individual factors, and heavy 
workload 
 
Percentage: 8.4% ADE at hospital 
admissions 
• No thematic analysis for causes of 
medication errors  
• Limiting the search to English 
language 
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M
e
ts
ä
lä
, 
E
 e
t 
a
l.
, 
2
0
1
3
 (
3
5
) 
Systematically reviewed studies 
to find out what kind of 
medication errors happen in 
elderly acute care. 
2001 to 2011 Key findings 
 
• 20 studies were included 
• Most common causes of errors 
were nursing competency, 
prescription and patient related 
factors, organisational factors and 
culture 
• Search was limited to studies 
published in English and Finnish 
only 
 
M
il
le
r,
 M
. 
R
 
2
0
0
7
 (
3
6
) 
To synthesise peer reviewed 
knowledge on children’s 
medication errors and on 
recommendations 
to improve paediatric 
medication safety by a 
systematic literature review 
1 January 2000 
to 30 April 2005 
Key findings 
 
• 31 studies were included  
• Majority of the studies were from 
the university affiliated hospitals 
in UK and USA. 
• Most of the studies were carried 
out on adults.  
  
Error Rates - prescribing 3-37%, 
dispensing 5-58%, administering 72-
75%, and documentation 17-21 
• Differing definitions of numerator 
and denominator 
• Lack of consistent definition of 
medication errors 
• Poor methodology 
• Short data collection period  
• Poor generalisability of the data 
• Future research should use 
standardised definition, 
methodology and data collection.  
R
o
s
s
, 
S
.,
 
2
0
0
8
 (
1
3
) 
A systematic review of the 
current published evidence to 
answer the research question 
‘how many prescribing errors 
are committed by junior 
doctors’ was undertaken. 
1990 to 2007 Key findings 
 
• 24 studies were included  
• Majority of the studies were from 
the hospitals in UK and USA and 
Canada. 
  
Error Rates - 2–514 per 1000 items 
prescribed and 4.2–82% of patient 
charts 
• Considerable variation was 
observed in design, methods, 
error definitions and error rates 
reported. 
• Future research should be well 
constructed and generalizable 
using standard definitions and 
methods. 
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S
a
lm
a
s
i,
 S
 e
t 
a
l.
, 
2
0
1
5
 (
3
7
) 
To systematically identify and 
review research done on 
medication errors in Southeast 
Asian countries in order to 
identify common types of 
medication errors and estimate 
its prevalence in this region.  
From inception 
to December 
2014 
Key findings 
 
• 17 studies were included 
• Majority of the studies focussed 
on administration errors and 
prescribing errors 
• Staff shortages, heavy workload 
distraction, and misinterpretation 
of the prescription/medication 
chart were the main causes that 
lead to medication errors. 
• Only 41% of the studies were 
labelled as good quality. 
  
Rate: medication administration errors: 
15.2 to 88.6% 
 
Prescribing errors: 7 - 35.4% 
• No data related to incidence and 
nature of medication errors among 
half of the south east Asian 
countries.  
• Difficult to generalise the data as 
there is paucity of data from 
economically developed southeast 
Asian countries.  
• There was heterogeneity in 
approach to data collection.  
 
• Southeast Asian countries and 
suggests that a collective and 
standardized effort is needed to 
improve the reporting and 
documentation of ME with the aim 
of minimising the occurrence of 
such errors. 
 
T
u
ll
y
, 
M
. 
P
.,
 
2
0
0
9
 (
7
) 
To identify all informative 
published evidence concerning 
the causes of and factors 
associated with prescribing 
errors in specialist and non-
specialist hospitals, collate it, 
analyse it qualitatively and 
synthesize conclusions from it. 
1985 to July 
2008 
Key findings 
 
• 16 studies were included  
• Majority of the studies were from 
the university affiliated hospitals 
in UK and USA.  
• Causes were grouped according to 
Reasons Model of Accident 
Causation. Active failures 
occurred mostly due to lack of 
knowledge with the medication or 
the patient. Error provoking 
conditions occurred mainly due to 
• High data heterogeneity and 
different types of data reporting, 
interpretation, and classification 
systems were used. 
• Studies that used observational 
methods might be subjected to 
Hawthorne effect; studies with 
interviews might have had social 
desirability bias.  
• Further studies using in-depth 
qualitative interviews should be 
conducted in order to investigate 
the actual cause and 
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lack of experience, heavy 
workload, fatigue, poor 
communication etc. Latent failure 
included reluctance to question 
senior administrators, inadequate 
training provisions etc.  
• Prescribing errors were 
multifactorial, and the most 
common types reported 
multifactorial nature of error 
causation.  
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It is clear from these systematic reviews that medication errors (of all 
categories) are still highly prevalent and that there are a number of 
complex and inter-related causative factors. Notably, there have been no 
systematic reviews specifically on aspects of medication error reporting. 
Two of the systematic reviews described medication error studies 
conducted in the Middle East. (30) In 2013, Alsulami et al. published a 
systematic review of studies up to and including 2011 on the incidence 
and types of medication errors and main contributory factors in Middle 
Eastern countries. While noting that error rates were difficult to compare 
due to being expressed differently, prescribing errors ranged from 7.1% 
of prescriptions in a teaching hospital to 90.5% of prescriptions in a 
primary healthcare centre. Poor knowledge of medicines was identified as 
a contributory factor for errors by doctors and nurses. One limitation of 
this review was the lack of any theories of error causation in the synthesis 
stage. Furthermore, the review highlighted that published papers from 
Middle Eastern countries were relatively few and generally of poor quality. 
A later systematic review was published in 2018 summarising the 
incidence and nature of medication errors, drug related problem and 
adverse drug events reported among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates). Almost all errors (91%) were related to prescribing issues in 
primary care facilities. The most common types of errors were dosing 
errors, error of omission and reconciliation errors.  
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1.7 Qatar  
 
This section provides an overview of healthcare system in Qatar to provide 
context for the primary research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-5: Qatar 
1.7.1 Demographics  
Qatar is a sovereign Arab emirate occupying 11,571 km2 of land in the 
Gulf of Persia and shares borders with Saudi Arabia to the west and 
United Arab Emirates to the south. (38) Qatar is one of the wealthiest and 
affluent countries in the world with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita exceeding US $101,500. The economy largely depends on natural-
gas and oil reserves. Data collated from Qatar’s Ministry of Development 
Planning and Statistics reveals that of the 2.6 million inhabitants, only 
about 12% are native Qataris with the remainder being expatriates from 
neighbouring countries, notably India (20%), Nepal (13%), Philippines 
(10%), Pakistan (7%) and Sri Lanka (5%). Qatar is one of the fastest 
growing populations in the world and has an average life expectancy of 
78.5 years (38-41). 
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1.7.2 Healthcare Delivery in Qatar 
The first hospital in Qatar was opened in 1945, followed by the first state 
funded hospital (Rumailah Hospital) in 1957 with 157 beds. Hamad 
Medical Corporation (HMC), a non-profit health care provider, was 
established by decree from the Emir of Qatar in 1979 to provide medical 
facilities and treatment to the people of Qatar (42,43). 
While the country predominantly relies on expatriate healthcare 
professionals to work in modern healthcare facilities, the government has 
invested in human resource development by encouraging, educating and 
training Qatari nationals and providing scholarship opportunities for 
pursuing careers in the healthcare sector (39,43). The quality of 
healthcare in Qatar is generally of a high standard and compares 
favourably to the standards of western countries. Over the last few years, 
the government has invested heavily in developing an ‘ultra-modern 
healthcare sector’. A report from Alpen Capital (a financial advisory group) 
has noted that, in 2016, the healthcare spending growth in Qatar was 
highest in the Gulf region (44).  
1.7.3 Qatar’s National Health Strategy 2018-2022 
The Qatar National Vision (QNV) 2030, published in 2008, is a long-term 
national strategy that guides economic, social, human and environmental 
reforms in the state of Qatar. ‘Human Development’ is one of the four 
pillars of the Qatar National Vision, which is strategically driven to guide 
Qatar’s ambition to develop a healthy population through a National 
Health Strategy. The strategy outlines the commitment to building an 
integrated healthcare system to develop a world-class healthcare system 
and provide world-class treatment modalities and improve patient safety. 
The first strategy was launched in 2011 followed by an updated strategy 
in 2018. This is designed to meet the healthcare needs of current and 
future generations, to deliver comprehensive patient centred care through 
patient empowerment, teamwork, leadership and intelligence and thus 
embed a culture of patient safety and quality (45,46). There are, 
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however, several key healthcare related challenges as illustrated in Figure 
1.5. 
 
Figure 1-6: Challenges to the healthcare system  
 
1.7.4  Structure of Healthcare Services under Ministry of 
Public Health  
 
Unlike, other high-income countries where people are the main source of 
healthcare funding, in Qatar, healthcare costs are predominantly financed 
by government revenues, providing free treatment to the nationals and 
heavily subsidized treatments to all residents. The Ministry of Public 
Health (MoPH) is Qatar’s highest health authority, which is responsible to 
plan and advise national healthcare priorities, to regulate and monitor 
healthcare systems and provide services to meet the national healthcare 
needs. The MoPH has a vision to create a healthcare system that will 
provide the most effective and advanced healthcare to its people and to 
be a model for the world to follow. Under the regulation of MoPH, the 
healthcare system in Qatar is primarily divided into private and public 
healthcare sectors. Healthcare services are currently structured as:  
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Primary health care centres: providing basic curative care and preventive 
healthcare through 23 primary healthcare facilities situated at different 
locations.  
Specialized and teaching hospitals: HMC is one of the main providers of 
secondary and tertiary care healthcare. HMC manages twelve hospitals, 
nine of which are specialty hospitals and the remainder community 
hospitals. HMC also provides national ambulance services and residential 
care services. 
Private hospitals and clinics: Six main private hospitals (Al Ahli Hospital, 
Al Emadi Hospital, Doha Clinic Hospital, American Hospital, Turkish 
Hospital, Aster Hospital) with inpatient facilities and several private day 
care clinics are also operated under the regulations of MoPH.  
Some of the non-medical government ministries also provide medical care 
to their staff, such as Ministry of Interior, Qatar Armed Forces and Amiri 
Guard, Qatar Petroleum (QP) etc. The healthcare system is summarised in 
Figure 1.6 
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Figure 1-7: Structure of the healthcare system in Qatar
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1.8  Medication error reporting and monitoring at 
Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC) 
 
By international standards, HMC is the only healthcare organisation outside 
the US to have all hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission International 
(47,48).  
The Medication Safety and Quality Center (MSQC) was established in 2016 to 
monitor medication safety practices within HMC. The centre is committed to 
prevent medication related harm and develop interventions to improve 
medication safety practices and further strengthen the pharmacovigilance 
practice at HMC. MSQC has developed a methodical system for reporting, 
monitoring, analysing, disseminating the incidents reported across HMC.  The 
centre is a full member of the International Medication Safety Network 
(IMSN), an international organisation committed to preventing medication-
related harm and contribute to safer healthcare (49). 
Medication error reporting within HMC is policy driven (CL 7045: Managing 
and Reporting Medication Errors and Near Misses) (Appendix 1.1) and has 
recently migrated from a paper-based reporting to an electronic system 
(Cerner/RL6).  HMC mandates all errors to be reported to the supervisory 
team immediately and should be reported to the incident monitoring system 
within 24hrs. The policy also states that the incident reports will be handled 
in a confidential manner and the documentation will be accessible to 
authorised personals only. All healthcare professionals are eligible to report 
the incidents. The completed reports are reviewed for appropriateness by the 
facility medication safety officers and then forwarded to the corporate MSQC. 
The MSQC then collates and reviews the completed reports and analyses 
them for quantity, quality, causality, seriousness and conducts root causes 
analysis for the significant preventable harm (Figure 1.7) 
The centre summarises the reports and submit their reports and 
recommendations on a monthly basis to the pharmacy executive office. The 
pharmacy executive director informs the risk management, hospital quality 
and patient safety committee, and to the MoPH for further actions. 
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Figure 1-8: Process flow of medication error reporting, monitoring and dissemination at HMC
MSQC, Medication Safety & Quality Centre; P&T, Pharmacy and Therapeutic Committee;  
QPS, Quality and Patient safety; MoPH, Ministry of Public Health  
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1.9 Rationale for the doctoral research on medication 
errors  
 
The recent WHO report highlights that medication errors continue to be a 
global issue with significant impact on patient care and patient safety. Of the 
two systematic reviews on aspects of medication errors specifically conducted 
within the Middle East, only few studies originated from Qatar. There is 
therefore a need for further research, particularly primary research using 
qualitative methodologies, since there were no such studies from Qatar 
captured within the systematic reviews. It was anticipated that the research 
would provide an in-depth understanding of medication errors and related 
causes thus potentially contribute to developing interventions aimed at 
reducing medication errors while also improving error reporting.  
The overall aim of the doctoral research was to investigate issues relating to 
medication error causality and suboptimal reporting of medication errors, 
with the intention of contributing to the development of theory informed 
interventions. 
Phase 1 
The aim of this phase was to critically appraise, synthesise and present the 
available evidence on the incidence/prevalence, nature and causes of 
medication errors amongst hospitalised patients in Middle Eastern countries. 
The key review questions were: 
➢ What is the incidence/prevalence/rate/frequency of medication errors 
amongst hospitalised patients? 
➢ What is the nature (e.g. classification, severity) of these errors? 
➢ What are the causes or contributory factors (e.g. workload, lack of 
knowledge, poor communication) leading to these errors? 
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Phase 2 
The aim of this phase was to collate data recorded in medication error 
reports. 
The specific objectives were to: 
1. Estimate the incidence of medication errors derived from submitted 
error reports 
2. Describe the nature and severity of medication errors from submitted 
error reports 
3. Explore the causative factors documented on medication error reports 
 
Phase 3 
The aim of this phase was to explore the perspectives of health professionals 
on issues of medication error causes and contributory factors, and error 
reporting. 
The specific objectives were to explore: 
1. Experiences of medication errors according to Reason's Accident 
Causation Model 
2. Potential behavioural determinant of medication errors 
3. Potential behavioural determinants of reporting of medication errors 
1.10 Summary and conclusion 
This introductory chapter provides and overview of the thesis and sets the 
stage for subsequent chapters. Prior to the research it was important to know 
about Qatar, its healthcare sector, current medication safety practices, 
background, what has been already published and what needs to be 
addressed more around this topic.  
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Chapter 2 : Research methodologies 
and theories 
This chapter provides a brief overview of research philosophy and research 
paradigms in general, and application throughout this doctoral research. 
There is consideration and justification of the methodological approaches, 
with emphasis on research methods and issues of outcome measures, 
sampling and sample size. The need to embed theory throughout the 
research and the selection of the theoretical frameworks are also described.  
2.1 Research philosophy 
Derived from Greek for ‘love of wisdom’, philosophy is described as the 
‘development of logical reasoning that incorporates contemporary ideas with 
previously established methods of thought through structural phases’. (50) 
Creswell (51,52) describes four philosophical concepts to be considered at 
the outset of any research study.  
1. Ontology, the nature of reality and its characteristics, classified on 
the basis of objectivity and subjectivity. Researchers embrace the idea 
of multiple realities and report on these multiple realities by exploring 
multiple forms of evidence from individuals’ perspectives and 
experiences. 
2. Epistemology, how researchers know what they know. Researchers 
try to get as close as possible to participants being studied. Subjective 
evidence is assembled based on individual views. 
3. Axiology, the role of values in research, concerned with judgement 
and ethics. Researchers make their values known in the study and 
actively report their values and biases.  
4. Methodology, the theoretical framework of the methods used in the 
research processes. (52) 
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2.2 Philosophical paradigms 
The term ‘paradigm’ can be described essentially as, ‘a collection of beliefs 
and concepts’. (52,53) Bowling(54) and Cresswell (52)  take this further, 
stating that a paradigm is the ‘process of scientific practice based on people’s 
philosophies and assumption about the world and the nature of knowledge’.  
While research paradigms can be described in an array of complex 
categories, these can be simplified into three distinct categories which each 
related to accepted scientific frameworks. These are,  
• Positivism, which advocates a single reality which can be measured 
hence, aligns to quantitative methods.  
• Constructivism or interpretivism where there is no single reality or 
truth hence needs to be interpreted, aligning more to qualitative 
methods.  
• Pragmatism where reality is constantly renegotiated, debated, 
interpreted. The best method to use is the one that solves the 
problem.  
The links between philosophical concepts and paradigms is illustrated in 
Table 2.1.  
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Table 2-1: Features of research paradigms (adapted from Guba and Lincoln 
1994, Onwuegbuzie 2004 , Bowling 2009, and Creswell 2013). 
 
 Positivism Constructivism Pragmatic 
O
n
to
lo
g
y
 
Researcher may 
not be able to 
understand reality it or 
get to reality because of 
lack of absolutes 
Reality is thought to be 
local and specific 
constructed 
Reality is what is 
useful, is practical, and 
‘works’ 
E
p
is
te
m
o
lo
g
y
 
What we know can only 
be approximated. 
Interaction with research 
subjects is kept to a 
minimum 
What is known is 
constructed 
between the researcher 
and 
the participants and 
shaped by individual 
experiences 
 
What is known is 
discovered through using 
many tools of research 
 
A
x
io
lo
g
y
 
Researchers’ biases 
are not expressed 
Individual values are 
honoured, and are 
negotiated among 
individuals 
Values are discussed 
because of the way 
that knowledge 
reflects both the 
researchers’ and the 
participants’ views 
M
e
th
o
d
o
lo
g
y
 
Experiments/surveys 
Verification of 
hypotheses; chiefly 
quantitative methods 
Researcher is a 
‘passionate 
participant’; chiefly 
qualitative methods 
Research process 
involves both 
quantitative and 
qualitative 
approaches to data 
collection and 
analysis 
 
 
 
This doctoral research was conducted in three specific phases aligned to the 
research aims. The field work of primary data collection (error analysis) in 
phase two aligned to positivism and phase three data generation (focus 
groups) to constructivism. These are described in further detail in Table 2.2 
The methodological approach in this doctoral research is best described as 
‘multimodal’, combining different methodologies appropriate to specific 
research outcomes. This is in contrast to a ‘multimethod’ approach which 
combined methodologies relating to the same or similar, linked research 
objectives. (52,53) 
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Table 2-2: Summary of the distinct research paradigms employed in this 
research  
 
Characteristic Positivist Constructivist 
Research approach 
Quantitative (deductive) Qualitative (inductive) 
 
Research methodology 
Cross-sectional  Phenomenology 
 
Research method 
 
Analysis of medication 
error reports  
Focus groups 
Study sample 
 
Entire population studied 
and then sampled for 
further analysis 
Purposive sample  
Data analysis 
 
Descriptive analysis 
 
Descriptive and 
framework approach 
 
2.3 Evidence synthesis through systematic review  
The first phase of this research was a systematic review of the published 
literature on aspects of medication error studies conducted in the Middle 
East. This was conducted for several reasons:  
• to identify key gaps in the literature 
• to explore methodological strengths and weaknesses of the specific 
studies 
• to inform later stages of the research.  
 
Systematic reviews and metal-analyses of the data from randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) at the top of the evidence-based medicine pyramid, 
as shown in Figure 2.1. While the systematic review described in Chapter 3 
was conducted and reported according to best practice, this was a review of 
quantitative, observational studies and qualitative studies and not RCTs. The 
evidence generated from such a review would therefore sit further down the 
evidence hierarchy. 
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Figure 2-1: Hierarchy of evidence (adopted from Markman and Callanan 
1984(56), Greenhalgh 1997(57)) 
 
A systematic review is defined as a ‘a review of the evidence on a clearly 
formulated question that uses systematic and explicit methods to identify, 
select and critically appraise relevant primary research, and to extract and 
analyze data from the studies that are included in the review’(58). 
Systematic review differs from narrative literature reviews, as described in 
Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2-3: Comparison of narrative and systematic reviews (adapted from 
Cook et al, 1997).  
Feature Narrative review Systematic review 
Question Broad Scope, overview 
Focussed, specific 
 
Search  Not usually specified Comprehensive and explicit 
Appraisal  Variable 
Robust and rigorous; checklist 
driven  
Synthesis  Narrative only 
Meta-analysis, meta-synthesis, 
narrative; answers question  
Inferences Sometimes evidence-based Always evidence-based  
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Greenhalgh stated that systematic reviews will: 
• limit bias 
• generate valid and reliable conclusions 
• deliver required information to healthcare providers, researchers, and 
policymakers 
• generate new hypotheses about subgroups of the study population. 
(59) 
 
Key characteristics of a systematic review are: 
• a clearly defined review question 
• an explicit, reproducible method with clear study inclusion and 
exclusion criteria  
• a systematic search that attempts to identify all studies meeting the 
eligibility criteria 
• an assessment of the validity of the findings of the included studies 
• a systematic presentation, and synthesis, of the characteristics and 
findings of the included studies (58) 
2.4 Quantitative versus qualitative methodologies 
 
Research methodologies are categorised as quantitative or qualitative (or 
mixed); key characteristics of how these are described within healthcare 
related research are provided in Table 2.4. Essentially, quantitative research 
involves collecting numerical data that are analysed using mathematically 
based methods. In contrast, qualitative research generates in-depth and rich 
textual or audio-visual data allowing understanding, interpreting and 
describing phenomena. Quantitative and qualitative approaches are being 
increasingly used in healthcare related research to allow both a numerical 
analysis and in-depth description. 
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Table 2-4: Comparison of qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
(adapted from Bowling, Creswell) 
Characteristic Quantitative Qualitative 
Research aim 
To quantify, classify, count, 
correlate, construct and test 
statistical models  
Provides a detailed and 
rich description  
Design 
All aspects of the study are 
designed carefully before data 
are collected 
 
May be planned in advance 
or emerge and adapt as 
the study unfolds 
Sample 
Tend to be large sample sizes Tend to be small sample 
sizes 
 
Data gathering, 
collection 
The researcher uses tools 
(e.g. questionnaires, 
equipment) to collect data 
 
The researcher is the data-
gathering instrument 
Form of data 
Data are in the form of 
numbers and statistics 
Data are in the form of 
words (interviews), 
pictures (videos) or objects 
(artifacts) 
Data 
Quantitative data are able to 
test hypotheses, but may miss 
contextual data 
Qualitative data are richer 
but should not be 
generalized  
 
Phase two of this research employed a quantitative approach to analyse data 
routinely collected through medication error report and phase three a 
qualitative approach to explore and describe aspects of medication errors and 
their reporting.  
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2.5 Quantitative methodologies 
 
While there are many subcategories of quantitative methodologies, these can 
be described more generally as being either experimental or cross-sectional. 
Experimental methodologies (correlational, causal) assume that the cases 
being studied can be manipulated in order to measure a change or a 
difference. (60) These methodologies are described in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2-5: Quantitative research methodologies  
 
Common quantitative 
methodologies 
Description 
Cross-sectional (e.g. surveys) 
Describes real-life situations to determine 
meanings (e.g. frequencies, mean, standard 
deviation) of phenomena, and describe and 
categorise information  
 
Experimental (correlational) 
(e.g. cohort studies, case-
control studies) 
Explores relationships between variables to 
determine the degree of relationship without 
manipulating an intervention (Walker, 2005; 
Burns and Grove, 2011) 
 
Experimental (causal) (e.g. 
randomised controlled trials) 
Manipulates an independent variable and 
observes the outcome on a dependent variable 
whilst attempting to keep other unrelated 
variables constant  
 
 
A quantitative, cross-sectional survey methodology was selected for phase 
two. Surveys allow the researcher to make certain inferences about the study 
population. In phase two, a data collection from was developed to extract 
data routinely reported on medication error forms.  
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2.6 Qualitative methodologies 
 
As noted earlier, qualitative methodologies set out to gather and report non-
numerical data. While there are many different methodological approaches, 
the five most frequently reported are described in Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2-6: Description of the five common qualitative methodologies 
Methodology Description 
Narrative 
 
Spoken or written text of a single event or a series 
of events which are chronologically connected  
 
Phenomenology 
Provides an in-depth understanding of the lived 
experience of individuals by exploring the meaning 
of a ‘phenomenon’ 
 
Grounded theory 
Sets out to develop a theory constructed from the 
data of participants with an experience of the 
phenomenon  
 
Ethnography 
Describes and interprets human cultures with the 
aim of getting an in-depth understanding of a 
particular culture  
 
Case study 
Explores a case (or multiple cases) through in-
depth data generation involving multiple sources of 
information  
 
In phase three, the intention was to report the lived experiences of health 
professionals around the phenomena of medication errors and their 
reporting. A phenomenological methodology was particularly appropriate for 
this phase of the research as it focuses on the meaning and values of the 
lived experiences of the research participants. Phenomenological research 
methods are also anticipated to generate in-depth discussions between the 
participants and thus generate rich contextual data providing more real-life 
resonance in terms of issues identified in the earlier phases of the doctoral 
thesis.  
 
 
 
 49 
  
Qualitative methods 
The three most common qualitative methods are participant observation, 
focus group discussions and in-depth interviews (Bowling 2009, Creswell 
2013). Strengths and weaknesses of each are summarised in Table 2.7. In 
this phase, providing the opportunity for discussion between participants was 
considered useful hence focus groups were selected. 
Table 2-7: Features of participant observation, focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews 
Method Strengths Weaknesses 
Participant 
observation 
 
• Allows the researcher to directly 
see what participants actually do 
• The researcher can determine 
what does not occur 
• The researcher may observe 
events and happenings that 
escape the awareness of the 
participants 
• May provide information on 
things participants would be 
unwilling to talk about 
 
• Sampling of settings and 
participants may be problematic 
• Some settings and content cannot 
be observed 
• Collection of unimportant material 
may be moderately high 
• Reactive effects may occur when 
participants know they are being 
observed 
• May place researcher at risk 
 
Focus groups 
 
• Useful for exploring ideas and 
concepts 
• Provides an opportunity for 
participants to discuss issues 
amongst each other 
• Researcher can assess how 
participants react to each other 
• Allows researcher probing 
 
• May be difficult to find a focus 
group moderator with good skills 
• Reactive effects may occur if 
participants feel they are being 
watched or studied 
• Recruitment may be difficult in 
certain groups 
• Participants may be influenced by 
each other 
In-depth 
interviews 
• Allows probing and posing of 
follow-up questions by the 
researcher 
• Closed-ended interviews can 
provide exact information needed 
by researcher 
• Useful for exploration as well as 
confirmation 
 
• Can be expensive and time 
consuming 
• Researcher effects may occur 
(e.g., untrained interviewers may 
distort data because of personal 
biases and poor interviewing 
skills) 
• Participants may not recall 
important information and may 
lack self-awareness 
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Focus group discussions were considered the most appropriate as the 
discussion amongst the participants would provide an interdisciplinary 
perspective of the experiences of the healthcare team or across a range of 
interdisciplinary individuals at different roles/grades. While individual 
interviews would provide depth of understanding of individuals’ life 
experiences, there would be no opportunity for exchange of information 
between the participants (52,53) 
2.7 The use of theory in research  
 
There is a trend of the increasing use of theory within healthcare research 
generally and pharmacy practice research specifically. Theory is defined as 
‘…an explanation of a phenomenon arrived through examination and 
contemplation of the relevant facts; a statement of one or more laws or 
principles which are generally held as describing an essential property of 
something’. (62) Theories can help to explain, predict, and understand 
phenomena and, in many cases, to challenge and extend existing knowledge. 
Theories can also connect pieces of research data to generate findings which 
fit into a larger body of other studies.  
Two ‘theories’ were used in this research: Reason’s Accident 
Causation(63,64) as described in Chapter 1 and the Theoretical Domains 
Framework (TDF)(65-67), which is an integrative framework developed from 
other theories hence is not a theory in itself. Reason’s Accident causation 
model was applied in phases two and three and TDF in phase three. 
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2.7.1 The Theoretical Domains Framework 
 
Evidence suggests that behavioural change interventions using a theoretical 
basis are far more effective than those developed using a more pragmatic 
approach. Whereas many other theories focus on individual factors (such as 
a belief, motivation etc.), the Theoretical Domains Framework (TDF) is an 
integrative framework developed from a synthesis of psychological theories 
aimed to propose interventions aimed at behaviour change. The TDF was 
developed by a group of psychological theorists, health service researchers 
and health psychologists. It is derived from 33 theories of behaviour change, 
comprising 14 domains and 84 constructs that allows synthesis of a 
multitude of coherent behavior change theories into a single, integrative 
framework. TDF allows assessment and explanation of behaviour and 
associated barriers and enablers and inform the design of appropriately 
targeted interventions. (65-67) 
 
In the current research TDF was applied to characterise the determinants of 
a range of behaviours and to identify the barriers and facilitators that 
influenced the medication error reporting and causality at HMC.  
 
The TDF domains and their descriptors are given in Table 2.8.  
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Table 2-8: The Theoretical Domain Framework (adapted from Atkin et al)  
Domain Examples 
Knowledge An awareness of the existence of something 
 
Skills An ability or proficiency acquired through practice 
 
Social/Professional role and 
identity 
A coherent set of behaviours and displayed personal 
qualities of an individual in a social or work setting 
 
Beliefs about capabilities Acceptance of the truth, reality, or validity about an 
ability, talent, or facility that a person can put to 
constructive use 
 
Optimism The confidence that things will happen for the best 
or that desired goals will be attained 
 
Beliefs about consequences Acceptance of the truth, reality, or validity about 
outcomes of a behaviour in a given situation 
 
Reinforcement Increasing the probability of a response by arranging 
a dependent relationship, or contingency, between 
the response and a given stimulus 
 
Intentions A conscious decision to perform a behaviour or a 
resolve to act in a certain way 
Goals Mental representations of outcomes or end states 
that an individual wants to achieve 
 
Memory, attention and 
decision processes 
The ability to retain information, focus selectively on 
aspects of the environment and choose between two 
or more alternatives 
 
Environmental context and 
resources 
Any circumstance of a person's situation or 
environment that discourages or encourages the 
development of skills and abilities, independence, 
social competence, and adaptive behaviour 
 
Social influences Those interpersonal processes that can cause 
individuals to change their thoughts, feelings, or 
behaviours 
 
Emotion A complex reaction pattern, involving experiential, 
behavioural, and physiological elements, by which 
the individual attempts to deal with a personally 
significant matter or event 
 
Behavioural regulation Anything aimed at managing or changing objectively 
observed or measured actions 
 53 
  
2.7.2 James Reason’s Accident Causation Model 
 
The historical person-centred approach to error used in healthcare and other 
industries is based on the philosophy that errors occur due to human 
weakness. (68-70) This approach was widely criticised for being blame 
oriented, wherein an individual is deemed completely responsible for errors 
and not providing attention to system-related issues. In 1990, James Reason 
introduced the ‘accident causation model’, a system centred model focusing 
on the principle that errors occur due to flaws in the much larger system and 
that humans are just a small part. (64) Prior to its use in the healthcare, this 
model was initially used in nuclear industry, aviation industry etc. (69) 
Several studies have previously adapted the accident causation model to 
understand medication errors and medication non-adherence. (70-74) 
According to this model, a system is compared to a knife that has a sharp 
end (active failures) and a blunt end (latent failures). Active failures mostly 
occur due to frontline workers, they are unsafe acts that are conducted by 
people who are in direct contact with the patients or the system itself. Active 
failures are subcategorised as slips, lapses, mistakes and violations. While 
‘slips’ and ‘lapses’ occur when a right plan is executed incorrectly, ‘mistakes’ 
and ‘violations’ happen when an incorrect plan is formulated and then 
followed. Active failures do not occur in isolation, but instead are believed to 
have a casual history and occur due to error provoking conditions that lie 
deep rooted within the system (latent failures). Error provoking conditions 
such as lack of knowledge among the staff, busy working environment etc. 
are anticipated to occur due to latent failures such as poor organisational 
policies or lack of budget for training and development. Latent failures are 
considered as inevitable and they lie dormant within the system, these 
mostly occur due to wrong strategic decisions, incorrect planning at top level 
management. Understanding such errors are important as they lead to 
proactive management and prevent errors and thus promote patient safety. 
(64,69,70)   
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Table 2-9: James Reason’s Accident Causation model, with descriptions of 
types of failures  
Reasons Accident Causation model with illustrations  
Slips  
When a step of the plan is performed wrongly, e.g. choosing 
a wrong medication from the shelf during dispensing  
Lapse  
When a step of a plan is missed or omitted, e.g. omitting 
prescribing a medication following reconciliation  
Mistakes  
Occurs due to misapplication of rules or lack of knowledge, 
e.g.  prescribing a wrong dose or medication due to lack of 
knowledge 
Violations 
Occurs when a person intentionally chooses not to follow the 
rule or policy (may not be with a purpose to cause harm, but 
to save time or achieve something more easily), e.g. 
prescribing an unauthorised medication to save time; not 
following the hospital policy/guideline while prescribing, 
dispensing or administering a medication  
 
Error provoking 
conditions  
Active failures result from the error provoking conditions 
such as patient factors, individual, team, environment etc.  
Latent failures  
Error provoking conditions are hidden within the 
organisational and surrounding culture, e.g. lack of budget to 
hire staff and provide training, lack of transparency among 
the healthcare professionals and patients, lack of resources 
to manage drug information questions etc.  
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Figure 2-2 James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model illustrating the consequences 
of failures aligning. 
 
2.8 Robustness and rigour  
 
2.8.1 Robustness in quantitative research 
 
The criteria adopted to promote robustness in quantitative research are 
internal validity, external validity and reliability.  
Validity is considered to be, ‘the accuracy and truth of the data being 
produced in terms of the concepts being investigated’ (61). Internal validity 
relates to the research processes and the data collected, while external 
validity (also termed generalisability) relates to the extrapolation of research 
findings and conclusions from a study sample population at large within or 
beyond the study setting (61). While there are a number of categories of 
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internal validity, those employed in this study were face and content. Face 
validity considers the extent to which a data collection tool covers the 
concepts it aims to measure in terms of transparency or relevance and 
content validity the extent to which the tool represents all facets of a given 
construct (61). Reliability is referred to as, the extent to which results are 
consistent over time.  
2.8.2 Rigour in qualitative research 
 
The concepts of validity and reliability are quantitative, measurable and not 
applicable to qualitative studies. While there are many approaches to 
considering rigour in qualitative research Shenton’s is a comprehensive 
approach that incorporates Guba’s pursuit of a trustworthiness in a study.  
 
Shenton (153) describes four criteria to consider in relation to qualitative 
research trustworthiness, as described in Table 2.10.  
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Table 2-10: Components of trustworthiness [Adapted from Shenton et.al 
(2004)] 
 
In qualitative research, threats could also include reactivity and bias from the 
researcher as well as from the participant. To overcome this, a qualitative 
researcher must include a variety of strategies (such as reflexivity, prolonged 
engagement, triangulation, peer debriefing etc) to ensure that the findings 
represent the meaning as described by the participants. Reflexivity is one of 
the key factors to enhance the rigour and trustworthiness of qualitative 
research, allowing understanding of the ways in which the researcher’s 
beliefs, experience and identity intersect with that of the participant. 
Reflexivity is defined as an ‘active acknowledgement by the researcher that 
her/his own actions and decisions will inevitably impact upon the meaning 
and context of the experience under investigation’. (153) 
Several key factors pertaining to reflexivity were considered in the doctoral 
research, such as the doctoral researchers influence on the participants’ 
responses, study design (prospective reflexivity), professional history, 
Trustworthiness Description 
Credibility Similar to validity by ensuring that findings are an accurate 
reflection by: employing well-established methodologies and 
methods; providing detailed description of the phenomenon 
under investigation; encouraging participant honesty through 
direct instructions, developing rapport, and giving 
opportunities for withdrawing from the study; and meeting 
with team members frequently for debriefing sessions and 
peer review 
Dependability Similar to reliability, described as the extent to which similar 
findings would be obtained had the study been repeated 
exactly 
 
Transferability Similar to external validity, described as the extent to which 
findings can be applied to other contexts and settings. 
Promoted by providing detailed information to allow readers 
to judge the applicability of findings to their own context.  
 
Confirmability Relates to the extent to which findings have emerged from 
the data gathered rather than the biases and preconceived 
notions of the researchers 
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collegial relationships, selection of research design, approach to interviews 
and data collection etc.) 
 
Further approaches to promoting validity, reliability and trustworthiness are 
described throughout this thesis. 
 
2.9 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the underlying methodological concepts which are 
applied in all phases of the research. Figure 2.3 describes the methodological 
approaches applied throughout this research. The specific research methods 
are described in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
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Figure 2-3: Methodological phases of current research
Phase One - systematic review 
illustrating the gap in the 
literature and providing strong 
justification for the need of 
current research in Qatar
Phase Two - Medication Error 
Analysis is a Quantitative 
phase, retrospective data 
analysis exploring the  current 
status of medication error 
reporting process in HMC, Qatar 
Phase Three - Focus group 
discussion of health 
professionals is a Qualitative 
phase with paradigm, 
constructivism methodology 
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Chapter 3 : A systematic review of 
incidence/prevalence, nature and 
causes of medication errors among 
hospitalised patients in Middle 
Eastern countries 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the introduction, aim, method and discussion of a 
PROSPERO (International Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews) 
registered systematic review of incidence/prevalence, nature and causes 
of medication errors among hospitalised patients in Middle Eastern 
countries. As described in Chapter One, in 2013 Alsulami et al (30)  
published a systematic review including all studies published up to and 
including 2011 on the incidence/prevalence and contributory factors of 
medication errors in Middle Eastern countries. The review highlighted that 
published papers from Middle Eastern countries were relatively few and 
generally of poor quality. Since publication of that review, many more 
studies have been published hence it was timely to update the review 
prior to the collection and generation of primary research in Qatar.  
The systematic review conducted within this doctoral research also 
extended that of Alsulami et al. by applying a theory-based approach, 
centred on Reason’s Accident Causation Model (64), to the stage of data 
synthesis. Furthermore, this review highlighted gaps in the literature, thus 
providing a basis for the doctoral primary research. 
3.2. Review aim and questions 
 
This review aimed to critically appraise, synthesise and present the 
available evidence on the incidence/prevalence, nature and causes of 
medication errors amongst hospitalised patients in Middle Eastern 
countries. 
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The key review questions were: 
 
➢ What is the incidence/prevalence/rate/frequency of medication 
errors amongst hospitalised patients? 
➢ What is the nature (e.g. classification, severity) of these errors? 
➢ What are the causes or contributory factors (e.g. workload, lack of 
knowledge, poor communication) leading to these errors? 
3.3. Methods  
 
A systematic review protocol was developed according to best practice, 
mapped to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis Protocols (PRISMA-P) guidelines on developing systematic 
review protocols. (75) Following peer review within the doctoral 
supervisory team, the protocol was registered with the International 
Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews (PROSPERO). (76) The review 
aimed to capture both quantitative and qualitative studies. Studies on 
incidence and nature of errors will have employed quantitative designs 
while studies of causes or contributory factors may have employed 
quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods designs. 
3.3.1 Inclusion criteria 
 
Population 
 
The review considered original primary research involving health 
professionals (specifically doctors, nurses or pharmacists) that reported 
the incidence/prevalence/rate/frequency, nature, severity, factors or 
causes of medication errors amongst hospitalised patients in any of the 16 
Middle Eastern countries. Studies of hospital practitioners (or other key 
stakeholders such as risk managers) were also included.  
 
Types of interventions, comparators 
There were no interventions or comparators as would be the case in 
reviews of effectiveness or cost-effectiveness. 
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Outcome(s) 
Quantitative outcomes were related to each of the review questions as 
follows: incidence/prevalence/rate/frequency of medication errors, the 
nature (e.g. classification, severity, patient outcomes) of errors; and 
causes and contributory factors leading to errors. Qualitative outcomes 
were around the causes and contributory factors. 
3.3.2 Exclusion criteria 
 
Studies of adverse drug reactions which were not classified as medication 
errors were excluded, as were review articles, letters, opinion papers, 
editorials and conference abstracts (due to lack of sufficient study details 
to allow critical appraisal and data extraction), Studies which employed a 
pre-, post-intervention design were also excluded due to the difficulty in 
quantifying incidence as part of data extraction and synthesis.  
 
3.3.3 Study design 
 
All study designs were included: 
1. Quantitative designs - randomised controlled trials which may have 
captured data on incidence, nature and causes, non-randomised 
comparative studies, observational studies, cohort studies and 
before and after studies, surveys.  
2. Qualitative designs - narrative, phenomenology, grounded theory, 
ethnography, case studies, action research.  
3. Mixed methods design. 
 
Language 
Due to the difficulty in translation from other languages to English, only 
papers in English were included.  
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Capture dates 
All papers published from 2000 until the end of March 2018 were included 
in the review.   
3.3.4 Search terms  
 
Search terms were: 
• medic* OR prescrib* OR dispens* OR administ* 
 
   AND 
 
• Error* OR incident* OR mistake*  
 
   AND 
 
• Middle East OR Saudi Arabia OR Qatar OR United Arab Emirates OR 
Kuwait OR Bahrain OR Oman OR Palestine OR Israel OR Iran OR 
Iraq OR Syria OR Lebanon OR Egypt OR Jordan OR Turkey OR 
Yemen  
Search terms were generated from a number of sources: the previous 
systematic reviews published around medication errors described in 
Chapter 1; the title and keywords from key papers in the field; and from 
Google Scholar scoping search and from the references of published 
literatures. These search strings were also used to search Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH®).  
3.3.5 Databases 
 
 
To ensure adequate performances in search, the review included MEDLINE 
(including Epub ahead of print), PubMed, Embase, CINAHL (for nursing 
and allied health sciences), Science Direct and Google Scholar were used. 
The narrative review reported in Chapter one identified that almost all of 
the systematic reviews in the medication errors field had used at least 
three of these databases.  
 
Table 3.1 describes the different databases included in the review.    
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Table 3-1: Description of all databases searched  
Database Description 
Year 
started 
 
Scope 
 
Medline 
Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System Online (a subset of 
PubMed), or MEDLARS Online is a bibliographic database of life 
sciences and biomedical information. It includes bibliographic 
information of articles from academic journals covering medicine, 
nursing, pharmacy, dentistry, veterinary medicine, and health care. 
1964 
Contains over 26 million records from 
more than 5,600 selected journals in 
40 plus languages. 
PubMed 
PubMed is an online version of Index Medicus produced by the US 
National Library of Medicine. It covers back to 1966 and selectively to 
1809. 
1996 
Has more than 27 million references 
including Medline. 
Science 
Direct 
Science Direct is operated by Elsevier. It covers articles from 1823 
that include information on topics from Physical Sciences and 
Engineering Life Sciences Health Sciences Social Sciences and 
Humanities. 
 
1997 
Has more than 12 million references 
from 3,500 academic journals and 
34,000 e-books. 
Embase 
A biomedical and pharmacological database that covers literature 
related to Pharmacology and Pharmaceutical Science; 
Pharmacoeconomics; Toxicology; Evidence-Based Medicine; 
Environmental Health Research and Policy Management. 
 
1947 
Covers 32 million records over 8,500 
journals. 
CINAHL 
The Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature 
(CINAHL) is one of the most comprehensive databases used by 
nursing and allied healthcare professionals. It covers articles from 
1981 on topics over 50 nursing specialties, speech and language 
pathology, nutrition, general health and medicine and more. 
 
1961 
Covers more than 5.8 million records 
from 5,500 journals. 
CDSR 
The Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) is leading 
resource for systematic reviews and protocols in healthcare. It covers 
systematic reviews related to primary research in human health care 
and health policy. 
 
2005 Contains over 10000 records. 
Google Scholar and reference lists of all included studies were searched for potentially relevant studies 
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3.3.6 Screening and selection 
 
Independent, duplicate screening of titles, abstracts and full papers in 
relation to the review aim (detailed description of the search is given 
PRISMA flowchart describing systematic review), questions and inclusion 
criteria was independently performed by two reviewers. Disagreements 
were resolved by consensus and referred to a third reviewer whenever 
required.  
3.4. Assessment of methodological quality 
Papers were assessed for methodological quality and bias by two 
independent reviewers prior to inclusion in the review. Disagreements 
were resolved by consensus and referred to a third reviewer whenever 
required. The STROBE checklist (STrengthening the Reporting of 
OBservational studies in Epidemiology) was adapted and adopted as a 
quality assessment tool. STROBE is a reporting tool developed in 2004 by 
an international, collaborative initiative of epidemiologists, 
methodologists, statisticians, researchers and journal editors involved in 
the conduct and dissemination of observational studies. (77) While 
STROBE was developed for quantitative studies, it was also used in this 
review (with further minor adaptations) for any qualitative studies. The 
specific criteria were: 
 
• Is there a clear statement of research aim?  
• Is the research setting described?  
• Is the term ‘medication error’ defined?  
• Are categories of medication errors stated?  
• Are medication error categories defined?  
• Is the denominator defined (for studies reporting incidence etc.)  
• Are data collection methods clearly described? 
• If the sampling method described and appropriate?  
• Is there consideration of reliability and validity?  
• Are issues of generalisability considered?  
• Are study limitations discussed? 
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This tool was selected for the systematic review based on the level of 
details described in the methods and results section. This tool is also 
endorsed by over 100 high quality journals and the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors. Given that a small number of 
qualitative studies were identified, the STROBE tool was adapted for these 
studies to include reference to research trustworthiness rather than the 
aspect of validity and reliability. This also provided for consistency of 
presentation of quality assessment findings between the quantitative and 
qualitative studies. 
3.5. Data extraction 
A data extraction tool was developed to extract the following: authors; 
country of publication/study; year of publication; study population; 
setting; recruitment; incidence; nature of errors; causes of errors. Data 
extraction was also performed by two independent reviewers, as per 
quality assessment. 
3.6. Data synthesis  
Synthesis is a key part of systematic reviews and refers to collating, 
combining and summarising the findings of individual studies. Pooling of 
data derived from quantitative studies was inappropriate due to the 
observational study designs and major differences in approaches to 
measurement of study outcomes hence the findings were presented in 
narrative form using the approach described by Popay et al. (78) While it 
had been intended that qualitative research would be pooled using a 
meta-synthesis approach, only two qualitative studies were identified.  
 
The results were presented in tables and data was transformed and 
expressed in numerical values, in percentages, median and interquartile 
ranges wherever necessary. Data related to causes were expressed using 
a theoretical framework model using Reason’s Accident Causation model. 
(64,70)  
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3.7. Results  
3.7.2 Literature search 
 
Database searching and review of reference lists yielded 452 articles, 110 
of which were duplicates and excluded. Review of titles and abstracts 
excluded a further 129 papers, with reviewing the full papers excluding 
79. Fifty papers were included in the quality assessment stage. The 
PRIMSA flowchart is given in Figure 3.1. Of the fifty studies, 48 were of a 
quantitative design and two were qualitative in nature. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Records identified through 
database searching  
(n=445) 
 
Additional records identified 
through other sources 
 (n=7) 
 
Records after duplications removed 
(n=342) 
 
Titles and abstract screened 
(n=342) 
 Titles and abstracts excluded  
• Not investigating 
incidence/prevalence/ 
rates or causes/ factors 
associated with errors  
• (n=112) 
• Review/editorial articles 
(n=36) 
• Not relevant to hospital 
settings (n=65) 
 
Total studies included in the 
final synthesis 
(n=50) 
 
Full text articles screened 
for eligibility 
(n=129) 
 Full texts excluded due to 
irrelevant focus, full text in 
Arabic, not originating from 
Middle East, studies using 
pre-and post-interventional 
methods (n=79) 
 
Quantitative  
 (n=48) 
 
Qualitative  
 (n=2) 
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 Figure 3-1: PRISMA flowchart describing systematic review search and study 
selection 
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3.7.3 Quality assessment  
 
Of the 50 studies, none met all 11 STROBE-related quality assessment 
criteria. Thirteen studies (26%) met eight or more criteria, 21 (42%) 
between five and seven criteria, and the remaining 16 (32%) meeting four 
or less. Key limitations centred on lack of justification for the method of 
sampling and sample size, and not adequately considering issues of data 
validity and reliability (quantitative studies) and trustworthiness 
(qualitative studies). Quality assessment is given in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3-2: Quality assessment of studies included in the review 
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Al-Jeraisy,et al 2011, SA (79) Y Y P N N Y Y P N Y Y 
Abbasinazari et al, 2013, Iran (80) Y P N Y P Y Y N N N N 
Abbasinazari et al, 2013, Iran (81) Y Y Y P P Y P N N P P 
Abdar et al, 2014, Iran (82) Y Y Y P P NA Y Y Y P Y 
Al Ramahi et al, 2017, Palestine (83) Y Y Y N N Y Y Y NA Y Y 
Alakahli  et al  et al, 2014, Yemen (84) Y Y N P N Y Y P N Y Y 
Al-Dhawailie et al, 2010, SA (85) Y Y Y N N Y Y P N Y Y 
Al-Hajje et al, 2012, Lebanon (86) Y Y Y P P Y P P N P Y 
Aljadhey et al, 2013, SA  (87) Y P Y P P Y Y P P Y Y 
Ali S et al, 2017, SA (88) Y Y Y Y Y N Y N NA Y Y 
Alshaikh et al, 2013 SA (89) Y Y Y P P Y Y P Y Y Y 
Al-Shara et al, 2011, Jordan (90) Y Y Y P N NA Y Y N N Y 
Arabi et al, 2012, SA  P P Y P P P Y P N N Y 
Al Tehewy et al, 2016, Egypt (91) Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y 
Bagheri-Nesami et al, 2015, Iran (92) Y Y Y P P Y Y P  P P Y 
Cheragi  et al, 2013, Iran (93) Y Y N N N NA N N N Y Y 
Dabaghzadeh  et al, 2013, Iran (94) N Y Y Y P P P P P N Y 
Dibbi  et al, 2006,  SA (95) P P N N N P P N N P P 
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Ehsani  et al, 2013. Iran (96) Y Y Y P P NA Y N N N P 
El-Shazly  et al, 2017, Egypt (97) Y Y Y N P P P P N P P 
Fahimi  et al,  2009, Iran (98) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y P P P Y 
Fahimi  et al, 2008, Iran (99) P P P P P P P N N P P 
Fahimi  et al, 2015, Iran (100) Y Y Y Y P P P N P P P 
*Farzi  et al, 2017, Iran (101) Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y Y 
Fathi  et al, 2017 Iran (102) Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Gharekhani  et al, 2014, Iran (103) P P Y P P Y P N N Y P 
Gorgich  et al, 2016, Iran (104) Y Y Y N Y NA P P N P P 
Güneş  et al, 2014, Turkey (105) Y Y Y P P NA P P N Y P 
Hamishehkar  et al, 2014, Iran (106) Y Y Y N N P P P P P P 
Hammoudi  et al, 2017,  SA (107) Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y 
Hammour  et al, 2016, Jordan (108) Y Y Y Y Y N Y N NA Y Y 
Kandil  et al, 2012, Egypt (109)  Y p Y Y P Y P P N N N 
Khammarnia  et al, 2015, Iran (110) Y Y N N N N Y N P N Y 
Lustig  et al, 2000, Israel (111) Y Y N P P Y P N N N P 
Ali MA  et al, 2017, Egypt (112) Y Y N Y N N Y N NA Y Y 
Mrayyan et al, 2012, Jordan (113) Y Y Y Y P NA Y N N Y Y 
Mrayyan  et al,  2007, Jordan (114) Y Y Y N P NA Y Y Y Y Y 
Pawluk  et al, 2017, Qatar (115) Y Y Y P P N P P N P Y 
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*Pazokian  et al, 2014, Iran (116) Y Y N N N NA Y Y Y Y Y 
Sadat-Ali  et al, 2010,  SA (117) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N NA Y N 
Saravi  et al, 2015, Iran (118) Y Y N P P Y Y N N N N 
Shahrokhi  et al, 2014, Iran (119) Y Y Y N N NA Y P P Y P 
Shehata  et al, 2015, Egypt (120) Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y P Y 
Shohani  et al, 2018, Iran (121) Y Y N N N N Y P Y N Y 
Suleiman  et al, 2017, Jordan (122) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N NA Y Y 
Toruner  et al, 2012, Turkey (123) Y Y Y N N N Y N N Y P 
Vazin  et al, 2012, Iran (124) Y Y N P P Y P P Y Y P 
Vessal  et al, 2010, Iran (125) Y Y Y N Y P Y N Y P Y 
Youssif  et al, 2013,  SA (126) Y Y Y NA NA NA Y N N N N 
Zeraatchi et al, 2013, Iran (127) Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Y – Yes ,                             N – No ,                       NA – Not Available,         P – Partially available                         SA – Saudi Arabia     
*  indicates - qualitative studies 
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3.7.4 Data extraction and synthesis  
 
The first paper included in the review was published in 2000 (111), with 
most (80%, n=40) being published subsequently to the review of Alsulami 
et al. Figure 3.2 illustrates the increase in numbers of publications on 
medication errors in recent years.  
 
 
Figure 3-2 Medication error research, publications per year 2000-March 
2018 
 
3.7.5 Country of origin  
 
Almost half of the studies were conducted in Iran (23, 46%), with the 
next being Saudi Arabia (10, 20%). Five studies (10%) were conducted in 
each of Egypt and Jordan, with two (4%) from Turkey and one each (2%) 
from Israel(111), Qatar, Yemen, Palestine (83) and Lebanon. There were 
no publications with data from more than one country.  
3.7.6 Setting 
 
Almost three quarters of the studies (33, 66%) were conducted in 
university-affiliated or academic hospitals (institutions that combine 
services of a hospital with education and research of health professional 
students), with just one fifth (10, 20%) tertiary care, non-teaching 
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hospitals, and less (3, 6%) in general hospitals. Three studies (3, 6%) did 
not state the type of hospital in which the study took place and one study 
used a national online database with data reported from different 
hospitals. Within each hospital, a range of specific patient groups were 
targeted, mostly adults, and the most common type of wards chosen were 
intensive care units. 
3.7.7 Study aims  
 
In more than half of the studies (26, 52%) the primary research aim was 
to determine the incidence/prevalence/frequency/rate of medication 
errors (or a sub-category of medication errors). Fewer focused on the 
causes of medication errors (16, 32%). Eight studies (16%) reported data 
relating to incidence/prevalence/frequency/rate and causes of medication 
errors.  
3.7.8 Definition of Medication Errors or subcategories 
 
The definition of medication errors (or sub-categories of medication 
errors) was inconsistent. Of 50 studies, 17 different definitions were used 
that differed markedly in wording and content. The most widely used 
definition was that of the National Coordinating Council for Medication 
Error Reporting and Prevention (NCCMERP) (128) in the United States (20, 
40%). Ten studies (20%) adopted non-standardised definitions from 
previous studies or provided their own definition. Three studies (3, 7%) 
used the definition of medication errors as per Aronson et al (25). Two 
studies (5%) on prescribing errors used the definition of the American 
Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) (129). One study each used 
definitions provided by Dean et al, Bates et al (130) and Institute of 
Medicine (22). Twelve studies (24%) did not provide a clear definition of 
either medication errors or the sub-category being reported. 
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Table 3-3: Definitions of medication errors or subcategories of medication errors 
Source 
Error 
Classification 
Definition 
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Prescribing errors 
“A prescription error was defined as an incorrect or inappropriate drug selection (based on indications, 
contraindications and other factors), dose, route, rate of administration, or frequency. A prescription error 
also included illegible handwriting, an incomplete order (missing the dose, route, or frequency), 
incompatibility, incorrect instructions for using the drug product, and the use of non-standard nomenclature 
or abbreviations that requires further interpretation” (79). 
 
“A medication error is defined as any error in the medication uses process, whether there are adverse 
consequences”. 
 
“…therefore, medication error is defined as any type of error in the prescription, transcription, dispensing 
and administration process which could bring about serious consequences”(90).  
“…any medication administered or prepared in a way that deviates from the prescription chart, the 
manufacturer’s instructions and hospital policy which can be prevented and may cause injury to the 
patient” (96). 
 
“…any preventable event at each stage of pharmacotherapy process, such as prescription, transcription, 
distributing medication, and administration” (101). 
 
“Medication prescribing errors are defined as discrepancies between intended medication order and the 
prescription. There have been many reports concerning drug errors published in the medical literature 
including drug usage, prescribing practices and poor system design in medical practice which can result in 
occurrence of adverse drug events” (111). 
 
“Medication errors are broadly defined as errors in prescribing, dispensing or administration of a drug, 
irrespective of whether such errors lead to adverse consequences or not” (117).  
 
“A disorder in the treatment process, which is followed by a potential or actual risk of hazard for patient”. 
 
“Disregarding the status of forming a damage, or risk, any avoidable incidence to occur during the process 
from medication request to patient monitoring” (123). 
 
“Mistakes associated with drugs and intravenous solutions that are made during the prescription, 
transcription, dispensing, and administration phases of drug preparation and distribution” (126). 
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Medication 
Administration 
Errors 
"A medication error is any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or 
patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer. 
Such events may be related to professional practice, health care products, procedures, and systems, 
including prescribing, order communication, product labeling, packaging, and nomenclature, compounding, 
dispensing, distribution, administration, education, monitoring, and use"  
“A deviation from a prescriber's valid prescription or the hospital's policy in relation to drug administration, 
including failure to correctly document the administration of a medication (91). 
Dean B (130) Prescribing errors 
“A clinically meaningful prescribing error occurs when, as a result of a prescribing decision or prescribing 
writing process, there is an unintentional significant (1) reduction in the probability of treatment being 
timely and effective or (2) increase in the risk of harm when compared with generally accepted practice” 
(86,130). 
 
Aronson et.al 
(25) 
Medication errors 
“A medication error is ‘a failure in the treatment process that leads to, or has the potential to lead to, harm 
to the patient” (94,103,127).  
 
Bates et. Al 
(131) 
 
Medication errors 
“Errors occurring at any stage in the ordering or delivering processes of medications” (108).  
 
Institute of 
Medicine (22) 
 
Medication errors 
“Medication errors are events that may cause harm if inappropriate medication is used”. 
ASHP(129) Prescribing errors 
“Prescribing error was defined as incorrect drug selection, dose, dosage form, frequency, route, or 
instructions. Incorrect drug selection was based on indication, contraindication, known allergies, existing 
drug therapy, and other factors”.  
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From this point forward, data extraction and synthesis are presented 
together in relation to the specific review questions.  
3.7.9 Review question 1 - Incidence/prevalence/ of 
medication errors 
 
Of 32 studies quantifying medication errors, the most common methods of 
data collection were via review of medication charts or records 
(prescribing, dispensing and administration) (n=11, 31%) or by analysis 
of data from an error or incident monitoring system (n=9, 28%). Only one 
study employed multiple approaches to data collection. Data collection 
periods ranged from 20 days to two years. Data extraction of the 32 
studies is provided in Supplementary Table 2.   
 
Inconsistencies in definitions of ‘medication error’, ‘prescribing error’ etc., 
together with the vast range of approaches to data collection and 
presentation of findings, limited pooling of data hence a narrative 
approach to data synthesis was employed. Almost half of the studies 
(n=32, 47%) quantified ‘medication errors’ in general, with fewer solely 
reporting ‘administration errors’ (n=7, 22%) or ‘prescribing errors’ (n=6, 
18%) and one (3%) reporting only transcribing errors. Three studies 
reported data with combinations of classifications of medication errors.  
The specific terms used in the studies to report medications errors varied 
and eight different denominators were used, the most frequent being 
‘total number of medication orders’ or ‘number of prescriptions’ (n=13, 
40%) followed by ‘number of patients admitted’ (n=6, 19%), ‘total 
number of opportunities for errors’ (n=4, 12%). One study (3%) each 
used, ‘total number of preparations’, ‘total number of medications 
dispensed’, ‘total number of cases/records’, ‘total number of patient days’ 
and ‘total number of reports’. Four studies (13%) did not specify the 
denominator. 
Given this marked heterogeneity, it was not possible to make valid 
comparisons of the outcome measure of prevalence. Even in studies which 
used the same outcome measure, the error definitions and methods of 
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measurement varied considerably. The following results should therefore 
be interpreted with caution.  
Of the 13 studies reporting medication errors per ‘total number of 
medication orders’/ ‘number of prescriptions’, the median across all 
studies was 10% (IQR 2-35%). The rates varied from 0.18 to 56 per 100 
medication orders’/ ‘number of prescriptions’. Of the six studies reporting 
‘number of patients admitted’ the median was 28% (IQR 1-35%), varying 
from 0.15 to 40 errors per 100 patient admissions. Data extraction is 
given in Table 3.4.
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Table 3-4: Data extraction of the 32 studies reporting medication error incidence/prevalence/frequency/rate 
 
Author Setting Method 
Error type 
reported 
Determination of error incidence/ 
prevalence/ frequency/ rate 
A
l-
Je
ra
is
y
, 
2
0
1
1
, 
 
 S
A
 
Hospital type - tertiary care  
 
Units/wards – pediatric wards 
 
No. beds - 280 
Methodology – retrospective  
 
Data collection - chart review  
 
Duration - 5 weeks  
Prescribing errors  Method –no. of medication errors/ total 
medication orders 
 
Terminology - incidence  
 
Incidence - 56/100 medication orders 
A
b
b
a
s
in
a
z
a
ri
, 
2
0
1
3
, 
 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type –  academic  
 
Units/wards: gastroenterology 
and endocrinology 
 
No. beds -  NS 
Methodology - prospective 
 
Data collection - chart review  
 
Duration - 2 months  
Medication errors  Method -  no.medication errors/ total 
no. patients admitted 
 
Terminology - frequency 
 
Frequency - 27% 
A
b
b
a
s
in
a
z
a
ri
, 
 
2
0
1
3
, 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type - aacademic  
 
Units/wards - orthopedic, 
gastroenterology wards 
 
No. beds - 620 
Methodology - prospective  
 
Data collection - chart review  
 
Duration - 20 days  
Medication 
administration 
errors 
Method - medication errors/ total no. 
preparations and administrations 
 
Terminology - frequency 
 
Frequency - 20.6 % 
A
l 
R
a
m
a
h
i,
 
 2
0
1
7
 
P
a
le
s
ti
n
e
 Hospital type – 3 government 
hospitals 
 
Units/wards – pediatric   
 
No. beds - NS  
Methodology – prospective 
observational 
 
Data collection – EHR 
 
Duration - 1 month 
Prescribing errors  Method – number wrong doses/total 
number of patients  
 
Terminology - Percentage  
 
Percentage - 40%  
A
la
k
a
h
li
, 
 
2
0
1
4
, 
 
Y
e
m
e
n
 
Hospital type - 3 tertiary care 
hospitals 
 
Units/wards – intensive care 
 
No. beds -  NS 
Methodology - prospective  
 
Data collection - observational  
 
Duration - 4 months  
Medication errors/ 
Prescribing and 
administration 
errors 
Method – NS 
 
Terminology - Frequency 
 
Frequency – Prescribing errors -87.5% 
Administration errors – 12.41% 
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Author Setting Method 
Error type 
reported 
Determination of error incidence/ 
prevalence/ frequency/ rate 
A
l-
D
h
a
w
a
il
ie
, 
2
0
1
1
, 
 
S
A
 
Hospital type - academic  
 
Units/wards – Medical wards 
 
No. beds - 1200 
Methodology - prospective  
 
Data collection - chart review  
 
Duration - 1 months  
Prescribing errors  Method – no. pharmacist interventions/ 
total no. written medication orders 
 
Terminology - Frequency 
 
Frequency  - 7.1% 
A
l-
H
a
jj
e
, 
2
0
0
8
, 
L
e
b
a
n
o
n
 
Hospital type -7 hospitals 
 
Units/wards - medicine, intensive 
care, cardiology , pediatrics 
 
No. beds - NS 
Methodology - prospective  
 
Data collection - chart review  
 
Duration - 1 months  
Prescribing errors  Method – no. prescribing errors/ total 
no. of medication orders 
 
Terminology – percentage  
 
Percentage  – 39.3 %  
A
l 
Ja
d
h
e
y
, 
 2
0
1
3
, 
S
A
 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units/wards – general 
 
No. beds -   900 
Methodology - prospective 
cohort study 
 
Data collection – IRS 
 
Duration - 4 months  
Medication errors  Method – no. prescribing errors/ 1000 
patient-days 
 
Terminology - Incidence 
 
Incidence  - 23.2 /1000 patient days 
A
li
 S
, 
 2
0
1
7
 
S
A
 
Hospital type – tertiary care 
 
Units/wards – hospital wide 
 
No. beds – NS 
Methodology – retrospective  
 
Data collection – IRS 
 
Duration – 1 year 
Medication errors Method – no of ME reported/ total 
number of prescriptions ordered 
 
Terminology – incidence   
 
Incidence – ME - 1.5/100 prescriptions 
A
ls
h
a
ik
h
, 
 2
0
1
3
, 
S
A
 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units/wards - NS 
 
No. beds - 1000 
Methodology - prospective 
 
Data collection – IRS  
 
Duration - 1 year  
Medication errors  Method – no. medication errors/ total 
no. prescriptions 
 
Terminology - rate  
 
Rate -0.4%  
A
ra
b
i,
 
 2
0
1
2
, 
S
A
 
Hospital type – academic 
 
Units/wards – hospital wide 
 
No. beds - 900 
Methodology – retrospective  
 
Data collection – IRS  
 
Duration - 1 year  
Medication errors  Method – no. incident reports / 1,000 
patient days 
 
Terminology – incidence  
 
Incident – 5.8/1000 patient days  
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Author Setting Method 
Error type 
reported 
Determination of error incidence/ 
prevalence/ frequency/ rate 
a
l 
T
e
h
e
w
y
, 
2
0
1
6
, 
 
E
g
y
p
t 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units/wards – medical wards 
 
No. beds - 199 
Methodology – prospective 
 
Data collection - observational  
 
Duration - 1 months  
Medication 
administration 
errors 
Method – total errors/ 100 
opportunities of error (observation) 
*100 
 
Terminology - rate  
 
Rate – 2.7/ observation 
D
a
b
a
g
h
z
a
d
e
h
, 
2
0
1
2
, 
 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units/wards – emergency department 
 
No. beds -    24  
Methodology – prospective  
 
Data collection - chart review  
 
Duration - 1 month 
Medication 
administration 
errors 
Method - NS 
 
Terminology – incidence  
 
Incidence – 50.5%  
D
ib
b
i,
  
2
0
0
6
, 
 S
A
 
Hospital type – general 
  
Units/wards - intensive care  
 
No. beds - NS  
Methodology - retrospective  
 
Data collection - chart review  
 
Duration - 2 years  
Medication errors  Method – no. of records with ME/ total 
no. patient records  
 
Terminology - incidence  
 
Incidence – 26.3 %  
E
l-
S
h
a
z
ly
, 
2
0
1
7
, 
 
E
g
y
p
t 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units/wards – NICU 
 
No. beds -   NS 
Methodology - prospective 
and retrospective 
 
Data collection - observation  
 
Duration - 6 months  
Medication errors Method – No. medication errors/ total 
no. written medication orders 
 
Terminology - percentage 
 
Percentage - 10.55% 
F
a
h
im
i,
 
 2
0
0
9
, 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type – academic 
 
Units/wards –hospital wide 
 
No. beds - NS 
Methodology – prospective  
 
Data collection - observation  
 
duration - 5 months  
Transcribing error Method – no. medication errors/ total 
no. opportunity for errors 
 
Terminology - incidence 
 
Incidence - 51.8% 
F
a
h
im
i,
 
 2
0
0
8
, 
 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type -  academic 
 
Units/wards – intensive care 
 
No. beds - 446  
Methodology - prospective  
 
Data collection - observation  
 
Duration - 3 months  
Medication 
administration 
errors 
Method – no. prescribing errors/ total 
no. written medication orders 
 
Terminology - frequency 
 
Frequency - 9.4% 
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Author Setting Method 
Error type 
reported 
Determination of error incidence/ 
prevalence/ frequency/ rate 
F
a
h
im
i,
  
2
0
1
5
, 
 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type - tertiary care 
 
Units/wards – respiratory wards 
 
No. beds - NS 
Methodology – prospective   
 
Data collection - observation  
 
Duration - 1 year  
Medication 
administration 
errors 
Method – no. ME/100 admitted patients 
 
Terminology - rate  
 
Rate - 35.3 % 
G
h
a
re
k
h
a
n
i,
 
 2
0
1
4
, 
 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units - nephrology  
 
No. beds - 23  
Methodology - prospective,  
 
Data collection - pharmacist 
interventions  
 
Duration - 18 months  
Medication errors Method – no. medication errors/ total 
no. medication orders 
 
Terminology – percentage/incident 
rate 
 
Percentage - 86.2%  
Incidence – 3.5 patient or 0.18/order 
H
a
m
is
h
e
h
k
a
r,
 2
0
1
4
, 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type - general 
 
Units/wards – infectious diseases 
 
No. beds - 25 beds 
Methodology – prospective  
 
Data collection – chart review  
Medication errors  Method – no. of ME/no of admission 
 
Terminology – mean  
 
Mean - 0.633 
H
a
m
m
o
u
r 
K
A
, 
 2
0
1
6
 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type – academic hospital 
 
Units/wards – hospital wide study 
 
No. beds – 570 beds 
Methodology – retrospective  
 
Data collection – IRS 
 
Duration – 14 months 
Administration 
errors/dispensing 
errors/prescribing 
errors 
Method – NS 
 
Terminology - percentage 
 
Percentage –  
 
Administration errors - 75.5% 
Dispensing errors – 12.8% 
Prescribing errors – 10.5 
K
a
n
d
il
, 
 
2
0
1
2
, 
 
E
g
y
p
t 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units/wards – emergency  
 
No. beds - NS  
Methodology - prospective  
 
Data collection - observation  
 
Duration - 9 months  
Medication 
administration 
errors 
Method – no. prescribing errors/ total 
no. written medication orders 
 
Terminology - percentage 
 
percentage - 4.18%  
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Author Setting Method 
Error type 
reported 
Determination of error incidence/ 
prevalence/ frequency/ rate 
K
h
a
m
m
a
rn
ia
, 
2
0
1
5
 
Hospital type – general hospital 
 
Units/wards –ICU 
 
No. beds -14 
Methodology – retrospective  
 
Data collection -  chart review  
 
Duration - 3 months  
Medication 
administration 
errors 
Method – no. of ME/ total medication 
orders 
 
Terminology – Rate 
 
Rate – 17.3%  
L
u
s
ti
g
, 
 
2
0
0
0
, 
 
Is
ra
e
l 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units/wards - intensive care 
 
No. beds - 400 
Methodology - prospective  
 
Data collection – structured 
form 
 
Duration- 6 months  
Prescribing errors  Method – no. prescribing errors/ 1,000 
prescriptions  
 
Terminology - rate  
 
Rate - 11.2/1000 prescriptions. 
M
A
S
 A
li
, 
2
0
1
7
 
E
g
y
p
t 
Hospital type – academic hospital  
  
Units/wards – coronary care unit 
 
No. beds - 16 
Methodology – prospective 
observational   
 
Data collection – chart review 
 
Duration - 12 months  
Medication 
errors/prescribing 
errors/monitoring 
errors  
Method – total prescription item 
reviewed /number of ME  
 
Terminology - incidence 
 
Incidence – prescribing errors – 
9.03%, monitoring errors – 0.41% 
P
a
w
lu
k
, 
 2
0
1
7
, 
 
Q
a
ta
r 
Hospital type – tertiary care 
  
Units/wards – neonatal intensive care 
 
No. beds - 80 
Methodology - retrospective  
 
Data collection – IRS  
 
Duration - 16 months  
Medication errors  Method - NS 
 
Terminology – total number of ME 
 
Total Number - 201 
S
a
d
a
t-
A
li
, 
2
0
1
0
, 
 
S
A
 
Hospital type – tertiary care 
 
Units/wards - NS 
 
No. beds - 470 
Methodology -  retrospective  
 
Data collection – IRS  
 
Duration - 2 years  
Medication errors  Method – no. medication errors / 1000 
admissions  
 
Terminology – Incidence  
 
Incidence - 1.58/1000 admissions  
S
a
ra
v
i,
 B
M
, 
2
0
1
5
, 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type – academic hospital 
 
Units/wards - NS 
 
No. beds - NS 
Methodology - retrospective  
 
Data collection -  IRS  
 
Duration - 1 year  
Medication errors Method -  no. medication errors/ total 
no. admissions 
 
Terminology – percentage  
 
Percentage - 28% 
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Author Setting Method 
Error type 
reported 
Determination of error incidence/ 
prevalence/ frequency/ rate 
S
u
la
im
a
n
 
 2
0
1
7
, 
 J
o
rd
a
n
 
Hospital type – academic hospital 
 
Units/wards – internal medicine  
 
No. beds - 54 
Methodology – prospective 
observational  
 
Data collection -  direct 
observation and chart review 
 
Duration – 6  month 
Medication errors  Method –no of ME/ total opportunities 
of errors * 100 
 
Terminology – rate  
 
Rate – 12.6% ie. 2.6/patient 
 
V
a
z
in
, 
 2
0
1
2
, 
 I
ra
n
 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units/wards – intensive care 
 
No. beds -   11  
Methodology - prospective  
 
Data collection - observation  
 
Duration - 38 shifts  
Medication errors  Method – no. medication errors/ total 
no. opportunities for error 
 
Terminology – percentage  
 
Percentage - 7.6%  
V
e
s
s
a
l,
 
 2
0
1
0
, 
Ir
a
n
 
Hospital type – academic 
 
Units/wards - nephrology  
 
No. beds - 15 
Methodology – retrospective  
 
Data collection - chart review  
 
Duration - 4 months  
Prescribing errors  Method -  rate of prescription errors/ 
100 medication orders  
 
Terminology - rate  
 
Rate - 10.5 /100 medication order 
Z
e
ra
a
tc
h
i,
 
 2
0
1
3
, 
 I
ra
n
 
Hospital type - academic 
 
Units/wards – emergency department 
 
No. beds - 46  
Methodology - prospective  
 
Data collection - chart review  
 
Duration - 1 year  
Medication errors  Method – ME/ total number of patients 
and/or medication orders 
 
Terminology – percentage/rate 
 
Percentage -  22% 
 
Rate – 0.41/patient and 0.18/ 
medication order  
  
NS – Not Specified /No details available, NICU -  neonatal intensive care unit, SA – Saudi Arabia, IRS – Incident reporting system, EHR – Electronic 
Health Record 
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3.7.10 Review question 2 – nature of medication errors 
 
Almost all studies (31/32, 97%) provided data regarding the nature of the 
errors. For prescribing errors, the most commonly reported included 
errors of omission, wrong drug, wrong dose, wrong route, incomplete 
order, wrong duration, drug-drug interaction and wrong patient. Studies 
reporting administration errors were largely related to wrong 
administration time, wrong administration route and wrong infusion rate.    
Fourteen studies (43%) reported the specific medications most commonly 
associated with errors. Most frequently reported therapeutic groups 
included anti-infectives for systemic use, drugs used for alimentary tract 
and metabolism and cardiovascular drugs.  
 
Thirteen studies (40%) reported error severity, with eight categorising 
according to the NCCMERP Index (132). These studies, however, provided 
very little methodological detail on the application of the index, specifically 
assessment of inter-rater reliability. In five studies, the most common 
category was B (near miss), with C (error occurred and reached the 
patient but with no harm) in two studies and E (error occurred and may 
have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm and required 
intervention) in one study.  
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3.7.11 Review question 3 – causes/contributory factors of 
medication errors  
 
Twenty-four studies (48%) from six Middle-Eastern countries reported 
causes or contributory factors leading to medication errors. Approaches to 
data collection were largely based on questionnaires (15/24, 63%), data 
from incident reporting systems (n=4, 17%), direct observation of 
practice (n=2, 8%), semi-structured interviews (n=2, 8%) and retrieval of 
information from patient medical records (n=1, 4%). A total of 3919 
health professionals were involved in these 24 different studies. Notably, 
none of these 24 studies used any theory (e.g. behavioural, 
organisational) in the processes of data collection or analysis. As 
described in the methods section, findings from these 24 studies were 
categorised according to Reason’s Accident Causation model (64), (Table 
3.5) and synthesis of the categories is provided in Table 3.6. Contributory 
factors most commonly reported were: active failures, largely slips, lapses 
and mistakes; error provoking conditions, particularly those relating to 
lack of knowledge and insufficient staffing levels; and latent conditions, 
most commonly heavy workload. Error provoking conditions such as lack 
of experience, poor documentation and look alike drugs, or latent 
conditions of issues relating to a blame culture were rarely reported. 
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Table 3-5: Classification of causes as per Reason’s model of accident causation 
Author Methodology 
Setting, participants and 
Number 
Classification of causes as per Reason’s model of accident 
causation 
A
b
d
a
r
, 
 
2
0
1
4
, 
 
I
r
a
n
  
  
  
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
Setting – 4 academic hospitals 
 
Participants – nurses  
 
No. of Participants - 238 
Error producing conditions 
 
• insufficient staff  
• nurse fatigue  
• illegible handwriting 
• nurse workload  
Latent failures 
 
• supervisory issues 
• not considering nurses’ 
views                                                        
A
ls
h
a
ik
h
 M
 
(
2
0
1
3
)
 
 
S
a
u
d
i 
A
r
a
b
ia
 
Retrospective 
analysis from 
incident reporting 
system 
Setting – academic hospital  
 
Participants – NA 
 
No. of ME reported – 949 
 
Duration – 1 year  
 
Error Producing Conditions 
 
• lack of knowledge 
• illegible handwriting  
  
Latent Failures 
 
• performance deficit 
A
l-
S
h
a
r
a
 M
. 
(
2
0
1
1
)
 
 
J
o
r
d
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
Setting -  NS 
 
Participants – Nurses 
 
No. of Participants - 126 
Active Failures 
 
• Slips  - sound alike  
• Mistake - prescribing wrong dosage 
• Violation - using abbreviations  
  
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• heavy workload 
• unfamiliarity of nurses’ 
with patients’ medical 
conditions 
• unfamiliarity with the use 
of medications  
 
A
li
 S
, 
 
(
2
0
1
7
)
 
S
a
u
d
i 
A
r
a
b
ia
 
Retrospective 
analysis from 
incident reporting 
system 
 
Setting – tertiary care hospital 
 
Participants – NA 
 
No. of Participants - NA 
Active Failures 
 
• Slips  - look alike 
sound alike medications  
 
 
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• miscommunication of 
drug orders 
 
 
Latent 
Failures 
 
• Lack of 
educational 
activities  
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Author Methodology 
Setting, participants and 
Number 
Classification of causes as per Reason’s model of accident 
causation 
A
l 
T
e
h
e
w
y
 M
 
(
2
0
1
6
)
  
 
E
g
y
p
t 
Prospective  
observational study 
 
Setting -  academic hospital 
 
Participants - nurses 
 
No. of Participants - 28 
Error Producing Conditions 
 
• heavy workload  
• patient condition (illiteracy, elderly) 
 
 
Latent Failures 
 
• poor staffing  
• lack of policy and 
procedures 
• low commitment of 
hospital administration 
towards patient safety  
B
a
g
h
e
r
i-
N
e
s
a
m
i 
M
 
(
2
0
1
5
)
 
 
I
r
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
 
Setting – 12 academic hospitals 
 
Participants – Nurses 
 
No. of Participants - 190 
Active Failures 
 
• Slips  - selecting 
wrong medication  
• Lapse - failed to put 
correct labels on 
medications 
• Mistake - delivered 
incorrect medication 
doses   
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• physicians’ medication 
orders illegible 
• many patients 
receiving similar 
medications 
• limited knowledge of 
medications 
 
Latent 
Failures 
 
• poor 
communicatio
n  
• Limited 
access to 
medication 
information. 
• Medication 
experts not 
available. 
C
h
e
r
a
g
i 
M
  
(
2
0
1
3
)
 
 
I
r
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
 
 
Setting - academic 
 
Participants – nurses  
 
No. of Participants - 237 
Active Failures 
 
• Slips  - wrong patient,  
• Lapse - failure to give 
medication 
• Mistake - prescribing 
wrong dosage and 
infusion rate  
• Violation - using 
acronyms of medication 
names  
  
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• large variety of drugs 
in the medication cabinet  
• sound alike 
medications 
• too busy and tired from 
excessive work (nurses) 
 
 
Latent 
Failures 
 
• lack of 
training 
• lack of 
staffing  
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Author Methodology 
Setting, participants and 
Number 
Classification of causes as per Reason’s model of accident 
causation 
D
ib
b
i 
H
M
 
(
2
0
0
6
)
 
 
S
a
u
d
i 
A
r
a
b
ia
 
Retrospective chart 
review 
 
Setting – general hospital 
 
Participants – NA 
 
No. of Participants - 2627 
Active Failures 
 
• Slips – choosing wrong medication 
(look alike and sound alike) 
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• lack of knowledge 
• performance deficit 
E
h
s
a
n
i 
S
R
 
(
2
0
1
3
)
 
 
I
r
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
 
Setting – academic hospital 
 
Participants – nurses  
 
No. of Participants - 94 
Active Failures 
 
• Slips  - choosing 
wrong medication (look 
alike and sound alike)  
• Violation - using 
abbreviated names 
  
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• fatigue from hard work 
• illegibility  
• insufficient 
pharmacological 
knowledge 
 
Latent 
Failures 
 
• high patient 
-to- nurse 
ratio  
• insufficient 
education/trai
ning  
F
a
r
z
i 
S
 
2
0
1
7
 
I
r
a
n
  
Semi structured 
individual interview 
Setting -  academic hospitals 
 
 
Participants – Physicians, Nurses 
and clinical pharmacists  
 
No. of Participants - 19 
Active Failures 
 
• Slips  -Look alike 
sound alike   
• Mistake – incomplete 
medication orders  
 
 
 
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• lack of knowledge of 
healthcare team 
• lack of professional 
communication 
• lack of medication 
reconciliation   
• interruption/talking 
while medication 
administration  
• lack of pharmaceutical 
knowledge     
Latent 
Failures 
 
• lack of 
monitoring or 
supervisory 
mechanisms  
• weak 
professional 
collaboration 
between 
healthcare 
team  
• lack of 
management 
decisions   
• lack of 
adequate 
staffing    
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Author Methodology 
Setting, participants and 
Number 
Classification of causes as per Reason’s model of accident 
causation 
F
a
th
i 
(
2
0
1
7
)
 
I
r
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
Setting – 7 academic hospitals 
 
Participants – Nurses  
 
No. of Participants - 500 
Active Failures 
 
• Slips  -Look alike 
sound alike   
• Mistake – wrong 
labelling  
 
 
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• inappropriate behavior 
of patients 
• fatigue from hard work 
• phone call orders 
• high number of 
patients 
• noisy environment  
 
Latent 
Failures 
 
• lack of 
monitoring or 
supervisory 
mechanisms  
• shortage of 
nursing staff • 
lack of drug 
information 
resources  
 
G
o
r
g
ic
h
 
(
2
0
1
6
)
 
 
I
r
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
 
 
Setting - academic hospitals 
 
Participants – Nurses 
 
No. of Participants - 327 
Active Failures 
 
• Violation - unreadable 
orders  
 Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• fatigue due to high 
workload  
• large number of 
critically ill patients  
• poor physical 
environment (light, 
temperature)  
• poor communication 
between team members  
Latent 
Failures 
 
• low ratio of 
nurses to 
patients  
• failure in 
emphasizing 
the 
importance of 
recording and 
reporting the 
medication 
errors   
• blame 
culture  
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Author Methodology 
Setting, participants and 
Number 
Classification of causes as per Reason’s model of accident 
causation 
G
ü
n
e
ş
 Ü
,Y
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
 
 
T
u
r
k
e
y
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
Setting - 2 government hospitals 
 
Participants – nurses 
 
No. of Participants  243 
Active Failures 
• Lapse - physicians not writing drug 
route 
• Mistake -  prescribing interacting 
drugs  
• Violation - physicians not writing 
the order or not in time 
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• interruption by telephone, 
etc. while preparing 
medication 
• poor mathematical skills 
for drug dose calculation 
H
a
m
m
o
u
d
i 
 
(
2
0
1
7
)
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
Setting – tertiary care hospital 
 
Participants – Nurses  
 
No. of Participants - 367 
Error Producing Conditions 
 
• illegibility of patients records 
• wrong medication preparation by 
pharmacists 
Latent Failures  
low staffing   
M
r
a
y
y
a
n
  
(
2
0
1
2
)
 
 
J
o
r
d
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
Setting – academic hospitals 
 
Participants – Nurses 
 
No. of Participants - 212 
Active Failures 
• Mistake -  inaccurate rate of total 
parenteral nutrition 
  
Error Producing 
Conditions  
• poor quality or damaged 
medication labels 
• fear of disciplinary actions 
M
r
a
y
y
a
n
  
(
2
0
0
7
)
 
 
J
o
r
d
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
Setting – 11government and 11 
private hospitals 
 
Participants – nurses 
 
No. of Participants – 799 
 
Active Failures 
• Slips  - nurses confused by different 
types and functions of infusion devices 
• Lapse - nurse fails to check the 
patient name with medication 
administration record  
Error Producing 
Conditions 
• nurses distracted by other 
patients, coworkers or 
events on unit 
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Author Methodology 
Setting, participants and 
Number 
Classification of causes as per Reason’s model of accident 
causation 
P
a
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k
 S
 
(
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0
1
7
)
 
 
Q
a
ta
r
 Retrospective 
analysis from 
incident reporting 
system 
Setting – tertiary care hospital 
 
Participants – NA 
 
No. of Participants - 201 
Active Failures 
• Lapse – missing documentation  
• Mistake -  error in calculation  
• Violation - improper use of hospital protocol 
P
a
z
o
k
ia
n
 M
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
 
 
I
r
a
n
 
Semi structured 
individual interview 
 
Setting – academic hospital  
 
Participants – nurses 
 
No. of Participants - 20 
Active Failures 
 
• Mistake - prescribing 
wrong medications  
  
Error Producing 
Conditions 
• poo documentation  
• poor knowledge 
 
 
 
Latent 
Failures 
 
• lack of 
attention of 
managers to 
staff physical 
and 
psychological 
issues leading 
to decrease in 
nurses’ 
motivation 
• Risk 
management 
strategies 
insufficient  
 
S
h
a
h
r
o
k
h
i 
A
 
(
2
0
1
3
)
 
 
I
r
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
Setting – academic hospitals  
 
Participants – nurses  
 
No. of Participants - 150 
Active Failures 
 
• Mistake -  incorrect 
transcription   
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• excessive workload 
• inadequate 
pharmacological 
knowledge 
• shortage of time 
 
Latent 
Failures 
 
• Low nurse 
to patient 
ratio 
• inadequate 
number of 
staff in each 
working shift 
• Similar drug 
packing 
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Author Methodology 
Setting, participants and 
Number 
Classification of causes as per Reason’s model of accident 
causation 
S
h
e
h
a
ta
 Z
H
A
 
(
2
0
1
5
)
 
 
E
g
y
p
t Retrospective 
analysis from 
incident reporting 
system 
 
Setting – government and private 
hospitals  
 
Participants – NA  
 
No. of Participants – 1200 
reports 
Active Failures 
 
• Lapse - lack of 
documentation  
  
Error Producing 
Conditions 
• lack of knowledge and 
experience 
• excessive workload and 
distractions 
• incomplete prescribing 
instructions 
• illegible handwriting 
 
Latent 
Failures  
 
• lack of drug 
information 
resources 
S
h
o
h
a
n
i 
M
 
2
0
1
8
 
 
I
r
a
n
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
 
 
Setting – academic hospital 
 
Participants – Nurses  
 
No. of Participants - 120 
Error Producing Conditions 
 
• lack of awareness of drug  
• fatigue and workload 
• lack of patient information 
• noisy working environment 
• heavy work load  
 
Latent Failures 
 
• lack of motivation among 
nurses  
• lack of drug protocol  
• lack of training  
 
T
o
r
u
n
e
r
 E
K
 
2
0
1
2
 
 
T
u
r
k
e
y
  
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 
Setting – 4 tertiary care hospitals 
 
Participants – Nurses  
 
No. of Participants - 124 
Active Failures 
 
• Mistake -  reading the 
prescription in wrong 
way 
 
 
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• long working hours 
• high patient – nurse 
ratio • lack of patient 
information 
 
Latent 
Failures 
 
• 
unavailability 
of 
medications 
in appropriate 
forms 
• poor work 
environment  
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Author Methodology 
Setting, participants and 
Number 
Classification of causes as per Reason’s model of accident 
causation 
V
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A
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a
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ia
 
Prospective 
Observational study 
 
Setting – academic hospitals  
 
Participants – patients  
 
No. of Participants - 38 
Active Failures 
 
• Slips - memory lapses 
• Lapse - faulty dose 
checking (missing) 
• Mistake -  preparation 
error 
• Violation -  violating 
hospital rules  
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• lack of drug knowledge 
• lack of interaction with 
other services 
• lack of patient 
information 
 
Latent 
Failures 
 
• poor drug 
stocking and 
delivery 
Y
o
u
s
s
if
 
(
2
0
1
3
)
 
 
S
a
u
d
i 
A
r
a
b
ia
 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
Setting – government hospital 
 
Participants – nurses  
 
No. of Participants - 253 
Active Failures 
 
• Lapse – dispensing 
wrong drug  
• Mistake -  wrong 
packaging 
• Violation - poor 
adherence to protocol 
Error Producing 
Conditions 
 
• illegible prescription  
• poor communication  
Latent 
Failures 
 
• pharmacists 
not available 
24hrs 
 
 
 94 
 
 
 
Table 3-6: Human errors at different levels in an organisational hierarchy, classified based on the Reasons Accident Causation 
Model 
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Abdar et 
al, (82) 
     ✓       ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓   
Alakahli  et 
al (84) 
    ✓        ✓        
Al-Shara  
et al,  
✓ ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓     ✓       
Ali S  et al,  ✓       ✓       ✓      
Al Tehewy  
et al, (91) 
     ✓ ✓       ✓    ✓ ✓  
Bagheri-
Nesami  et 
al, (20) 
✓ ✓ ✓  ✓       ✓ ✓     ✓  ✓ 
Cheragi  et 
al, (93) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓      
Dibbi  et 
al, (95) 
✓    ✓                
Ehsani  et 
al, (96) 
✓    ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓ ✓      
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*Farzi  et 
al, (101) 
✓  ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓      ✓  ✓   
Fathi  et al, 
(102) 
✓  ✓   ✓  ✓  ✓        ✓  ✓ 
Gorgich  et 
al,  
   ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓      ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  
Güneş  et 
al,  
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓     ✓           
Hammoudi  
et al, (107) 
     ✓       ✓        
Mrayyan et 
al, (113) 
  ✓              ✓    
Mrayyan  
et al,   
✓ ✓        ✓           
Pawluk  et 
al  
 ✓ ✓ ✓                 
*Pazokian  
et al,  
  ✓  ✓   ✓          ✓ ✓  
Shahrokhi  
et al,  
  ✓  ✓ ✓     ✓   ✓       
Shehata  
et al,  
 ✓   ✓        ✓ ✓      ✓ 
Shohani  et 
al, (121) 
    ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓    ✓ ✓     ✓ 
Toruner  et 
al, (123) 
  ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓    ✓  ✓     
Vazin  et 
al,  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓          ✓     
Youssif  et 
al, (126) 
 ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓     ✓      ✓  
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3.8. Discussion  
3.8.1 Statement of key findings 
 
Heterogeneity in medication error definitions and scope, differences in 
methods of data collection and units of analysis of the studies included in this 
review limited data pooling. This heterogeneity limited data pooling 
conducted as part of the synthesis stage. Most frequently reported was the 
percentage of medication errors per total number of medication orders with a 
median across all studies of 10% (IQR 2-35%). Prescribing errors were the 
most common type of errors reported, with dose-related errors being most 
prevalent. Contributory factors associated with medication errors were 
multifactorial. Synthesis of findings according to Reason’s Accident Causation 
(64) model identified that active failures (slips, lapses and mistakes) were 
most commonly reported followed by error provoking conditions (e.g. lack of 
knowledge, insufficient staffing), with latent failures (e.g. heavy workload) 
least reported. There was only one study from Qatar which reported 
medication errors occurring in a specialised setting (neonatal intensive care 
unit - NICU) and was limited to analysis of error reports submitted by 
pharmacists, with no focus on error causation.  
3.8.2 Strength and weakness  
There are several strengths to this review. The protocol was developed 
according to the standards of PRISMA-P (Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic review and Meta-Analysis Protocols (75), registered in the 
PROSPERO database (76) and the systematic review reported according to 
PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis) criteria (75). The synthesis adopted a theory driven approach 
based on Reason’s Accident Causation Model (64), which could subsequently 
facilitate the development of interventions. There are, however, several 
weaknesses hence the review findings should be interpreted with caution. 
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Restricting the search to the English language and excluding those written in 
regional languages of Arabic or Persian may have limited retrieval of 
potentially relevant studies. It is, however, worth noting that English is the 
preferred language of most professional organisations in the Middle East.  
3.8.3 Interpretation of key findings 
Although there has been an increase in the number of medication errors 
studies originating from Middle East over the last few years, two thirds were 
from Iran and Saudi Arabia with none from eight countries. While the reasons 
for the lack of studies in other countries are unknown, this does have 
implications for the generalisability and transferability of review findings and 
conclusions. Furthermore, there was a lack of studies employing a qualitative 
approach to explore contributory factors of errors.  
The majority of studies had key limitations in study design and lacked 
transparency in reporting key study details. Authors should be encouraged to 
adopt standardised reporting checklists available from the EQUATOR 
(Enhancing the QUAlity and Transparency Of health Research) network 
(133). This international network aims to ‘improve the reliability and value of 
published health research literature by promoting transparent and accurate 
reporting.’ An example is the STROBE checklist (Strengthening the Reporting 
of Observational Studies in Epidemiology) for reporting observational studies 
(77).  
As noted in previous systematic reviews (6,7,12,26,29,30,34,36,37,134-
136), many studies either did not define terms such as ‘medication errors’, 
‘prescribing errors’ etc., or used non-standardised definitions. The most 
common terminologies used in this regard varied from error, failure, near 
miss, rule violation, deviation, preventable ADE and potential ADE etc.  It is 
evident from these studies that the multiplicity of definitions or terminology 
used has led to variation in prevalence of medication errors, while making it 
difficult to quantify the medication error occurrence rates. There was also 
variation in the methods used and the duration of data collection. To further 
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advance this field of research, the adoption of standardised definitions and 
methodologies should be encouraged. This would enable analytical 
approaches such as meta-analyses and provide more robust and 
generalisable findings to inform practice.  
Few studies reported the severity of errors, often providing little 
methodological detail. In a systematic review of tools used in error severity 
estimation, Garfield et al. highlighted that of the 40 tools assessed; only two 
were deemed to have acceptable validity and reliability (122).  
Despite these issues around standardisation, it is evident from this 
systematic review that medication errors remain prevalent in hospitals in the 
Middle East. For those reporting medication errors, the median ‘total number 
of medication orders’/ ‘number of prescriptions’ across all studies was 10% 
(IQR 2-35% and range of 0.18-56%). While differences in methodology, 
settings and patient populations limits comparisons to other systematic 
reviews, these figures are similar to those reported by Alsulami et al. in a 
systematic review of Middle Eastern studies up to 2011 (30). The prevalence 
of medication errors in the Middle East would appear to remain largely 
unchanged and at a similar level to those reported from around the world 
(6,7,12,26,29,30,34,36,37,134-136).  
None of the 24 studies in this review and only two previous systematic 
reviews analysed causative factors according to Reason’s theory. In a review 
of prescribing errors in hospitalised patients, Tully et al. reported that the 
active failure most frequently cited was a mistake due to inadequate 
knowledge of the drug or the patient. There were issues of lack of training or 
experience, fatigue, stress, high workload and inadequate communication 
between healthcare professionals [9]. In a systematic review of medication 
administration error studies, Keers et al. reported that slips and lapses were 
the most common unsafe acts (26). Our synthesis of study findings according 
to Reason’s Theory are similar in those active failures of slips, lapses and 
mistakes were most common. Error provoking conditions included lack of 
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knowledge and insufficient staff. It is possible that other contributory factors 
may have been identified if the primary studies had used Reason’s Theory in 
data collection and analysis. Using a theoretical framework in primary 
research would ensure that all possible explanations underlying medication 
errors are identified [84]. Given the accumulation of evidence from this and 
other systematic reviews a standardised, theory informed approach should 
be adopted. This is fundamental to the key stated WHO objective of 
assessing and scoping the nature of avoidable medication-related harm (2). 
Policy makers, leaders, practitioners and other relevant stakeholders must 
continue working towards minimising the key identified contributory factors 
where possible.  
3.9. Conclusion  
While there has been a clear increase in the number of publications from 
selected Middle Eastern countries, there is need to improve the quality and 
reporting of studies. A standardised approach to quantifying medication 
errors prevalence, severity, outcomes and contributory factors is warranted.   
3.10.  Implications for further research 
The systematic review identifies the lack of qualitative studies grounded in 
theories of behaviour and behaviour change originating from the middle-east 
to provide an in-depth understanding of specific issues that contributes to 
medication errors, such as social/professional role and identity, emotions, 
and environmental context and resources etc. The review further highlights 
paucity of quantitative data from Qatar around medication errors, guiding the 
doctoral thesis to further phases. 
 100 
 
Chapter 4 : An analysis of medication 
error reports in Hamad Medical 
Corporation  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the medication error reporting system 
and process operating within HMC. This is followed by the introduction, aim, 
method, results and discussion of research utilising standard medication 
error reports as a source of data collection.  
The systematic review presented in the previous chapter highlighted the lack 
of any consistency in medication error studies set in hospitals of the Middle 
East in terms of methods, methods of data collection and outcome measures. 
While nine studies described medication error data routinely collected via 
error or incident reports, none of these has been conducted in Qatar. 
Furthermore, these studies primarily reported error prevalence and did not 
present data relating to contributory factors.  
Prior to conducing further primary research on the causes and reporting of 
medication errors in Qatar, there was a need to study the actual reports.  
As noted earlier, the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error 
Reporting and Prevention (NCCMERP) defines a medication error as, “any 
preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or 
patient harm while the medication is in the control of the healthcare 
professional (HCP), patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to 
professional practice, healthcare products, procedures, and systems, 
including prescribing, order communication, product labelling, packaging, and 
nomenclature, compounding, dispensing, distribution, administration, 
education, monitoring, and use”.(137) 
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This definition has been adopted by Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC) in the 
policy on error reporting, ‘Managing and Reporting Medication Errors and 
Near Misses’ (CL-7045) (see Appendix 1.1). Within the policy, all medication 
errors and near misses must be reported immediately. A near miss is defined 
as, “an event or situation that could have resulted in an accident, injury, or 
illness, but did not, either by chance or through timely intervention. An 
example of a near miss would be prescribing, transcribing, or administering 
medication to the wrong patient due to lapses in verification of patient 
identification but caught at the last minute by chance.”  
4.2 Medication error reporting in HMC  
Medication Error reporting in HMC is policy driven and has recently migrated 
from paper-based reporting to an electronic reporting using RL Solutions 
(RL6) (20). To better understand the nature and scope of medication-related 
harm, improve the current medication safety practices, and further 
strengthen the pharmacovigilance activities, the pharmacy leadership at HMC 
established a corporate clinical unit, the Medication Safety & Quality Centre 
(MSQC). MSQC is responsible for collecting and collating data on safe 
medication use practices and to report to key stakeholders and policy 
makers. The medication error reporting process is described in Figure 4.1. 
 102 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Process flow of medication error reporting and analysis at HMC 
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The medication error policy mandates that the supervisor is informed 
immediately of all errors and near misses (e.g. wrong route, frequency, 
unclear/wrong order, wrong time administration, omission, wrong 
dispensing) so that appropriate corrective action can be taken if required. 
Furthermore, the individual identifying the error should, within 24 hours, 
submit a report via the electronic reporting system (RL6). If the error 
reaches the patient the physician, the error and progress should be 
documented in the patient’s clinical progress notes. The completed incident 
report should also be forwarded to the hospital pharmacy department for 
further review and feedback. The reports are also sent to the medication 
safety and quality center for in-depth review and analysis. The Quality and 
Patient Safety department within each facility is responsible for taking 
appropriate action regarding serious incidents and forwarding the report to 
the Corporate Quality Management Department. This department is 
responsible for consolidating each facility’s quarterly and annual reports, 
including action taken, and for sharing the data with the Corporate Quality 
and Patient Safety Committee, the Corporate Pharmacy and Therapeutic 
Committee and the Ministry of Public Health.  
4.3 The reporting system (RL 6)  
 
RL6 is a web-based online reporting system adapted by HMC for voluntarily 
reporting of medication errors (and other non-medication related incidents) 
by healthcare professionals in a standard format. This system has been in 
place since 2009 and was modified in 2015 to improve medication error 
reporting. Medication errors are classified into four levels and nine severity 
categories ranging from potential for error (category A) to actual error that 
may have contributed to or resulted in a patient’s death (category I), as 
recommended by NCCMERP (ref). 
This medication error form was designed to capture all medication related 
incidents and was divided into six main sections 
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4.3.1.1 The medication error reporting form (electronic) 
 
General Event Information 
This section includes general information about the event, including whether 
or not this was a medication related incident, the location of the person 
affected, any injury caused and whether the event was due to any 
malfunctioning of the equipment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Screenshots of HMCs medication error electronic reporting form 
(general Information about the error) 
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Person Affected 
This section gathers the demographic details of the person affected, including 
name, marital status, age, contact details etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Screenshot of HMC medication error electronic reporting form 
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Event Details/specific event details  
This section gathers details of the date and time of the incident, the 
hospital/facility involved, and the person who identified and reported the 
incident. The section also gathers a description of the type of medication 
error that has occurred (e.g. prescribing, dispensing etc.) 
causes/contributory factors, details of the immediate action taken to mitigate 
the harm, severity of error, and a description of the error.  
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Figure 4-3: Screenshot of HMC medication error electronic reporting form 
 
Figure 4-4: Screenshot of HMC medication error electronic reporting form 
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Healthcare Professional Involved 
This section gathers details of the those involved in the error and those 
reporting the error.  
 
Figure 4-5: Screenshots of HMCs medication error electronic reporting form 
 
Physician Comment 
This section is completed, recording the action taken and subsequent 
progress.  
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Figure 4-6: Screenshot of HMC medication error electronic reporting form 
4.4 Aim and objectives 
 
The aim of this phase of the doctoral research was to collate data recorded in 
medication error reports. 
 
The specific objectives were to 
1. Estimate the incidence of medication errors derived from submitted 
error reports 
2. Describe the nature and severity of medication errors from submitted 
error reports 
3. Explore the causative factors documented on medication error reports 
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4.5 Methods 
 
4.5.1 Design 
 
This was a retrospective review of all medication errors submitted to the 
HMC incident reporting system.  
4.5.2 Data collection 
 
All medication error reports submitted by a health professional during the 
period of January 2015 to December 2017 (i.e. 36 months) were included 
in the study. All reports were extracted from the RL6 database 
electronically and exported to Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
version 20.0 add-on for Microsoft Office Excel. Multiple reports of the 
same event were counted as one (each report was identified using a 
unique number, hence were easily retrieved); if the same error was 
reported by multiple health professionals, only the first report was 
included. Given that the study also sought to report data completeness, 
there was no further data cleaning.  
4.5.3 Analysis 
 
The incidence of medication errors was calculated using the formula.  
 
 
 
The incidence was expressed as per 1,000 medications ordered. The total 
number of medications ordered over the study period was generated by 
Cerner (an electronic prescribing system used by HMC). In Cerner, one 
‘order’ represents each item prescribed to an individual patient, 
irrespective of route, duration etc.   
The severity of medication errors was categorized using NCCMERP 
classification system, in which, severity of error varied from no error 
(circumstances or events that have the capacity to cause error), error no 
Incidence (i) 
Total number of medications ordered  
Total number of medication errors reported 
= 
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harm, error harm and error death. The free text was the reporter stated 
severity, no modifications to these were done during the analysis as that 
might introduce bias. The nature and severity of the medication errors 
were analysed using descriptive statistics, using the classification assigned 
by the reporter. 
The free text data on contributory factors of medication errors recorded 
by the reporter were independently analysed by two reviewers 
experienced in assessment of medication error reports (the doctoral 
student plus one other). Instances of non-consensus were referred to two 
further experienced assessors for final judgement.  
Each reviewer applied Reason’s Accident Causation Model (see previous 
chapters) as a framework for categorizing potential contributory factors as  
• Active failures, e.g. forgetting to administer a medication at a 
scheduled time 
• Error provoking conditions, e.g. a medication was ordered by an 
unauthorized physician and administered to the patient 
• Latent failures, e.g. lack of knowledge or time, busy working 
environment, lack of training  
While the research team had considered applying a behavioural change 
theoretical framework (Theoretical Domain Framework (TDF)) to 
characterize the behavioural determinants, this was not undertaken due 
to the lack of detailed information contained within the reports.  
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4.6 Results  
4.6.1 Incidence of medication errors 
 
A total of 18,390 incidents were reported over 36 months, as described in 
Figure 4.x. Of these 2,130 were excluded as duplicates and a further 
2,720 excluded as not deemed errors by the study reviewers. Examples 
included medication out of stock and adverse drug reactions which could 
not have been prevented. The total number of individual medication error 
reported was therefore 13,540 giving a mean monthly reporting rate of 
376 errors. Of the 13,540 reports, 6,237 had to be excluded as had 
incomplete information (e.g. facility, incident type) and a further 2,200 
with no or almost no free text description of the error. Only 5,103 reports 
(37.7%) had sufficient information to be included in the remaining stages 
of analysis.  
Over the 36 months, there was a total of 30,650,000 medication orders 
giving an incidence of (13,540/30,650,000) x 1,000 = 0.44 per 1,000 
medication orders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-7: Medication incident and error reports included and excluded in 
the study 
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4.6.1.1 Medication errors reported across different HMC facilities  
 
Almost three quarters of the reports originated from general hospital (medical 
and surgical hospitals) (61.5%, n=3183), with the remainder from speciality 
hospitals such as heart, cancer and mental health (Figure 4.8). Almost all the 
reports (94.1%, n=4800) were for adults. The majority (91.5%, n=4667) were 
submitted by pharmacists followed by nurses (7.6%, n=388) with very few 
(0.2%, n=11) by doctors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8: Medication errors reported across different HMC hospitals (%) 
ME – Medication Errors, RH - Rumailah Hospital, WWRC - Women's Wellness and 
Research Center, MHS - Mental Health Service, HGH - Hamad General Hospital, AWK - Al 
Wakra Hospital, AKH - Al Khor Hospital, HH – Heart Hospital, CDC – Communicable 
Disease Center, HHCS – Home Health Care services, NCCCR - National Center for Cancer 
Care and Research, CH –Cuban Hospital, Others include, Ambulatory Care Center, Qatar 
Rehabilitation center, Fahad Bin Jassim Kidney center & Ambulance services   
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4.6.1.2 Types of medication errors  
 
Figure 4.9 illustrates that the majority of reports (87.9%, n=4485) were 
for prescribing errors, followed by administration errors (6.3%, n=322).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-9: illustrates types of medication errors reported 
 
Figure 4.10 illustrates the subcategories of prescribing errors, the most 
common being wrong dose (36%, n=1619), wrong frequency (14.6%, 
n=658) and duplication (ordering two or more medications with the same 
pharmacologic actions) (11.3%, n=510).  
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Figure 4-10: different types of prescribing errors reported 
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Of 322 medication administration errors, 18% (n=58) were non-
compliance to the physicians’ orders or prescriptions (e.g. monitoring 
errors, such as missing to monitor the response of an antihypertensive or 
anticoagulants prior to medication administration, wrong storage, 
discontinuing the medication etc,.) followed by administration of the 
incorrect medication (14.3%, n=46) or administering medication at the 
incorrect time (13%, n=42) (Figure 4.11). 
 
Figure 4-11: different types of medication administration errors reported 
Dispensing and monitoring errors were less frequently reported, the most 
common dispensing error being wrong medication (24.5%, n=64), 
followed by delayed dispensing (19.9%, n=52) (Figure 4.12).  
18
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Figure 4-12: different types of dispensing errors reported 
 
4.6.1.3 Medication categories  
 
Classifying medications involved according to the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
(ATC) classifications gave the most common as anti-infectives for systemic use 
(22%, n=1123) followed by medications used to treat neurological disorders 
(17.2%, n=876).  
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Figure 4-13: Medication categorised based on the Anatomical Therapeutic 
Chemical (ATC) Classification System 
 
4.6.1.4 Severity of errors as reported 
 
According to the reporter, most reports (77.3%, n=3943) were either Category A 
(circumstances or events that have the capacity to cause error) or B (an error 
occurred but the error did not reach the patient) (2.43%, n=124)  followed by 
Category C (14.32%, n=731) (an error occurred that reached the patient but did not 
cause patient harm),  Category D (5.90%, n=301) (an error occurred that reached the 
patient and required monitoring to confirm that it resulted in no harm to the patient 
and/or required intervention to preclude harm). Three (0.06%) errors were Category 
E (wherein an error occurred and may have contributed to or resulted in temporary 
harm to the patient and required intervention). Only one error (0.02%) contributed to 
or resulted in temporary harm to the patient and required initial or prolonged 
hospitalization (Category F).  
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Figure 4-14 severity of harm based on NCCMERP severity index 
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4.6.2 Contributory factors potentially leading to 
error  
 
As described in the methods, the 5,104 error reports were analysed according 
Reason’s Accident Causality Model. Almost all (91.5%, n=4671) were classified 
as active failures (90%). These comprised mistakes (60.5%, n=), slips (15.1%, 
n=777), lapses (11.6%, n=595) and violations (4.2%, n=217). Around one 
tenth (8.5%, n=430) were classified as error provoking conditions (Figure 
4.14). Further details and sub-classifications are given in Table 4.x. Note that, 
in many instances, the detailed sub-classification could not be given due to 
incomplete information.  
 
Figure 4-15: Contributory factors as per the Reasons Accident Causation  
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Contributory factors based on Reasons Accident Causation Theory                                                      n (%)                                                                                  
Active Failures 
(Slips)                             n=777 
Incomplete Order 286 (36.9) 
Selecting  a wrong medication 279 (35.6) 
Selecting a wrong dose 43 (5.5) 
Wrong labeling  24 (3.1) 
Look alike sound alike medications 24 (3.1) 
Others  62 (8.0) 
Not enough information for classification  83 (10.7) 
 
(Lapse)                             n=595 
Missing information (route/age/dose/weight etc.)  395 (66.9) 
Omission   146 (23.8) 
Failure to collect the medication from pharmacy    12 (2) 
Others   6 (1.2) 
Not enough information for classification 36 (6.10) 
 
(Mistakes)                             n=3089 
Skill based mistakes  675 (21.9) 
Knowledge based mistakes 124 (4.0) 
Technology based mistakes   62 (2.0) 
Others  62 (2.0) 
Not enough information for classification 2160 (69.9) 
 
(Violations)                             n=217 
Noncompliance (policy/procedure/orders)  203 (94) 
Ordering contraindicated medications     7 (3.2) 
Patient or caregiver       2 (1) 
Others  3 (1.3) 
Not enough information for classification      2 (1) 
 
Error provoking conditions                              n=424 
Lack of knowledge 148 (34.6) 
Reconciliation  76 (17.9) 
Technology based errors (Cerner issues)   29 (6.8) 
Communication problems 9 (2.1) 
Environment factors  9 (2.1) 
Others  110 25.8) 
Not enough information for classification 43 (10.1) 
 
Latent factors  n=2 
Organizational factors <1 
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4.7 Discussion 
 
4.7.1 Statement of key findings 
The estimated incidence of medication errors in HMC, as derived from 
medication error reports was 0.44 per 1,000 medication orders. Almost all 
reports were submitted by pharmacists for prescribing errors which were 
largely wrong dose or wrong frequency errors relating to anti-infectives or 
neurological medications. Most errors were considered by the reporter to 
be minor in nature. According to Reason’s Accident Causality Model 
(64,69), the vast majority were considered as active failures (slips, 
lapses, mistakes and violations).  
4.7.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
There are several strengths to this research. The systematic review 
presented in Chapter 3 provides evidence that this research is novel 
within Qatar and that the consideration of a theoretical framework of 
accident causation is novel within the Middle East. All medication error 
reports over a three-year period were included in the study, with no 
further sampling or exclusion, hence reducing bias. Much of the data 
presented was extracted from the electronic reports with no manipulation 
reducing the likelihood of error.   
There are, however, a number of study weaknesses which should be 
considered during interpretation. The study findings are largely dependent 
on the validity and reliability of the data recorded in the error reports by 
the individual reporter. These are therefore potentially subjected to 
reporter bias by either under-reporting or selective reporting. While the 
determination of the potential causative factors was undertaken 
independently by experienced practitioners are researchers, this was still 
rather subjective. Furthermore, as the study was conducted within HMC, 
the findings may not be generalisable within Qatar, the Middle East or 
beyond. While the lack of completeness of the medication error reports 
could be considered a limitation of this study, this is an important finding 
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which will inform the development of the medication error reporting 
process within HMC. 
4.7.3 Interpretation 
Both NCCMERP and HMC have strategic aims that highlight the value of 
effective and efficient medication error reporting systems and practices in 
reducing error prevalence and severity.(138) The findings from this phase 
of the doctoral research provide evidence of the need that the reporting 
system and processes at HMC are not optimal. Of the reports extracted, 
around one fifth were either duplicate reports or reports for incidents not 
classified as medication errors. Furthermore, of the remaining reports, 
just over one third had sufficient details to be included in the study. 
Submission of incomplete reports (e.g. standardised variables or the 
narrative of the actual report) is a waste of time and effort on behalf of 
the reporter and also those involved in reviewing the reports. 
Furthermore, these reports can then not be used for the purpose of 
reflecting on healthcare practices hence will not contribute to improved 
patient safety. Several studies in other settings have also highlighted the 
issue of incomplete reports. (139-142) 
The medication error incidence estimated from this study was 0.44 per 
1,000 medication orders. The systematic review presented in Chapter 3 
reported nine studies based on medication error reports. Of these nine 
studies, there was a lack of inconsistency in presentation of results. 
Studies used terms of ‘errors per 1,000 admissions’, ‘errors per 100 
prescriptions’, ‘errors per 1,000 patient days’, ‘percentage’ etc. The 
results of this doctoral phase cannot be compared with similar studies of 
hospital settings in the Middle East. As stated in Chapter 3, there is a 
need to agree defined method and reporting standards for all such studies 
to facilitate data pooling, comparison and learning from best practice. 
Such developments would align to the aspirations of the WHO, ‘Medication 
Without Harm’ and also provide a standardised benchmark for 
determining the impact of any interventions.  
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There are other complications to the interpretation of incidence data which 
are likely to compromise its validity. To be valid, all medication errors 
have to be identified and reported promptly. There is accumulated 
evidence of widespread and significant under-reporting of medication 
errors by healthcare professionals.(113,114,143-148) The incidence data 
derived from this study can only be considered an estimate of the true 
incidence of medication errors in HMC. 
It is notable that almost all medication error reports were submitted by 
pharmacists. While the nature and practise of clinical pharmacy involves 
review of prescribing, and thus the identification of errors, the number of 
pharmacists in HMC is very small compared to nurses and doctors. It 
would therefore appear that there is under-reporting by nurses and 
doctors specifically. In their practise, pharmacists are likely to identify 
(and therefore report) medication errors but are likely to be less aware of 
administration errors unless they are alerted to these by others or observe 
administration errors.  
While most errors were categorised as no harm, the severity rating was 
undertaken solely by the reporter hence may have been subjected to 
biases including reporting and social desirability. Rating this severity of 
medication errors is not straightforward hence the validity of these 
findings may be questionable. A systematic review of the tools used to 
assess prescribing error severity in studies reporting hospital prescribing 
error rates highlighted that 57% of 107 studies included in the review had 
an assessment of severity. While 40 different tools were identified, only 
two were considered to have acceptable reliability and validity. (9)While it 
may be useful for the reporter in HMC to consider the severity and 
consequences of the error, the potential validity issue should be borne in 
mind. Given the limited information in many reports, it would be difficult 
for others to rate severity on this limited information.  
One strength of this review was the application of Reason’s Accident 
Causality Model (64,69) in analysing the narrative description of the 
reports. While the findings will be dependent on the richness of the 
narrative (and in many instances this was incomplete and reports 
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excluded), this does provide some indication of causality. Almost all errors 
were considered to be active failures (slips, lapses, mistakes and 
violations). According to this theory, contributory factors are: 
1. Active failures which are unsafe acts committed by people who are 
in direct contact with the patient or system. They take a variety of 
forms including slips and lapses (errors in task execution), mistakes 
(errors in planning), and procedural violations (rule breaking). 
2. Error producing conditions which can have adverse effects of error 
provoking conditions within the local workplace (e.g. time pressure, 
understaffing, inadequate equipment, fatigue, and inexperience). 
3. Latent failures which arise from decisions made by policy makers, 
leaders and top-level management. 
 
While none of the studies included in the systematic review of Chapter 3 
included this theory, the findings of the studies were synthesised 
accordingly, with results similar to this phase of the doctoral research. 
Active failures of slips, lapses and mistakes were most common. Error 
provoking conditions included lack of knowledge and insufficient staff. 
(149) Similar findings have been reported in systematic reviews of studies 
not restricted to the Middle East. In a review of prescribing errors in 
hospitalised patients, Tully et al. reported that the active failures were 
most frequently cited (7), as did Keers et al. in a systematic review of 
medication administration error studies.(26) 
This accumulation of evidence around active failures will be useful in 
considering any potential interventions aiming to reduce these factors. 
One limitation is that this theory does not describe the full range of 
behavioural determinants potentially leading to errors occurring. As 
described in Chapter 2, TDF is an integrative theoretical framework of 
behavioural determinants which can then be mapped to behaviour change 
techniques allowing the development of targeted interventions. While it 
has initially been suggested that a content analysis approach, based on 
TDF, could be used in the analysis of the error narratives, this was 
precluded by the depth and richness recorded by the reporter.   
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4.7.4 Implications for further research 
This phase of the doctoral research, based on analysis of medication error 
reports, has highlighted issues in the reporting of medication errors 
together with the lack of information around the errors themselves and 
any potential behavioural determinants. These issues are the focus of the 
final phase of primary data collection reported in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 : Qualitative interviews 
with health professionals at HMC 
(Focus Group Discussions) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
One key finding of the systematic review was a lack of qualitative 
research in the Middle East which focused on aspects of medication error 
causes and contributory factors. Furthermore, there is a notable lack of 
any qualitative research on the facilitators and barriers to medication error 
reporting.  
5.2 Aim and objectives 
The aim of this phase of the doctoral research was to explore the 
perspectives of health professionals on issues of medication error causes 
and contributory factors, and error reporting. 
The specific objectives were to explore 
• Experiences of medication errors according to Reason's Accident 
Causation Model 
• Potential behavioural determinant of medication errors 
• Potential behavioural determinants of reporting of medication errors 
 
Note that the research in this phase was conducted as part of a study 
funded by Qatar National Research Fund, ‘Exploring medication error 
causality and reporting in Hamad Medical Corporation: a study of the 
attitudes, beliefs and experiences of health professionals and other key 
stakeholders’ (NPRP 7 - 388 - 3 – 095) (principal investigator Professor 
Derek Stewart).  
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5.3 Methods 
Design 
A qualitative, interpretative phenomenological methodology of focus 
groups was employed. As described in chapter 2, phenomenological 
studies provide in-depth exploration of experiences through the 
descriptions provided by those involved (Willis, 2007). (150) The 
phenomena in question were the occurrence of medication errors and 
their subsequent reporting (or not).  
Focus groups providing multidisciplinary perspective were chosen above 
single discipline groups and were considered more appropriate than other 
forms of data generation such as one-to-one interviews for the main 
reason of the potential for discussion amongst wide range of health care 
participants thus providing the multidisciplinary team perspective.  
Setting 
The setting was Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC), Qatar. The focus 
group discussions were conducted at the conference hall in the Women’s 
Hospital (was not a part of the pharmacy department).  
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
As part of the funded study, all health professionals working in HMC were 
invited to participate in a cross-sectional survey (not part of the doctoral 
research). Respondents of the survey who expressed interest in 
participating in the focus groups (more than 350) were sampled 
purposively to represent a range of professions, hospitals and number of 
years of experience. Each sampled individual was contacted by email 
offering dates, times and location of each focus group. 
Data generation  
A pilot focus group was conducted to provide the doctoral research with 
real life experience in conducting a focus group, to allow consideration of 
the logistical issues, including timing, and to obtain feedback on the detail 
of the topic guide. The pilot data were not included within the final study 
dataset. The focus group topic guide (Apendix 5.1) was developed with 
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reference to Reason's Accident Causation Model (69) and TDF 
(65,151,152), and reviewed for credibility by the supervisory team and 
other members of the QNRF study.  Initial discussions were based around 
views and experiences of error causation, contributory factors and 
reporting. The focus group topic guide is given in Appendix. It was 
planned that each focus group should have no more than ten participants 
and should be multidisciplinary, where possible. Focus groups were 
moderated by two experienced qualitative researchers (the doctoral 
student plus one other, with informed consent obtained from each 
participant at the outset. The moderator’s main role was to facilitate the 
group discussion and to keep it focused around the themes without 
leading it. The moderator also ensured equal contribution of the 
healthcare professionals in the discussion. The co-ordination of activities 
'on the day' of the focus group required more than a person, for several 
other tasks such as managing a room, materials, refreshments, managing 
all respondents’ queries before the focus group, their arrivals and 
departures, specific needs of the individuals etc. Discussions were audio-
recorded (with permission), transcribed verbatim and checked for 
transcribing reliability. Transcribing was shared between the two 
qualitative researchers who moderated the focus group discussion. All the 
recordings were reviewed by the doctoral student to check the accuracy 
and random samples were audited by the supervisory team to ensure the 
accuracy and completeness of the data. Not all, however, appropriate and 
significant nonverbal behaviors were captured and documented. 
Furthermore, clear audit trail was maintained which documented details of 
data gathering to promote dependability. Audit trails are qualitative 
strategies using in-depth approaches to establish the confirmability, which 
reassures that the findings are based on participants responses instead of 
researchers own perceptions and bias) (153) Sampling and recruitment 
continued to the point of data saturation (i.e. the point at which it 
appeared that no new themes were emerging from data analysis). (154) 
Focus groups were conducted between mid-May 2016 and mid-June 2016. 
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Analysis 
Data analysis followed the Framework Approach, using Reason’s Accident 
Causation Model and TDF domains deductively for to generate a coding 
framework (155), as follows 
1. data familiarization, repeatedly listening to the audio-recordings 
and reading transcripts to promote data immersion 
2. generating initial codes, using Reasons/TDF domains as headings, 
carried out independently by the doctoral student and one other 
member of the research team  
3. identification of themes within each of Reasons/TDF domains, as for 
code generation  
4. reviewing themes, which involved discussion between members of 
the research team  
5. defining, naming and mapping themes.  
6. producing the report, a narrative data analysis. Quotes were 
selected which best represented each of the themes, labeling each 
by profession to protect anonymity.   
 
Promoting quality in research: trustworthiness  
Steps were taken to enhance rigour and hence the trustworthiness of the 
findings. According to Lincoln and Guba, trustworthiness refers to the 
“truth value” of the study’s findings or how accurately the investigator 
interpreted the participant’s experiences.(55) As described in Chapter 2, 
rigour in qualitative research is established through credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability. The following steps were 
taken to promote trustworthiness: 
 
1. the doctoral student trained in qualitative interviewing and data 
analysis promoting credibility 
2. the doctoral student’s position and stance (as a pharmacist and 
medication safety officer in Qatar) was articulated and well-known 
to the supervisory team, and attempts made to promote both 
reflexivity and dependability 
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3. the research setting and participants were described to promote 
consideration of transferability 
4. a clearly described sampling strategy was adopted to enhance 
credibility and dependability 
5. all analysis was undertaken independently by two researchers to 
promote credibility and dependability 
6. there was constant reflection and reflexivity to promote credibility 
and dependability 
5.4 Ethics 
The study received ethical approval from Hamad Medical Corporation, 
Medical Research Center Qatar, Qatar University Institutional Review 
Board and Robert Gordon University Research Ethics Sub-Committee 
(Appendix 5.3).  
5.5 Results  
5.5.1 Demographics of participants 
The participants of the nine focus groups are given in Table 5.1. The 
duration of the focus groups was between 45 minutes to 1 hour. A total of 
54 participants from different disciplines participated, with just under half 
(n=26, 48.1%) being nurses, followed by 18 (33.3%) pharmacists and 10 
(18.5%) doctors. While almost all HMC hospitals were represented, the 
highest number of participants were from the Women’s Hospital (n=19, 
35.2%; where the focus groups were conducted), with no participants 
from the Cuban Hospital (provides a range of services to those residing in 
the western districts of Qatar). Most of the participants were highly 
experienced with only 11 (20.4%) having less than five years of 
experience
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Table 5-1: Demographics of focus group participants 
Code Profession Participants Department Years of practice 
FG1 Mixed 
N1 WH 11-15 
N2 WH 11-15 
P1 WH 6-10 
P2 WH 21-25 
D1 NICU 6-10 
D2 WH 6-10 
FG2 Mixed 
N1 HGH 11-15 
N2 WH 16-20 
P1 WH 11-15 
P2 AWK 11-15 
P3 HGH 11-15 
D1 HGH 6-10 
D2 HGH 16-20 
FG3 Nurses 
N1 RH 06-10 
N2 WH 11-15 
N3 HGH 06-10 
N4 HGH 11-15 
N5 HH 11-15 
N6 Quality < 5 
N7 WH < 5 
N8 HGH Not Given 
N9 HGH 6-10 
N10 WH Not Given 
N11 Quality < 5 
FG4 Mixed 
P1 NICU 6-10 
D1 HGH 6-10 
D2 WH 6-10 
P2 RH < 5 
FG5 Pharmacists 
P1 RH < 5 
P2 AKH 6-10 
P3 AKH < 5 
P4 WH 21-25 
FG6 Mixed 
N1 HGH 6-10 
D1 HGH < 5 
D2 NICU 6-10 
P1 NICU 6-10 
P2 WH 6-10 
FG7 Mixed 
N1 WH 6-10 
N2 AWK 11-15 
P1 WH 11-15 
D1 WH < 5 
N3 NCCCR 6-10 
D2 HGH 6-10 
N4 NCCCR < 5 
FG8 Nurses 
N1 RH 6-10 
N2 HGH 6-10 
N3 HH 6-10 
N4 WH < 5 
N5 HGH 16-20 
N6 HGH 6-10 
FG9 Pharmacists 
P1 WH 6-10 
P2 HGH 11-15 
P3 WH 16-20 
P4 WH < 5 
AKH Alkhor Hospital, AWK Alwakra Hospital, HGH Hamad General Hospital, HH Heart Hospital, 
NCCCR National Center for Cancer Care and Research, RH Rumailah Hospital, WH Women’s Hospital; 
P Pharmacist, D Doctor, N Nurse  
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5.5.2 Causes of errors discussed (Reason's Accident 
Causation Model) 
 
During the focus groups, there was wide-ranging discussion amongst the 
participants of their experiences across the spectrum of medication errors 
of prescribing, administration and dispensing errors.  
These are presented in Table 5.2, with illustrative examples from all 
professions and levels of seniority, in terms of the Reason Model of 
Accident Causation, (63,64) of active and latent failures.  
Table 5-2: Examples of active and latent failures discussed by focus group 
participants 
 
 Illustrative examples 
A
c
ti
v
e
 f
a
il
u
r
e
s
 
(
e
r
r
o
r
s
, 
v
io
la
ti
o
n
s
)
 
Knowledge-based 
errors 
‘Because we… we [pharmacists] do not know the doses 
actually, the accurate doses.  For adult patients, we 
would know the doses, but for paediatrics we may not 
know.’ (FG8P3) 
 
‘There are some specialties… if we’re dealing with 
general hospital, medicine department has good 
orientation regarding own medication, but if you go to 
ortho [orthopaedics] or surgery, really their knowledge 
about medication is very low.’ (FG5P3) 
 
‘Actually, I think we have a problem now with the new 
staff or the new doctors who don’t know about our 
formulary.’ (FG7P4) 
 
‘…I don’t think that education is done properly because 
nowadays when you go to the ward, X1, X2, X3 [names 
of the wards] the person… the nurse who’s coming with 
me for the rounds doesn’t know anything about the 
patient, and she’ll call somebody, some other sister to 
ask each time that I ask her…’ (FG1D2) 
 
Skills-based 
errors 
‘Most of the incidents happen, you know, the doctors 
get confused between dopamine and dobutamine in our 
unit. So, they are thinking about dopamine but they are 
prescribing dobutamine.’ (FG4P2) 
 
‘The pharmacist got confused between giving 
amitriptyline and amlodipine,  look alike, sound alike 
medication.’ (FG7P1) 
 
Rule-based errors ‘There are actually unapproved abbreviations used.’ 
(FG2N2) 
 
‘Medication reconciliation is not being performed by all 
doctors. In fact right now, we are worried that 
medication reconciliation is not being done most of the 
time.’ (FG8SP2) 
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‘…not following the policy because there is already a 
policy that we should not use unapproved medicines.’ 
(FG2N1) 
 
L
a
te
n
t 
fa
il
u
r
e
s
 
Organisational 
factors 
‘Yeah, shortage of staff, as he mentioned, it is one of 
the reasons [for errors occurring]. And this is why the 
medication errors are also increasing, so it’s not always 
related to the knowledge of the resident.  And if the 
resident is overloaded because he has to document for 
all the patients…’ (FG2N1) 
 
‘Actually I see frequently this type of medication 
error…the antibiotic guideline is not clear...it should be 
simpler.’ (FG7P1) 
 
Even I’m noting that during the rounds, with order 
decisions, the nurses are not informed. Sometimes they 
[the doctors] are discussing, sometimes in Arabic 
language The nurse, she cannot understand their plan 
and the decision.’  (FG3N) 
 
There are two problems here, a load on the physician 
that can leads to many mistakes and a load on the 
pharmacist because he needs to dispense medication for 
this patient and at the same time answer the questions 
of physicians, nurses…’ (FG5P4) 
 
Supervision 
issues 
‘One more thing what I noticed here, if any error is 
happening in our unit, it is not communicated with 
others.  If you are communicating with others, a second 
person will not make that error. …if I inform the 
supervisor or someone, he will keep that matter 
between two or three persons.’ (FG9P4) 
 
‘You see, the main thing is the administrative people 
need to sit together with the physicians and the nurses 
who are on the floor, to listen to them, and make 
amendments, changes. They have to ask us, the people 
who are on the floor, ‘what is the problem, why these 
things are happening?’ (FG1D2) 
 
Process design ‘If I’m ordering a double medication then Cerner 
[electronic health record system] does alert me.  But 
also many times Cerner alerts me for things that I don’t 
care, this is routine.  We do it all the time and it, I 
mean, it alerts me and what I do is override, override 
and give it. Suppose there is something which really 
needs to be seen then I will miss it.’  (FG6D2) 
 
‘This is again another problem we have in Cerner 
[electronic health record system]. We built the system 
and we think that it is correct and it is perfect. It is not 
perfect. It will not stop you at any time from doing 
something wrong.’ (FG7P1) 
 
‘So you are working in the pharmacy, I’m working in 
another unit, he is working in the transplant unit, she is 
working in the nursing office. We are all working 
together but we are not seeing each other. The system 
[Cerner] is connecting us together. So if there is a 
trouble with the system, a problem with the system, so 
mistakes happen.’ (FG6D1) 
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5.5.3 Behavioural determinants associated with errors 
(Theoretical Domain Framework) 
The following section describes the themes identified during analysis of 
the focus group transcripts in relation to causes of errors. These are 
mapped to the behavioural determinant domains of Theoretical Domain 
Framework (TDF). (65,151,152)  
Domain 1, Knowledge (an awareness of the existence of something) 
1. Lack of medication related knowledge  
There was a recurring theme from all participants that lack of medication 
knowledge led to errors occurring. This was discussed mainly in relation to 
nurses and doctors,   
‘So coming to the nursing knowledge regarding the dose. I will 
never believe they have that much knowledge about the doses…’
          
  (FG1D1) 
‘I do agree with that.’       
 (FG1D2) 
‘There is no physician will have full knowledge, full knowledge about 
all the medication.’       
 (FG5P4) 
‘Physicians are not medication-oriented. I cannot expect the 
physician to know everything about medication.’    
  (FG5P1) 
Several noted that with that additional knowledge, errors could be 
avoided, 
‘If we have a good knowledge about the side effects or how, you 
know, the proper dosage for levetiracetam administration, this 
[error] could have been avoided.’     
  (FG6N1) 
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A few voiced the opposite view that lack of knowledge was not an issue 
given that their training and continuing professional development was 
sufficient,  
‘I don’t think it’s a knowledge gap because no nurse graduates from 
nursing school without having a basic knowledge about the 
medication and as our colleagues said that all the nurses have the 
competencies updated and reviewed.’      
   (FG2N1) 
‘from NICU [neonatal intensive care unit] wise they are giving 
proper education and training regarding the pharmacology as well 
as the calculations and everything.’      
 (FG4P1) 
2. Knowledge is limited to a particular speciality/area 
There were several settings or circumstances in which lack of medication 
knowledge was considered more likely to be an issue. There was much 
discussion regarding the influence of the speciality and that those working 
within the area of general medicine were likely to possess a more rounded 
knowledge as opposed to those in specialist areas, who had less 
knowledge of medication outwith their speciality, 
‘If we’re dealing with the general hospital, medicine department 
they have good orientation regarding medication, but if you go to 
ortho [orthopaedics] or surgery, really their knowledge about 
medication is very low.’       
   (FG5P3) 
‘Some specialties have only limited knowledge of their medication.  
Let’s say endocrinologist, you know the diabetic patient may take a 
lot of medication, between 10 to 12 medications.  The 
endocrinologist knows the oral antidiabetic and let’s say insulin.   
    (FG5P4) 
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3. Lack of knowledge attributed to staff induction  
The lack of emphasis on medication related issues at induction for new 
staff was highlighted as a particular issue, 
‘We are bringing new staff and this [training related to medication 
use] is not incorporated in the curriculum of the training or the 
orientation of the staff.’         
  (FG2P2) 
 ‘Proper induction, you know, they should have proper induction 
regarding the medication, the medications that are used, how you 
do the checking and things like that. Nothing is done.’   
   (FG1D2) 
 
4. Need for education and training to reduce medication errors 
Many, across all professionals and grades of seniority, discussed the need 
for awareness raising and education and training to reduce the occurrence 
of medication errors, 
‘I guess just by, you know, like sister mentioned, you know, 
awareness. Creating awareness, okay. Such and such incident 
happened. These are the circumstances, the background, the 
contributing factors.   
(FG7D1) 
‘Educational sessions for the physician will have great impact on 
decreasing medication error.’      
 (FG5P3) 
‘There is too much error in this area, they can provide another or a 
new continuous education for this field. It’s very important and this 
can prevent such error.’        
  (FG7N1) 
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Domain 2, Skills (an ability or proficiency acquired through practice) 
1. Suboptimal medication related skills  
Suboptimal skills were considered to lead to medication errors. There was 
discussion around doctors’ prescribing skills,  
‘The doctors are ignorant in writing the prescriptions. They are 
all…mostly all making errors.’                       
  (FG3N) 
There were also concerns over nurses’ abilities relating to pharmaceutical 
calculations leading to medication errors,  
‘We need to think about the administration. I have seen plenty of 
times the paper on which they have written the calculation and it’s 
wrong, actually most of the time.’      
 (FG4P1) 
 ‘And of course, there is an administration error also because as a 
nurse, she should also think about how ten tablets at a time will be 
given to this patient.’        
 (FG2N2) 
Poor medication dispensing related skills of pharmacists were also 
identified as causes of medication errors,  
‘I feel it is negligence from the pharmacist, the person who has 
dispensed…there is definite negligence.’                
 (FG1D2) 
Domain 3, Beliefs about capabilities (acceptance of the truth, reality, 
or validity about outcomes of behaviour in a given situation) 
1. Lack of medication related competence  
During the focus group discussions, doctors and pharmacists particularly 
were of the view that nurses were not competent to check the prescribed 
doses prior to administering medication,  
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‘But you think it’s… it’s… it’s valid to let the nurses check the dose 
before administering? No, I don’t think it’s possible.  For me, I feel 
it’s impossible for them to check the correct dose.’    
 (FG1D1) 
‘It’s [checking the dose] something beyond their [nurses’], I mean, 
capability.’        
 (FG1P1) 
There was, however, discussion that while nurses may not be competent 
to check the doses of all medication, they should be sufficiently competent 
around unusual doses, particularly those within their areas of practice,  
‘So you know, I cannot say that they [nurses] are 100% competent 
enough but more than 70% or 80% I can say. We don’t expect the 
nurse to know all the wrong doses, but she knows the unusual 
dose.’  
(FG4P1) 
2. Overconfidence leading to medication errors   
Doctors and pharmacists also discussed that, at times, they were over-
familiar with medication, which resulted in them becoming overconfident 
and leading to medication errors occurring,  
‘Overconfidence with some particular medicines like I have been 
with this medicine for many years and I know by heart’   
 (FG1P2) 
Domain 4, Social/professional role and identity (a coherent set of 
behaviours and displayed personal qualities of an individual in a social or 
work setting) 
1. Doctors relying on pharmacists to correct errors 
During discussion, it emerged that there were instances where doctors 
would rely on pharmacists to correct their prescribing errors and this led 
to complacency around prescribing,  
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‘Yes. Most of the physician make a medication error and wait the 
pharmacist to correct it.’       
 (FG5P4) 
2. Doctors reluctant to alter other doctors’ prescribing  
During one focus group, there was concern that doctors were unwilling to 
alter prescriptions written by other doctors, particularly for doctors from 
other specialities. The doctors considered this to be the responsibility of 
the original prescriber, even if a prescribing error had been made and 
initial prescriber was unavailable,  
‘This will happen when you’re in the Ob-Gyn [obstetrics and 
gynaecology] setup.  If one physician came from Hamad from 
other… from cardiac or other site, if they write any prescription, if 
you call the Ob-Gyn doctor here, the on duty doctor, she will never 
agree to change because she will say it’s an order from the 
consultant from cardiology or neurology.’    
      (FG7P4) 
3. Lack of recognition of the role of nurses  
Some of the nurses described that they were often omitted from 
discussions around patient care and decision making, even when present 
on ward rounds or meetings. There were instances where discussions took 
place in a different language,  
‘Even I’m noting that during the rounds, order team decisions, the 
nurses are not informed. Sometimes they [the doctors] are 
discussing in Arabic language. The nurse, she cannot understand 
their plan and what is the decision. Their decisions are… they’re 
neglecting the nurses. They are not telling that the next plan for 
this patient.’  
(FG3N) 
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4. Policy non-adherence  
Health professionals not adhering to various policies was considered a 
cause of medication errors,  
‘Not following the policy because there is already a policy we should 
not use unapproved decimal point. There is already a policy and 
with the physician supposed to be followed, so they are not 
following that policy       
  (FG2P1, N1) 
‘Not abiding the… complying with the policies’        
 (FG2D2)  
 ‘There are seven or eight points that the pharmacist should check. 
If the pharmacist, for example, dispensed the wrong medication it 
means that he didn’t follow the policy.’                                           
   (FG5P4) 
Domain 5, Goals (mental representations of outcomes or end states that 
an individual wants to achieve) 
1. Promoting patient safety  
It was apparent that focus group participants shared a common goal of 
promoting patient safety and reducing harm through the prevention 
medication errors. They were, however, realistic that not all errors could 
be prevented,  
‘But you know, serious errors are part of the package, you know.  
As we save lives, we are not ensuring… I mean, we should expect 
that we cannot have zero even serious errors because we are 
human beings’.  
(FG5P1) 
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Domain 6, Emotions (a complex reaction pattern, involving experiential, 
behavioural, and physiological elements, by which the individual attempts 
to deal with a personally significant matter or event) 
1. Stress leading to medication errors 
Stress and high-pressure situations were described in all focus groups as 
influences on medication errors. While workload was a common factor 
leading to stress, patients themselves could also put undue pressure and 
hence cause stress in health professionals,  
‘According to the situation of the nurse, the nurse is having heavy 
load of work and she may have stress. Maybe some other stress, 
maybe… she cannot concentrate properly.’     
  (FG1N1) 
‘And I think that probably the stresses of the work [leads to 
errors].’           
  (FG1D2) 
 ‘And parents are too tense than they are… even the parents they 
are too much angry. Yeah, they will scold the staff then like that 
time they will get pressure.’      
   (FG7N3) 
Domain 7, Environmental Context and Resources (any circumstance 
of a person's situation or environment that discourages or encourages the 
development of skills and abilities, independence, social competence, and 
adaptive behaviour) 
Much of the discussion centred on aspects of environmental context and 
resources as key influences precipitating medication errors. These were 
discussed by almost all participants in all focus groups. There were several 
key themes within this domain.  
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1. Workload issues leading to medication errors   
Workload issues were discussed by doctors, nurses and pharmacists.  
Doctors believed one of the reasons for errors to happen was the heavy 
workload that they had.  
‘Too many patients.  Labour ward is full, you know, too many 
patients for the residents to see, doctors to see, you know.’ 
 (FG1D2) 
 ‘Yeah, I’m working in emergency.  So what I feel is it’s too much… 
sometime it is too busy and doctors are giving too much 
orders…they cannot be able to cope with the situation.’  
 (FG1N1) 
One pharmacist noted that the excessive workload for the doctor lead to 
errors occurring and that this workload also put pressure on other health 
professionals which could compound errors,  
‘There is two problems here, a load on the physician that can lead 
to many mistakes and a load on the pharmacist because he needs 
to dispense medication for this patient and at the same time answer 
the questions of physician, nurses, you know.’   
 (FG5P4) 
One of the nurse also explained that the main cause of errors committed 
by junior medical staff was workload rather than lack of knowledge,  
‘And this is why the medication errors are also increasing, so it’s not 
always related to the knowledge of the resident. And if the resident 
is overloaded because he has to document for all the patients and 
see all the patients and he is receiving calls from other units as well’ 
          
  (FG3N) 
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2. Lack of staff at key times  
Closely related to workload issues was a critical lack of staff at key times 
such as weekends and evening shifts, which could compromise patient 
safety,  
‘On the whole days of the week, there is complete staff, complete 
number of physicians. In weekend, well, only one physician, only 
one physician is going for the whole work.’     
 (FG4D2) 
‘Especially the areas like emergency, what I feel is that it is due to 
too much rush of patient and less staff. Less staff. They will be get… 
too much tense by the patients and they just want to do the things 
for faster than the… so it will make so much errors. Workload itself 
is the main cause because they are not getting time.’   
  (FG2N1) 
3. System related issues  
Discussion also centred on key issues related to the systems in operation 
in various wards and departments. There was particular concern over the 
implementation of Cerner (electronic health record system for hospitals, 
health care providers, clinics) from doctors, nurses and pharmacists,  
‘The electronic system is not robust, and I mean, the hardware is 
not good enough.  You might land up in this, and if a clinician has 
to do so many cases, he also has to write the notes.’   
 (FG2D1) 
‘Yeah and this is what we are after Cerner. We are facing a lot and 
the most common potential errors we are facing after Cerner. We 
have now to concentrate on the mistakes or medication errors 
happening by the prescribing system.’      
   (FG5P2) 
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‘Now, with the Cerner process, it has become more complicated.’  
(FG2N1) 
One senior doctor commented that following implementation of Cerner, 
fewer checks were being performed compared to the previous paper-
based system,  
‘Before it was like, when you have the hard copy of medication 
profile, someone is checking, she has to check and countersign it. 
Now in the system, it is not there as far as I know.  In the system, 
it’s not there.’          
  (FG1D2) 
 
Table 5-3: A summary of TDF domains and themes relating to causes of 
medication errors 
Domain Theme 
Knowledge 
1. Lack of medication related knowledge 
 
2. Knowledge is limited to a particular 
speciality/area 
 
3. Lack of knowledge attributed to staff induction 
 
4. Need for education and training to reduce 
medication errors 
Skills 
1. Suboptimal medication related skills   
 
Beliefs about 
Capabilities 
1. Lack of medication related competence  
 
2. Overconfidence leading to medication errors  
  
Social/Professional 
Role and Identity 
1. Doctors relying on pharmacists to correct errors 
 
2. Doctors reluctant to alter other doctors’ 
prescribing 
 
3. Lack of recognition of the role of nurses 
 
4. Policy non-adherence 
 
Goals 
1. Promoting patient safety  
 
Emotions 
1. Stress leading to medication errors 
 
 146 
 
The following TDF domains were did not feature during focus groups 
discussions as determinants of medication errors, 
1. Optimism, the confidence that things will happen for the best or 
that desired goals will be attained. 
2. Beliefs about Consequences, acceptance of the truth, reality, or 
validity about outcomes of a behaviour in a given situation. 
3. Reinforcement, increasing the probability of a response by 
arranging a dependent relationship, or contingency, between the 
response and a given stimulus. 
4. Intentions, a conscious decision to perform a behaviour or a 
resolve to act in a certain way. 
5. Memory, Attention and Decision Processes, the ability to retain 
information, focus selectively on aspects of the environment and 
choose between two or more alternatives. 
6. Social Influences, those interpersonal processes that can cause 
individuals to change their thoughts, feelings, or behaviours. 
7. Behavioural Regulation, anything aimed at managing or 
changing objectively observed or measured actions. 
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5.5.4 C. Behavioural determinants associated with 
reporting medication errors 
 
The following section describes the themes identified during analysis of 
the focus group transcripts in relation to the reporting (or not reporting) 
of medication errors. These are mapped to the behavioural determinant 
domains of Theoretical Domain Framework (TDF).  
Domain 1, Goals (mental representations of outcomes or end states that 
an individual wants to achieve) 
Focus Group participants across all health professions, and at all levels of 
seniority, believed that the reporting of medication errors was of great 
important and essential to preventing future errors hence enhancing 
patient safety. 
1. Prevention of future medication errors 
Doctors, nurses and pharmacists all considered that reporting errors was a 
positive step in preventing future errors, but were also aware that this 
could not be achieved simply by completing and submitting the report,  
 ‘You should work on the prevention stage along with reporting 
because if you are only reporting, it will be like okay, I’m just 
sitting catching [medication errors].’      
  (FG5P1) 
 
‘So if we want to change this and we want to learn… because we 
report medication errors to learn from them, how to avoid these 
errors in the future…’        
  (FG3N3) 
 ‘…when I see my reporting at the end, I reach a conclusion that 
this led to change in preventing errors in the future.’   
 (FG2D1) 
‘If we report, we’ll be aware about this problem and then will try to 
prevent it in the future.’       
 (FG7P1)     
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2. Promoting patient safety 
Promoting patient safety was a clear goal of medication error reporting,  
‘Yes, of course [to report medication errors] for patient safety. 
‘Yeah, we must, we have to focus on harm of the patient. Patient 
first.’   
(FG7N4) 
One pharmacist and nurse in focus group 2 discussed that if a medication 
error was not reported, the same error could recur with worse 
consequences for the patient,  
‘We learn from our mistakes. If the errors are not reported, they 
will keep happening, and if it keeps happening, it may lead to a 
mortality the next time. So reporting an error is a must just for 
patient safety.’  
(FG2P3 & N1) 
Domain 2, Knowledge (an awareness of the existence of something) 
There were four key themes in relation to the TDF domain of knowledge: 
lack of knowledge in general concerning error reporting; lack of 
knowledge of error reporting policies; uncertainty of processes; and the 
expressed need for further education and training.  
1. Lack of knowledge in general concerning medication error 
reporting 
Senior staff noted that medication error reporting was not included in the 
induction and orientation programme for new staff hence there was a 
particular issues for newly recruited staff who they considered to be 
unaware of medication error reporting,  
‘Yeah, but the new staff, they don’t know, they don’t know about it 
[medication error reporting], and every two to three months, we 
are bringing new staff and this is not incorporated in the 
curriculum of the training or the orientation of the staff.’  
  (FG2P2) 
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2. Lack of knowledge of medication error reporting policy 
During focus groups, there were discussions of the lack of knowledge of 
HMC medication reporting policies and this appeared to be a particular 
issue for the doctors,  
‘I think the doctors maybe didn’t have orientation about this. They 
don’t know about the policies [medication error reporting] of the 
HMC.’ 
(FG2P1) 
3. Knowledge of medication error reporting processes  
While the pharmacists appeared to be aware of how to report a 
medication error,  
‘We know how to report a medication error…’   
 (FG6P1) 
doctors and nurses were less aware, with some admitting that they had 
no knowledge whatsoever,  
 
‘So the first thing I will tell you very honestly, I don’t know how 
to. I don’t know whom to speak to or how to actually report a 
medication error.’        
 (FG6D2) 
One doctor had never reported a medication error, 
‘I’m not aware of it exactly [medication error reporting].  I know 
I’ve never reported a medication error. Maybe… maybe years ago 
when it was on paper. I don’t recall to be honest.’   
  (FG7D1) 
This was also the case for one nurse, stating,  
‘No. Because if anything happens in our department, we are 
usually informing our charge nurse. No, we don’t do directly’  
 (FG7N2) 
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4. Expressed need for education and training  
Many focus group participants, particularly those more senior, highlighted 
the need for education and training as a key step towards improving 
medication error reporting within HMC,  
‘Education of staff, encouraging the staff and reassuring the staff.’      
(FG4D1) 
 
‘So, educating the staff, you know, getting that change of attitude’ 
(FG4P1) 
 
One pharmacist suggested that education and training in reporting should 
be coupled with stressing that a blame free culture existed within HMC, 
 
‘If we make it like increase awareness about reporting and a free 
blame.’ 
(FG6P2) 
 
Several others suggested the need for regular education and training, 
particularly for those who had not reported during a fixed time period,  
 
You probably need timely orientations and it should be part of 
their [nurses] orientation when they come to the hospital, right? 
And if you don’t report for 2 years, like I have, maybe I got an 
orientation two years ago maybe, but I have never reported it, so 
I will forget it maybe, right?      
   (FG6D2) 
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Domain 3, Skills (an ability or proficiency acquired through practice) 
1. Possible lack of ability to recognise and report medication 
errors 
During one focus group of nurses, several participants with between six 
and ten years of experience discussed that they had never had to submit 
a medication error report as they had never witnessed an error. Given 
that all errors, irrespective of severity should be reported according to 
HMC policy, this may suggest a lack of ability to recognise medication 
errors,  
‘In case, but it’s [a medication error] never happened, so never. 
No, no, never happened that’s why’.      
 (FG8N1) 
 
‘I’m here for the past six years.  Six years, I have never heard 
anyone have a medication error also.’     
  (FG8N3) 
 
During the same focus group, one nurse described submitting a 
medication error report but it was apparent that this had been submitted 
using the incorrect form,   
‘Using the direct adverse effect form [the incorrect form].’ 
 (FG8N2) 
 
There was also some discussion over a lack of consistency in what was 
considered to be a medication error,  
‘As I had told before, one medication error in my mind is not the 
same as a medication error in his mind.’    
 (FG6P1) 
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Domain 4, Social/professional role and identity (a coherent set of 
behaviours and displayed personal qualities of an individual in a social or 
work setting) 
1. Professional obligation to report medication errors 
While most of the participants considered it part of their professional duty 
to report medication errors,  
‘Yeah, we need to report this medication error.  If you are… if you 
are setting aside all this blame-free culture and also, you know, 
everyone should come forward to report this error’  
 (FG6P1) 
  
some participants expressed the opposite view. As the following doctor 
described, there were individuals within HMC who were working for the 
salary only,  
‘why should they report also when they don’t feel like reporting, 
feel like acting on it and feel like improving the system? … you 
know, everybody almost I’ll tell you 60… 70 to 80% of people I’m 
working with or I’m come across, they are just working because 
they need to work. 
(FG1D1) 
2. Perceived lack of reporting from doctors 
There was a general acceptance that doctors were much less likely to 
report medication errors compared to pharmacists and nurses,  
‘Based on my experience for monitoring and analysing medication 
errors since two years ago, what is very noticeable is that high 
reporting, it is coming from the pharmacist, and there is also a 
percentage coming from the nurses especially for the 
administrating error but I never had for doctors.’   
      (FG2P1) 
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‘Until now, I never received any medication error report from any 
physicians unless one ADR [adverse drug reaction] report.’ 
 (FG2P2) 
Domain 5, Intentions (a conscious decision to perform a behaviour or a 
resolve to act in a certain way) 
1. Selectively reporting errors depending on severity 
There was much discussion that health professionals were much more 
likely to report those medication errors considered less serious or those 
which did not result in harm to the patient, 
 
‘One thing I will definitely say. If it is a serious error or something, 
I don’t think it is going to be reported. If there is no harm or 
something, they’re not going to report it.’     
  (FG9P4) 
 
The same pharmacist continued,  
‘…if you check the number of reports… if you analyze all the 
reporting that all the reports will be near misses. That is, there is 
no more… not much big errors.’      
   (FG9P4) 
 
Several nurses, however, gave the opposite view that they were more 
likely to report medication errors which had caused harm to the patient 
rather than those ‘near misses’ which had not reached the patient,  
 
If this is going to harm the patient, okay in such cases, definitely 
you will report but if it’s something like… like a near miss, it never 
gets reported because we never give it to the patient.’   
  (FG6N1) 
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2. Reporting for the wrong reason  
 
During one focus group of pharmacists there was concern that, on 
occasion, a health professional would submit a report for an error 
committed by a colleague as a way of retaliation for that colleague 
submitting a report for an error committed by the first health professional,  
 
‘Yeah, he’s suffering and he is now collecting any mistake for his 
colleague. He’s not concentrating. Now, he is just collecting the 
mistakes for the other people who report.’     
 (FG5P2) 
 
Domain 6, Beliefs about consequences (acceptance of the truth, 
reality, or validity about outcomes of behaviour in a given situation) 
1. Reporting leading to improved practice 
One positive consequence of reporting, discussed during all focus groups 
was the potential to improve professional practice which could prevent 
similar errors from occurring in the future,  
‘Yeah, it is essential and good [reporting medication errors]. You 
can prevent…you will learn from it. You will learn from it. And we 
can alleviate the fear of the staff.’     
 (FG8P1) 
One pharmacist described how submitting a medication error report could 
be a positive action with impact throughout HMC,  
‘That’s why I’m telling you report because you want to learn and 
others learn from your experience. See instead of having it as a 
negative point of view, they have converted it as learning and 
then positive. See if I report next time, people would learn not 
only me, but all throughout the corporation, across the corporation 
would know that having this experience, they can learn.   
    (FG8P2) 
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This was also described by a nurse,  
‘Well personally, yes because it would help in the future.  Because 
it would help a lot of nurses to avoid the same error.’ 
 (FG6N)   
 
Despite these positive views, there was much discussion in all focus 
groups on the perceived negative consequence of submitting medication 
error reports. 
 
2. Further investigation 
 
One negative consequence of submitting a medication error report was 
that there was likely to be further investigation into the error which was a 
barrier to submitting further reports, 
 
 ‘We bring us here to this committee to discuss the medication 
errors like imagine someone who has done an error and then he 
reports, and then he’s been called by two to three committees to 
investigate the errors.  What he will go back?’   
    (FG2P2) 
‘And another thing, if you are going to report an error, you will not stop 
there here. You will be asked to write a letter, you will be asked to for a 
meeting, it doesn’t stop from there. Again, next time they will ask you 
give me feedback on this. Give me explanation on this. So that is the… 
the… those are the things that compromises when you are reporting an 
error.’          (FG3N) 
3. Impacting staff appraisal 
Closely linked the investigations acting as barriers to reporting, there was 
concern that reporting medication errors was likely to affect any 
evaluation of their performance resulting in less likelihood of reporting 
medication errors,   
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‘Does affect the evaluation. Do you think that if she does an error 
and she does administer a wrong medication, do you think she will 
report it?’ 
(F
G3N1) 
It will affect [my performance appraisal]… the issue really…they 
decrease the evaluation. So even if you tell me hundred times that 
‘no you’re going to be safe’, I will think… I will take time before 
reporting.  That’s what I’m saying.      
   (FG4P2) 
 
4. Impacting working relationships 
There was also much concern that submitting a medication error report 
for an error committed by a colleague would damage working 
relationships. This was expressed by all health professionals at all levels of 
seniority, 
 ‘And she said yeah I will report it, but she never reported that 
because we know that it will end up with the… with blame. It’s not 
because I want to protect my colleague. It’s because I don’t agree 
that we should be blamed because this is the system that is 
provided to us to work in.’  
(FG3N) 
‘I will not [report], I mean, why would I?  Because, you know, I’m 
thinking about what happened to my friend. Isn’t it? So even if 
you tell me a hundred times that’ no you’re going to be safe’, I will 
think… never.’        
         (FG4D2) 
 
 ‘If anyone is coming to improve you, I will like him. But if anyone 
is coming to report against me, I will be the enemy of him.’ 
 (FG9P1) 
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5. Lack of confidentiality 
Many focus group participants perceived that submitted medication error 
reports were not handled in a confidential manner and that there was 
potential for the details of the report to be shared with others leading to a 
lack of trust,  
 
‘No confidentiality. If you did something, everybody would know 
about it, but then the people who get to have the authority to 
report, they have to be trusted people. They have to have the 
confidentiality agreement that they will not spread the name.’  
    (FG5P1) 
 
‘…and there is no confidentiality. That is most important, it’s 
gossiping. Everyone knows. Those who are not related also know 
that.’  
(FG4D1&D2) 
6. Lack of feedback 
Despite almost all focus group participants identifying the goal of 
reporting of improved patient safety, the lack of feedback obtained when 
submitting a medication error report was a deterrent to further reporting,  
‘But still I didn’t… never heard of any person coming back to us 
saying that this is the action. And this system [reporting system], 
I never heard of any outcome. No, not even improvement… we are 
investing our time for nothing.’     
  (FG4D1) 
‘So no feedback, no appreciation, so do you need to take the 
stress?  You work, do your assigned work, go home healthy and 
peaceful.’ 
(FG1D2) 
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‘As you said, like you know some, some staff are reporting but they 
are not getting a feedback. I mean there is no point in reporting.’  
 (FG8N4) 
 
Domain 7, Emotion (a complex reaction pattern, involving experiential, 
behavioural, and physiological elements, by which the individual attempts 
to deal with a personally significant matter or event) 
1. Fear and worry  
During all focus groups, the issue of reporting medication errors being 
associated with fear and worry emerged as a key barrier to reporting. For 
some, it appeared that this fear was real with reporting leading to 
punishment, 
‘You know people… when people think some error has happened, 
for me they should report openly but they don’t… it won’t happen 
in Hamad Hospital because they are… they are fearful actually. 
People are really… really… punished.’     
 (FG1P1 & FG1D1) 
 
‘Maybe people are afraid.  They are afraid if they will be punished 
or someone or something… They’re afraid.’    
 (FG2N2)  
 
‘And I think it’s… if you report it, there’s a lot of learning, but in 
the thing in… I think the thing in Qatar is that people are afraid of 
reporting because they’re afraid.’      
 (FG4P2 & D2) 
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Domain 7, Reinforcement (increasing the probability of a response by 
arranging a dependent relationship, or contingency, between the response 
and a given stimulus) 
1. Encouragement to report 
Several focus group participants, particularly those in more senior 
positions, suggested different approached ways to enhance medication 
error reporting.  
One pharmacist described a reward for the most active reporter within the 
department,  
‘I remember when we have a previous Director of Clinical 
Pharmacy service. She used to do every month the pharmacist 
who reporting the highest percentage of errors, and then they give 
him a certificate or a gift.’      
    (FG2P2)  
 
One nurse described positive feedback,  
‘Yeah, if you will ask me I do encourage reporting of cases. I will 
always tell them this is an incident. It doesn’t cause you any 
harm. This is a notification. This is not a punishment to anybody.’ 
  (FG3N1) 
Similarly, one pharmacist described feedback and encouragement report 
which was seen as a clear indication of a positive safety culture,  
 ‘I don’t think so because every hospital is different than the 
others, but I’m talking about the Women’s Hospital. The main 
reason for high reporting percentage from the pharmacist is the 
encouraging from the pharmacy administrations of reporting, and 
the safety culture.’  
(FG2P1) 
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Domain 8, Environmental context and resources (any circumstance 
of a person's situation or environment that discourages or encourages the 
development of skills and abilities, independence, social competence, and 
adaptive behaviour) 
There were several themes relating to the working environment and the 
available resources. 
1. No fair blame culture 
One key theme which deterred reporting was the perception that the 
participants were not working in a no blame or fair blame culture. This 
was discussed by all professions in all focus groups,   
‘I remember when it started, it was like a blame-free [culture] and 
there was no name of persons involved…. Now, it has become 
mandatory to mention the name [or the individual committing the 
error].’  
(FG1P1) 
‘It is not a blame-free environment…they [management] are 
telling us ‘blame free’ but it is not at all. We will not report at any 
cost.’ 
(FG7N3) 
‘Actually, what I’m thinking about this whole subject is it’s under 
reported and that’s 100% true. And why, because I think from my 
perspective this is a punitive environment that we are living in.’   
(FG6D1) 
2. Time consuming to report 
There was also discussion that completing and submitting a medication 
error report was time consuming and that health professionals were 
already working under pressure, 
‘Second thing, they have less time, you know. Maybe they will 
think they have seen one mistake. Suppose it is a prescribing 
error, they [health professionals] will call the doctor and get it 
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corrected rather than reporting it so that they will save their time.’ 
   (FG2N1) 
 
‘I think it’s more of a headache. If you report and then you’re 
being called for many meetings. We already have no time…’ 
(FG2D2) 
Several participants considered the reporting process to also be tedious, 
‘System of reporting is very tedious. It is very long…For example, 
I’m verifying 200 prescription and in the 200 prescription, I have 
50 medication errors. I will not be able to report.’  
 (FG4P2) 
Table 5.4 is a summary of all themes, liked to TDF domains. Each theme 
is identified as either a facilitator or barrier of medication error reporting. 
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Table 5-4: A summary of TDF domains and themes relating to reporting of 
medication errors, identifying each as a barrier or facilitator 
 
Domain Theme Facilitator Barrier 
Goals 
1. Prevention of future 
medication errors 
 
2. Promoting patient safety 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
Knowledge 
1. Lack of knowledge in general 
concerning medication error 
reporting 
 
2. Lack of knowledge of 
medication error reporting 
policy 
 
3. Knowledge of medication 
error reporting processes 
 
4. Expressed need for 
education and training 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
Skills 
1. Possible lack of ability to 
recognise and report 
medication errors 
 
 √ 
Social/professional 
role and identity 
1. Professional obligation to 
report medication errors 
 
2. Perceived lack of reporting 
from doctors 
 
√ √ 
 
 
√ 
Intentions 
1. Selectively reporting errors 
depending on severity 
 
2. Reporting for the wrong 
reason 
 
 √ 
 
 
√ 
Beliefs about 
consequences 
1. Reporting leading to 
improved practice 
 
2. Further investigation 
 
3. Impacting staff appraisal  
 
4. Impacting working 
relationships 
 
5. Lack of confidentiality 
 
6. Lack of feedback 
 
√  
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
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Emotion 
1. Fear and worry 
 
 √ 
Reinforcement 
1. Encouragement to report 
 
√  
Environmental 
context and 
resources 
1. No fair blame culture 
 
2. Time consuming 
 √ 
 
√ 
 
The following TDF domains were did not feature during focus groups 
discussions as determinants of medication error reporting, 
1. Optimism, the confidence that things will happen for the best or 
that desired goals will be attained. 
2. Beliefs about capabilities, acceptance of the truth, reality, or 
validity about outcomes of behaviour in a given situation 
3. Intentions, a conscious decision to perform a behaviour or a 
resolve to act in a certain way. 
4. Memory, attention and decision Processes, the ability to retain 
information, focus selectively on aspects of the environment and 
choose between two or more alternatives. 
5. Social influences, those interpersonal processes that can cause 
individuals to change their thoughts, feelings, or behaviours. 
6. Behavioural regulation, anything aimed at managing or changing 
objectively observed or measured actions 
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5.6 Discussion 
 
5.6.1 Statement of key findings 
 
This study highlighted experiences of medication errors across all of the 
sub-types of Reason’s Accident Causation Model. During focus group 
discussions, specific TDF determinants suggested as being potentially 
associated with these errors were: social/professional role and identity; 
emotions; and environmental context and resources. Thematic analysis 
identified issues of doctors relying on pharmacists to correct their errors 
and being reluctant to alter the prescribing of fellow doctors. There was a 
lack of recognition of nurses’ roles and frequent policy non-adherence. 
Stress was perceived to be a major contributor to errors, as was excessive 
workload and lack of staff at key times.  
Discussions on issues of medication error reporting identified a number of 
facilitators and barriers. The TDF domain of emotions featured heavily, 
with several key themes emerging as barriers to reporting: fear and 
worry; likely investigation follow reporting; impact on evaluation and 
appraisal processes; that reporting an error committed by a colleague 
would damage professional relationships; and that reports were not 
always handled in a confidential manner. 
5.6.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
 
This study has several strengths, including the many steps taken to 
promote research trustworthiness, as described previously. However, the 
main limitation is that the qualitative findings may not be transferable to 
other healthcare professionals, settings and countries.  
5.6.3 Interpretation 
 
This study aligns to the WHO ‘Global Patient Safety Challenge’ calling for 
action to reduce severe, avoidable medication-related harm by 50% in the 
next five years. (2,3) The use of behavioural theory within the focus 
groups in this study identified key determinants which could facilitate 
intervention development. TDF has been incorporated within intervention 
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developments for smoking cessation, physical activity, hand hygiene, 
acute low back pain and schizophrenia. (156) To date only one other 
published study has applied TDF to explore potential causes of medication 
errors, focusing on prescribing errors in a sample of junior doctors in 
Scotland.(157) There are some similarities with the findings of this study, 
most notably within the domains of knowledge and skills, particularly the 
general lack of medication-related knowledge. While pharmacists can 
provide support, and indeed doctors were found to rely on pharmacists to 
correct errors, there are issues around staff complement and workload, 
particularly at key times.   
TDF domains of social/ professional role and identify, emotions and 
environmental context and resources are related to organisational safety 
culture, as defined by ‘Study Group on Human Factors’.(158) Concerns 
were expressed around nurses perceiving that their professional role was 
not recognised leading to poor communication compromising patient 
safety. There were instances of doctors relying on pharmacists to correct 
their prescribing errors and, at times, would not alter the prescribing of 
others, even when errors could potentially lead to patient harm. Themes 
of environmental context and resources also emerged in the discussions 
around workload as a leading cause of errors, with lack of staff at key 
pressure times of evening and weekends. Furthermore, the electronic 
prescribing and records system was considered to have introduced 
potential for error. While such systems have been shown to enhance 
patient safety, others have also highlighted the risky human factors and 
user-centred design issues that have been encountered. (159)   
Stress was the main theme which emerged in the TDF emotions domain 
as a determinant of error, arising due to workload, work pressures and 
the influence of patients  
These TDF determinants which were highlighted as potential contributors 
to medication errors can be used during the development of behaviour 
change interventions, defined as ‘coordinated sets of activities designed to 
change specified behaviour patterns’. These are often complex, consisting 
of interacting components known as ‘behaviour change techniques’ 
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(BCTs), ‘observable and replicable components designed to change 
behaviour’.(66) Michie et al. developed a cross-disciplinary taxonomy of 
evidence based BCTs (160), mapped to specific TDF domains. Whilst 
knowledge and skills can be impacted through education and training 
(160,161), altering aspects of social/ professional role and identity and 
environmental context and resources are more complex. Indeed, the work 
of Michie et al. (160,161) did not identify any evidence-based BCTs which 
mapped reliably to social/professional role and identity. Those for 
environmental context and resources relating mainly to restructuring the 
physical environment and providing prompts and cues for safer practice, 
which in this case would focus on the electronic medication systems. 
(160,161) Given this lack of specific, identified BCTs to support behaviour 
change together with the likely difficulties in changing the behaviour of 
individuals, it may be that action and support are required at the level of 
the organization (i.e. HMC level). This could include review of policies to 
encompass structures (e.g. resource allocation and distribution) and 
processes (e.g. those promote patient safety culture and minimise harm). 
These organizational actions could then lead to, and support, changing 
behaviours of teams and individuals. Qualitative research focusing on 
understanding the perspectives of key strategic decision-makers in 
relation to promoting all aspects of medication safety is warranted.   
Effective and efficient medication error reporting systems impact patient 
care through early identification of issues informing safer systems of 
practice.(2,5) (1,5) HMC requires all errors, irrespective of severity, and 
near misses to be reported (24), hence the finding that less than one third 
of respondents had submitted any error reports in the last 12 months is 
likely evidence of significant under-reporting. This situation is not unique 
to Qatar or indeed the Middle East (7, 11-13), with the consequence that 
key opportunities to act on reports and improve medication practices are 
being missed.  
Development of effective interventions to improve reporting is based upon 
the identification of facilitators and barriers and consideration of theories 
of behaviour change (16). While other quantitative and qualitative studies 
have identified barriers of reporting (6-15), there has been a lack of 
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attention paid to theoretical underpinning. On exploring error reporting 
behaviour in the focus groups, several facilitators emerged, related to the 
goals of reporting (promoting safety and preventing future errors), 
knowledge of processes and reinforcement around encouragement to 
support. Most discussion in the focus groups centred on the barriers 
relating to emotions. Fear and worry emerged as a key theme that 
deterred reporting, with some citing others being ‘punished’ following 
reporting. There were narratives around intense follow-up investigations 
that appeared to focus on the individuals involved rather than the system. 
There was concern that reporting errors could impact future appraisals 
and career progression as well as negatively affecting professional 
reputation and relationships.  
In a study of one-to-one interviews with healthcare professionals in the 
UAE, Alqubaisi et al [21], identified several recurring themes of fear and 
impacting career progression and relationships, increasing the likely 
transferability of the findings. Given that these studies were conducted in 
the Middle East, it may be that these issues are related to the culture, 
although issues around emotions have also been identified in the US, 
Australia and the UK (7-9, 11-15). Furthermore, many healthcare 
professionals working in Qatar and the UAE are expatriate. 
Relevant BCTs for those determinants identified during analysis of the 
qualitative data are given in Table 5.5.  
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Table 5-5: Mapping of relevant BCTs for optimising medication error 
reporting and description of BCTs (adapted from 34, 35) 
Relevant behaviour 
change techniques 
(BCTs) for domains of 
beliefs of consequences 
and emotions 
 
Description of application of these BCTs to 
medication error reporting interventions 
Beliefs of consequences 
 
1. Emotional 
consequences 
 
Prompt assessment of feelings after reporting a 
medication error 
2. Anticipated regret 
Induce or raise awareness of expectations of 
future regret about not reporting a medication 
error  
3. Social and 
environmental 
consequences 
 
Provide information (e.g. written, verbal, visual) 
about social and environmental consequences of 
reporting a medication error 
4. Comparative imaging of 
future outcomes 
Prompt or advise the imagining and comparing of 
future outcomes of reporting v not reporting a 
medication error 
5. Vicarious consequences 
 
Prompt observation of the consequences for 
others when report a medication error  
Emotions 
 
 
1. Reduce negative 
emotions 
Advise on ways of reducing negative emotions to 
facilitate reporting a medication error (includes 
‘stress 
management’) 
 
2. Emotional 
consequences 
Prompt assessment of feelings after reporting a 
medication error 
 
3. Social support 
(emotional) 
Advise on, arrange or provide emotional social 
support (e.g. from colleagues, ‘buddies’ or staff) 
for reporting a medication error  
 
 
Interventions based upon these determinants of behaviour are much more 
complex to develop and implement effectively compared determinants of 
knowledge and skills that can be effected by education and training (34, 
35). Interventions should be co-developed with representatives of those 
who will deliver and receive the intervention. Although behaviour change 
focuses on the individual, commitment will be required at all levels of the 
organisation from policy makers, leaders and managers to all healthcare 
professionals and support workers. This is key within any organisation 
which operates a positive safety culture, defined as being ‘founded on 
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mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by 
confidence in the efficacy of preventive measure’ (36). It is noteworthy 
that one qualitative theme identified was the perception of a lack of a fair 
blame culture within the organisation hence the commitment at all levels 
of the organisation needs to be very obvious to all. 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In terms of medication error causality, specific TDF determinants 
highlighted issues of social/professional role and identity, emotions, and 
environmental context and resources. Further attention on these issues at 
strategic and policy levels is required. Qualitative findings highlighted 
particular concerns around fear and worry; likely investigation follow 
reporting; impact on evaluation and appraisal processes; that reporting an 
error committed by a colleague would damage professional relationships; 
and that reports were not always handled in a confidential manner. These 
results can be used to develop theoretically informed interventions with 
the aims of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the medication 
reporting systems impacting patient safety.
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Chapter 6 : Discussion and 
Conclusion  
 
6.1 Aims and key findings   
 
The overall aim of this research was to explore medication error causality 
and reporting in Qatar. The research was conducted in three phases, each 
with aims and key findings as described below. The methodological 
approach in this doctoral research is best described as ‘multimodal’, 
combining different methodologies appropriate to specific research 
outcomes. (52,53) 
Phase 1 aimed to aimed to critically appraise, synthesise and present the 
available evidence on the incidence/prevalence, nature and causes of 
medication errors amongst hospitalised patients in Middle Eastern 
countries. This PROSPERO registered systematic review identified 50 
papers meeting all search criteria. Thirty-two studies quantified errors; 
definitions of ‘medication error’ were inconsistent as were approaches to 
data collection, severity assessment, outcome measures and analysis. Of 
13 studies reporting medication errors per ‘total number of medication 
orders’/ ‘number of prescriptions’, the median across all studies was 10% 
(IQR 2-35). Twenty-four studies reported contributory factors leading to 
errors. Synthesis according to Reason’s model identified the most 
common being: active failures, largely slips, lapses and mistakes; error 
provoking conditions, particularly lack of knowledge and insufficient 
staffing levels; and latent conditions, commonly heavy workload. The 
review also identified a lack of primary research originating from Qatar.  
Phase 2 aimed to collate data recorded in medication error reports this 
allowing estimation of incidence of medication errors, their nature and 
severity, and causative factors. All medication error reports submitted by 
a health professional during a three-month period of January 2015 were 
extracted for quantitative and free-text data. The estimated incidence of 
medication errors in HMC was 0.44 per 1,000 medication orders. Almost 
all reports were submitted by pharmacists for prescribing errors which 
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were largely wrong dose or wrong frequency errors relating to anti-
infectives or neurological medications. Most errors were considered by the 
reporter to be minor in nature. According to Reason’s Accident Causality 
Model, the vast majority were considered as active failures (slips, lapses, 
mistakes and violations). One further finding was the lack of detail 
recorded which compromised the extent of analysis, and notably a 
behavioural change theoretical framework could not be applied.  
Phase 3 aimed to explore the perspectives of health professionals on 
issues of medication error causes and contributory factors, and error 
reporting. This was a qualitative, interpretative phenomenological 
methodology of 54 health professionals across nine focus groups. 
Reason’s Accident Causation Model and TDF were used in the 
development of the topic guide and in analysis. Findings highlighted 
experiences of errors across all of the sub-types of Reason’s Accident 
Causation Model. During focus group discussions, specific TDF 
determinants suggested as being potentially associated with these errors 
were: social/professional role and identity; emotions; and environmental 
context and resources. Discussions on issues of medication error reporting 
identified several facilitators and barriers. The TDF domain of emotions 
featured heavily, with several key themes emerging as barriers to 
reporting, most notably fear and worry, likely investigation follow 
reporting and impact on evaluation and appraisal processes.  
The findings of all three phases are relevant to the concepts of 
‘organisational safety culture’ and ‘safety culture’, with the focus on 
individual values,  perceptions, and behaviours.  
6.2 Originality of the research 
 
This doctoral research has generated original findings which extend the 
knowledge base around medication error causality and reporting, with 
potential to impact professional practice, and patient care and safety.  
The phase one systematic review protocol was registered with and 
published by PROSPERO, and the systematic review itself published in the 
European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology. The approach to data 
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synthesis by applying Reason’s Model of Accident Causation was also 
original. Phases two and three were conducted in Qatar, generating 
original data in this setting. The systematic review itself added to the 
limited published studies investigating causality according to Reason’s 
model. Phase three also adds to the very limited evidence base of 
applying a behavioural change theoretical framework to explore 
medication error casuality and reporting. The findings contributed to two 
papers published in PLOS ONE.  
Strengths and weaknesses of the research have been highlighted 
throughout the preceding chapters. One key strength is the multimodal 
approach to the research comprising systematic review, quantitative 
research and qualitative research providing comprehensive coverage of 
the research field under investigation. Unlike mixed method this is not 
restricted to combining qualitative and quantitative methods to study a 
single problem, perhaps open to a range of best possible methodological 
combinations. (51,52) 
6.3 Implications of research  
 
6.3.1 Standardising terminology 
 
Several systematic reviews have highlighted the issues of inconsistencies 
in methodological approaches in studies of medication errors, and also in 
the specific outcomes and reporting of those outcomes.(6,29,30,37) 
These inconsistencies have major implications for systematic review and 
meta-analyses, greatly limiting the potential for data pooling thus 
reducing the available levels of evidence. The systematic review presented 
in Chapter 3 provides adds weight to the argument for standardisation. 
There were many inconsistencies in terms of  
• Definition of ‘medication error’ and subcategories of error 
• Approaches to data collection and duration of data collection 
• Reporting of errors and denominators used 
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In addition, the data presented in Chapter 4 collating data from 
medication error reports in HMC highlighted the poor completion of the 
error documentation. Even when the documentation variables were all 
completed, the specific detail of the errors were often lacking. These 
issues greatly reduce the usefulness of any report in achieving the goal of 
reporting articulated by NCCMERP, to ‘stimulate the review and analysis of 
error reports leading to the development of recommendations to reduce, 
and ultimately prevent, errors’. (19) 
Standardisation of research approaches, outcomes measures and 
reporting would also contribute to achieving the aspirations of ‘Medication 
Without Harm, WHO Global Patient Safety Challenge’. As described in 
Chapter 1, this report calls for action to reduce patient harm which occurs 
as a result of medication errors. (2) Having valid and reliable data will 
provide a baseline from which to measure any improvement and 
standardisation will also facilitate from generalizing and transferring 
developments from other settings. Standardisation should also be 
relatively straightforward using technology-based solutions and training. 
6.3.2 Intervention development 
 
While accepting the study limitations discussed in Chapters 3-5, the 
findings of this study will contribute to the development of interventions to 
improve stages of the medication use processes. The findings can be used 
to facilitate the development of interventions to improve the processes of 
prescribing, dispensing, administering, and monitoring. The findings from 
this study will also lead to review and amendment of HMC’s medication 
error reporting policy and practice.   
 
Interventions developed and implemented with the aim of reducing 
medication errors and enhancing medication error reporting would be 
classified as ‘complex’ interventions. Such interventions are defined by the 
UK Medical Research Council (MRC) framework as ‘interventions with 
several interacting components’. (67) Dimensions of complexity can be 
multiple, including the: 
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✓ number of and interactions between components within the 
experimental and control interventions 
✓ number and difficulty of behaviours required by those delivering 
or receiving the intervention 
✓ number of groups or organisational levels targeted by the 
intervention 
✓ number and variability of outcomes 
✓ degree of flexibility or tailoring of the intervention permitted. 
 
According to the MRC framework, there are four cyclical stages, as 
outlined in Figure 6.1.  
 
 
Figure 6-1 : The MRC framework relating to complex interventions  
 
This doctoral research aligns to the development stage as follows 
• the narrative review presented in Chapter 1 and the systematic 
review presented in Chapter 3 contribute to identifying the evidence 
base 
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• the study of medication error reports presented in Chapter 4 
identified the need for further research 
• error theory and behavioural change theory were considered 
throughout the research 
• aspects of error causation were identified in Chapters 4 and 5 
• the use of TDF as a theoretical behavioural change framework 
allowed identification of the key determinants of behaviour (i.e. 
error causation and suboptimal error reporting) to serve as targets 
for modelling the intervention 
• the consideration of BCTs in Chapter 5 could form the basis of the 
specific interventions. 
 Application of Reason’s Error Causation Model in Chapters 4 and 5 
identified that most were ‘active failures’, with a minority ‘latent failures’ 
or ‘error producing conditions’.(63,64) This is highly relevant to 
intervention development given that these latter two categories occur as a 
result of factors such as time pressure, understaffing, inadequate 
equipment and decisions made by policy makers, leaders and top-level 
management. Such factors are outwith the control of the individual health 
professional thus cannot be modified by BCTs.  
The application of TDF in Chapter 5 relating to error causation identified 
issues of knowledge and skills around medication. As discussed, while 
these can be supported through education, training and support by clinical 
pharmacists, there are capacity and resource implications. The other TDF 
domains identified, namely social/ professional role and identify, emotions 
and environmental context and resources are related to organisational 
safety culture, as defined by ‘Study Group on Human Factors’.(158) 
Mapping BCTs to these domains is not straightforward, as altering aspects 
of social/ professional role and identity and environmental context and 
resources are more complex. Notably, there are no evidence-based BCTs 
mapped to social/professional role and identity. (160,161) As discussed, 
intervention may be required at the organisational strategic level to 
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review policies, structures (including resource allocation and distribution) 
and processes.  
In terms of medication error reporting, the key determinants of 
suboptimal reporting were beliefs of consequences and emotions. These 
are related to each other with worry being most likely related to the 
potential consequence of reprimand, affecting reputation and career 
progression. BCTs mapped to these domains could provide the basis for a 
complex intervention, which could then be tested through the 
feasibility/piloting and evaluation stages of MRC prior to implementation 
at scale.  
As noted earlier, commitment is also required from policy makers, leaders 
and managers, particularly within a framework of positive safety culture, 
defined as being ‘founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive 
measure’.  
6.4 Further research  
 
Further research should focus on these further MRC stages, using the 
intervention constructed in the development stage, as follows  
Study 1 – feasibility 
Aim – to explore health professionals’ perspectives of planned complex 
interventions which aim to reduce medication error causation and optimise 
medication error reporting.  
Methodology and method - A qualitative methodology will provide rich 
data with a focus group method of purposively selected health 
professionals. Those include should represent different professions, clinical 
specialties and levels of seniority, including leaders and policy makers. 
Outcome measures – perspectives of the feasibility, applicability, likely 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the interventions. Findings will be 
used to modify the interventions.  
Study 2 – piloting 
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The interventions will be piloted in selected, high medication-risk clinical 
areas. 
Aim – to test the likely effectiveness of the intervention on a small scale 
and explore the experiences of those involved 
Methodology and method – a quantitative before and after methodology. 
It should be noted that this is a pilot study hence is not powered for any 
specific outcome measures. The intention is to test the interventions in 
the clinical, real world settings. There will also be a qualitative phase of 
focus groups of purposively sampled health professionals who have 
experienced the intervention. 
Outcome measures – the outcome measures for the quantitative phase 
will determined around the specific interventions, centring on the 
structures and processes related to the intervention. If baseline data is 
not routinely recorded as part of clinical practice, there may need to be a 
baseline period of data collection. Likely data to be collected relating to 
medication error reporting will be the number of reports, the 
completeness of the report and the level of detail recorded. The 
qualitative phase will focus on the real-life experiences of those involved 
in the intervention (i.e. the health professionals).  
If both feasibility and piloting indicate that the interventions are 
appropriate, then these will proceed to the stages of evaluation, with fully 
powered sample sizes and qualitative components prior to large sale 
implementation. If not successful then the intervention will be modified 
accordingly.  
6.5 Impact of research  
 
Research Councils UK (RCUK) defines research impact as 'the 
demonstrable contribution that excellent research makes to society and 
the economy'. This research has potential to impact at several different 
levels, as described below. 
 
 178 
 
6.5.1 Academic impact 
 
Conducting this research has impacted the doctoral student, the members 
of the supervisory and advisory teams and the university. Presentation of 
the findings at national and international conferences and publication in 
peer-reviewed journals has added to the knowledge and evidence base 
around theoretically informed medication error causality and reporting 
research. While it is accepted that not all (or many) health professionals, 
policy makers or patients will attend conferences or read academic 
papers, efforts have been made to present the research throughout HMC 
to raise awareness at all levels. 
6.5.2 The healthcare organisation 
 
Chapter 1 While the research presented in the earlier chapters has 
focused on the MRC development phase, the specific findings will 
encourage the healthcare organisation to reflect and review policies, 
structures and processes as they relate to safe and effective medication 
use and medication error reporting. Patient care and safety and 
professional practice will be improved leading to the attainment of key 
organisational goals and those articulated by the WHO. Furthermore, the 
overall safety culture of the organisation will be enhanced.  
6.5.3 Health professionals 
 
Similar to the organisation, the research will impact health professionals 
through raising awareness, stimulating reflection and review of practice 
and through the implementation of any interventions. It is important that 
these interventions are delivered in such a manner that health 
professionals feel ‘safe’ in reporting errors and that these are considered 
within a framework of a ‘just and fair’ culture. This is particularly relevant 
given the behavioural determinants of beliefs of consequences and 
emotions which impacted suboptimal medication error reporting.  
6.5.4 Patients 
 
The most important impact should be in terms of enhanced patient care 
and patient safety. There is potential for this the findings of this doctoral 
 179 
 
research to translate to practice with real and measurable benefits for 
patients.  
6.6  Conclusion 
 
This doctoral research has generated original findings in relation to issues 
of medication error causality and medication error. The research has 
resulted in several peer-reviewed publications. The conclusions are as 
follows 
• the medication error research within the Middle East (and beyond) 
requires standardization and improved reporting in peer-reviewed 
publications 
• medication errors remain highly prevalent, with issues of active 
failures being highly relevant 
• there is a need to improve the quality of medication error reporting 
to enhance their usefulness and potential to impact professional 
practice and patient care 
• there is a need to enhance the engagement of all health 
professionals in medication error reporting 
• for error causality, specific attention should be paid to 
determinants of social/professional role and identity; emotions; 
and environmental context and resources 
• key barriers to medication error reporting were related to 
determinants of beliefs of consequences and emotions.  
These original findings can be used in the development of interventions 
with potential to impact organisational safety culture, professional practice 
and patient care. These findings align to the aspirations of the WHO.  
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Appendix 5: Focus Group Topic Guide 
 
 
 
Case Vignette1 
 
Hyperkalemia can cause altered cardiac electrical conduction resulting 
in death. We describe a case of a 23-year old pregnant patient who 
presented with severe epigastric pain and vomiting. She was severely 
pre- eclamptic and received initial treatment with intravenous labetalol 
and decision was taken to deliver. She quickly became hyperkalaemic 
(serum potassium level 6.4 mmol/L) and labetalol was discontinued, 
and intravenous hydralazine commenced. Post-surgery, her potassium 
levels were normal but due to rapidly rising blood pressure labetalol 
was recommenced, resulting in elevated potassium levels. Labetolol 
was discontinued, hydralazine prescribed, and potassium levels 
normalised. The adverse reaction was classified as 'probably' due to 
labetolol using the Naranjo Adverse Drug Reaction scale. Conclusion: 
This is the first reported case of labetolol induced hyperkalaemia in 
pregnancy, with life threatening consequences and hence all health 
professionals should be alert to this potential effect. 
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Case Vignette 2 
 
We report a case of 22-year-old primigravida presented to Women’s 
Hospital – Hamad Medical Corporation emergency with severe 
epigastric pain, nausea, and vomiting. On admission, she was 
dehydrated with remarkably worsening symptoms. Laboratory findings 
revealed significantly elevated liver enzymes with unknown etiology. 
Her past medical history showed an admission for nausea and vomiting 
3 weeks previously and she was discharged on antiemetics, and 
esomeprazole for the first time. Due to the predominantly elevated 
liver enzymes, the clinical pharmacist discussed the possibility of 
esomeprazole-induced adverse effects and suggested to suspend 
esomeprazole based on the evidence from literature review. The liver 
enzymes showed a substantial improvement within days after the 
discontinuation of the drug; however, a rechallenge was not done 
since it could have adversely affected the mother or the fetus. Using 
the Naranjo Adverse Drug Reaction Probability scales, the adverse 
reaction due to esomeprazole was classified as “probably”.  
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Case Vignette 3 
 
Unintentional administration of insulin instead of influenza 
vaccine  
 
In 2016, researchers published the results of an investigation where a 
cluster of 5 adult patients unintentionally received insulin instead of 
the influenza vaccine. The mix-up occurred at a public-school clinic in 
Missouri and was discovered following an investigation from the Saint 
Louis County Department of Public Health. Officials learned that a 
school nurse inadvertently administered Humalog U-100 insulin 
instead of the influenza vaccine. Acute hypoglycemia was reported in 
all 5 patients who received the insulin with varying degrees of 
symptoms. 
 
After the first 2 patients complained of sweating and light headedness, 
the nurse reported the incidents to the supervising nurse, but did not 
stop administering vaccines. Two later patients would require 
hospitalization for their symptoms, one of which was documented to 
have a blood glucose level of 23 mg/dL. The investigation revealed 
that the influenza vaccine vial was kept in the nurse’s office 
refrigerator along with a 10 mL vial of Humaog U-100 insulin; they 
were found to not be stored in separate, labeled containers or bins. 
The manufacturer of the influenza vaccine conducted its own analysis 
but found no deviations or manufacturing incidents that would suggest 
a quality control problem. 
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Questions and discussion 
 
• What do you think actually happened? 
• Do you think this could have been prevented? 
• What kind of error is it? And why? 
• Why do you think this has happened?  
• What are the potential contributing factors? 
• Have you seen such errors in your setting? 
• If yes, do you think this should be reported? Why? 
• Do you think reporting of medication errors is useful? 
• What happens if we don’t report such errors? 
• What happens if you report? Are there any consequences to such 
reporting? 
• Do you know anything about blame-free culture? Just culture? 
• Do you know how to report a medication error in your facility? 
• Have you ever reported any such errors? 
• If yes, what was the feedback you have received after you report? 
• What are the key barriers to reporting medication errors? 
• What is that prompts you or guides you to report errors? 
• Do you think you are appreciated for reporting such errors? 
 
 
